Muyoung Cheong

Ms. Muyoung Cheong

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
9 December 2024 in Expert Systems with Applications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SASaleh Alabdulwahab
Saleh Alabdulwahab
MCMuyoung Cheong
Muyoung Cheong
ASAria Seo
Aria Seo
YKYoung-Tak Kim
Young-Tak Kim
YSYunsik Son
Yunsik Son

20 June 2025 in Applied Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SPSeungun Park
Seungun Park
ASAria Seo
Aria Seo
MCMuyoung Cheong
Muyoung Cheong
HKHyunsu Kim
Hyunsu Kim
JKJaeCheol Kim
JaeCheol Kim
YSYunsik Son
Yunsik Son
(1) Background: Side-channel attacks (SCAs) exploit unintended information leakage to compromise cryptographic security. In cyber-physical systems (CPSs), embedded systems are inherently constrained by limited resources, restricting the implementation of complex countermeasures. Traditional countermeasures, such as hiding techniques, attempt to obscure power consumption patterns; however, their effectiveness has been increasingly challenged. This study evaluates the vulnerability of dummy power traces against deep learning-based SCAs (DL-SCAs). (2) Methods: A power trace dataset was generated using a simulation environment based on Quick Emulator (QEMU) and GNU Debugger (GDB), integrating dummy traces to obfuscate execution signatures. DL models, including a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN), a Bidirectional RNN (Bi-RNN), and a Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP), were used to evaluate classification performance. (3) Results: The models trained with dummy traces achieved high classification accuracy, with the MLP model reaching 97.81% accuracy and an F1-score of 97.77%. Despite the added complexity, DL models effectively distinguished real and dummy traces, highlighting limitations in existing hiding techniques. (4) Conclusions: These findings highlight the need for adaptive countermeasures against DL-SCAs. Future research should explore dynamic obfuscation techniques, adversarial training, and comprehensive evaluations of broader cryptographic algorithms. This study underscores the urgency of evolving security paradigms to defend against artificial intelligence-powered attacks.

15 May 2025 in Preprints.org
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
SPSeungun Park
Seungun Park
ASAria Seo
Aria Seo
MCMuyoung Cheong
Muyoung Cheong
HKHyunsu Kim
Hyunsu Kim
JKJaeCheol Kim
JaeCheol Kim
YSYunsik Son
Yunsik Son
(1) Background: Side-channel attacks (SCAs) exploit unintended information leakage to compromise cryptographic security. In cyber-physical systems (CPSs), embedded systems are inherently constrained by limited resources, which restricts the implementation of complex countermeasures. Traditional countermeasures such as hiding techniques attempt to obscure power consumption patterns, but deep learning models have challenged their effectiveness. This study evaluates the vulnerability of dummy power traces against deep learning-based SCAs. (2) Methods: A power trace dataset was generated using a QEMU and GDB-based simulation environment, integrating dummy traces to obfuscate execution signatures. Deep learning models—RNN, Bi-RNN, and MLP—were employed to assess classification accuracy. (3) Results: The models trained with dummy traces achieved higher classification accuracy, with the MLP model reaching 97.81% accuracy and an F1-score of 97.77%. Despite the added complexity, deep learning models effectively distinguished real and dummy traces, revealing limitations in existing hiding techniques. (4) Conclusions: These findings highlight the need for adaptive countermeasures against AI-driven SCAs. Future research should explore dynamic obfuscation techniques, adversarial training, and broader cryptographic algorithm evaluations. This study underscores the urgency of evolving security paradigms to counteract AI-powered attacks.