Paul B. Spiegel

Prof. Paul B. Spiegel


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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16 June 2020 in PLOS Medicine
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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STShaun Truelove
Shaun Truelove
OAOrit Abrahim
Orit Abrahim
CAChiara Altare
Chiara Altare
SLStephen A Lauer
Stephen A Lauer
KGKrya H Grantz
Krya H Grantz
PSPaul B. Spiegel
Paul B. Spiegel
COVID-19 could have even more dire consequences in refugees camps than in general populations. Bangladesh has confirmed COVID-19 cases and hosts almost 1 million Rohingya refugees from Myanmar, with 600,000 concentrated in the Kutupalong-Balukhali Expansion Site (mean age, 21 years; standard deviation [SD], 18 years; 52% female). Projections of the potential COVID-19 burden, epidemic speed, and healthcare needs in such settings are critical for preparedness planning. To explore the potential impact of the introduction of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in the Kutupalong-Balukhali Expansion Site, we used a stochastic Susceptible Exposed Infectious Recovered (SEIR) transmission model with parameters derived from emerging literature and age as the primary determinant of infection severity. We considered three scenarios with different assumptions about the transmission potential of SARS-CoV-2. From the simulated infections, we estimated hospitalizations, deaths, and healthcare needs expected, age-adjusted for the Kutupalong-Balukhali Expansion Site age distribution. Our findings suggest that a large-scale outbreak is likely after a single introduction of the virus into the camp, with 61%–92% of simulations leading to at least 1,000 people infected across scenarios. On average, in the first 30 days of the outbreak, we expect 18 (95% prediction interval [PI], 2–65), 54 (95% PI, 3–223), and 370 (95% PI, 4–1,850) people infected in the low, moderate, and high transmission scenarios, respectively. These reach 421,500 (95% PI, 376,300–463,500), 546,800 (95% PI, 499,300–567,000), and 589,800 (95% PI, 578,800–595,600) people infected in 12 months, respectively. Hospitalization needs exceeded the existing hospitalization capacity of 340 beds after 55–136 days, between the low and high transmission scenarios. We estimate 2,040 (95% PI, 1,660–2,500), 2,650 (95% PI, 2,030–3,380), and 2,880 (95% PI, 2,090–3,830) deaths in the low, moderate, and high transmission scenarios, respectively. Due to limited data at the time of analyses, we assumed that age was the primary determinant of infection severity and hospitalization. We expect that comorbidities, limited hospitalization, and intensive care capacity may increase this risk; thus, we may be underestimating the potential burden. Our findings suggest that a COVID-19 epidemic in a refugee settlement may have profound consequences, requiring large increases in healthcare capacity and infrastructure that may exceed what is currently feasible in these settings. Detailed and realistic planning for the worst case in Kutupalong-Balukhali and all refugee camps worldwide must begin now. Plans should consider novel and radical strategies to reduce infectious contacts and fill health worker gaps while recognizing that refugees may not have access to national health systems.


15 July 2019 in BMJ Global Health
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
PSPaul B. Spiegel
Paul B. Spiegel
RRRuwan Ratnayake
Ruwan Ratnayake
NHNora Hellman
Nora Hellman
MVMija Ververs
Mija Ververs
MNMoise Ngwa
Moise Ngwa
DLDaniele Lantagne
Daniele Lantagne
Background Large epidemics frequently emerge in conflict-affected states. We examined the cholera response during the humanitarian crisis in Yemen to inform control strategies. Methods We conducted interviews with practitioners and advisors on preparedness; surveillance; laboratory; case management; malnutrition; water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH); vaccination; coordination and insecurity. We undertook a literature review of global and Yemen-specific cholera guidance, examined surveillance data from the first and second waves (28 September 2016–12 March 2018) and reviewed reports on airstrikes on water systems and health facilities (April 2015–December 2017). We used the Global Task Force on Cholera Control’s framework to examine intervention strategies and thematic analysis to understand decision making. Results Yemen is water scarce, and repeated airstrikes damaged water systems, risking widespread infection. Since a cholera preparedness and response plan was absent, on detection, the humanitarian cluster system rapidly developed response plans. The initial plans did not prioritise key actions including community-directed WASH to reduce transmission, epidemiological analysis and laboratory monitoring. Coordination was not harmonised across the crisis-focused clusters and epidemic-focused incident management system. The health strategy was crisis focused and was centralised on functional health facilities, underemphasising less accessible areas. As vaccination was not incorporated into preparedness, consensus on its use remained slow. At the second wave peak, key actions including data management, community-directed WASH and oral rehydration and vaccination were scaled-up. Conclusion Despite endemicity and conflict, Yemen was not prepared for the epidemic. To contain outbreaks, conflict-affected states, humanitarian agencies, and donors must emphasise preparedness planning and community-directed responses.

12 June 2023 in Conflict and Health
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
NGNancy Glass
Nancy Glass
RJRabia Jalalzai
Rabia Jalalzai
PSPaul B. Spiegel
Paul B. Spiegel
LRLeonard Rubenstein
Leonard Rubenstein
Background: The Taliban takeover in August 2021 brought global economic sanctions, economic collapse, and draconian restrictions on women’s freedom of movement, work, political participation, and education. This study examined Afghan health workers’ experiences and perceptions of availability and quality of maternal and child health care since then. Methods: We conducted a survey, using a convenience sample, of health workers from urban, semi-rural, and rural public and private clinics and hospitals across the 34 provinces, covering changes in working conditions, safety, health care access and quality, maternal and infant mortality as well as perceptions about the future of maternal and child health and health care. Interviews were conducted with a subsample of health workers to further explore their perceptions of changes in working conditions, quality of care, and health outcomes since the Taliban takeover. Results: 131 Afghan practicing health care workers completed the survey. The majority were women (80%) working in facilities located in urban areas. Most female health workers (73.3%) reported that they have not always been safe when going to and from work; 81% because of harassment by the Taliban when they did not have male accompaniment. Almost half of the respondents (42.9%) reported a decrease in availability of maternal and child care and 43.8% stated that conditions for providing care were “worse” or “much worse” than before. Almost one-third (30.2%) indicated that changed working conditions negatively impacted their ability to provide quality care, and 26.2% reported an increase in obstetric and newborn complications. Health workers also reported (38.1% )an increase in sick child needs and an increase in child malnutrition (57.1%0. 57.1% reported decreases in work attendance and 78.6% a decrease in morale and motivation. Qualitative interviews (n = 10) of a subsample of survey participants expanded on these findings. Conclusion: The combination of economic collapse, lack of sustained donor support for health care and Taliban interference with human rights has severely compromised access and quality of maternal and child health care. Strong and concerted international pressure on the Taliban to respect women and children rights to essential health service is critical for the future of the Afghan population.

1 May 2020 in The Lancet Oncology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PSPaul B. Spiegel
Paul B. Spiegel
JCJoseph G Cheaib
Joseph G Cheaib
SASaad Abdel Aziz
Saad Abdel Aziz
OAOrit Abrahim
Orit Abrahim
MWMichael Woodman
Michael Woodman
FMFarrah J Mateen
Farrah J Mateen

21 February 2023 in The Lancet
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PSPaul B. Spiegel
Paul B. Spiegel
PKPavlo Kovtoniuk
Pavlo Kovtoniuk
KLKatarzyna Lewtak
Katarzyna Lewtak