Since its transition to democracy, South Africa has implemented a multifaceted programme of land reform to address problems of historical dispossession and rural poverty, relying heavily on the concept of ‘willing buyer, willing seller’. This version of market-led agrarian reform has been influenced by the World Bank but enjoys support from landowners and elements within the ruling African National Congress committed to maintaining the structure of large-scale, capital-intensive farming. Central to the South African approach is the voluntary acquisition of land, but also important have been the methods of beneficiary selection, of farm planning and of post-settlement support, all of which have been influenced by the market-led approach and serve to discriminate against the very poor. The rate of land transfer remains far below official targets and the limited available evidence suggests that, where land has been transferred, it has made little positive impact on livelihoods or on the wider rural economy. Key to understanding the slow pace of reform is the lack of mobilisation and militancy among the rural poor and landless, who to date have had minimal influence over the design and implementation of the land reform programme.

Market-led agrarian reform ( mlar ) has gained prominence worldwide since the early 1990s as an alternative to the state-led approaches widely implemented over the course of the 20th century. This neoliberal policy framework advocates voluntary transactions between ‘willing sellers’ and ‘willing buyers’ and the removal of various ‘distortions’ from land and agricultural markets. Related policies aim to secure and formalise private property rights. Emerging evidence from across the developing world suggests that such policies are incapable of challenging the political and economic power of large landowners and are unlikely to meet the land needs of the rural poor and landless. In key areas such as land transfer, farmer development and programme financing, mlar is shown to be falling far short of its objectives. Meanwhile, it is being actively challenged by national and international peasant movements that are calling for more direct intervention by the state in order to restructure patterns of landholding and provide the necessary support for small-scale farmers, many of whom produce primarily for their own consumption. The future of agrarian reform, it is argued, lies not in a return to the top-down, statist models of the past but in new forms of partnerships between progressive political forces and peasant movements that go beyond the confines of the market to redistribute land and create sustainable livelihood opportunities for the rural poor and landless.

This study analyzes cattle farmers’ perceptions of risk and risk management strategies in Tigray, Northern Ethiopia. We use survey data from a sample of 356 farmers based on multistage random sampling. Factor analysis is employed to classify scores of risk and management strategies, and multiple regression is then used to investigate the relationship between scores and farmers’ characteristics. The results demonstrate that shortage of family labor, high price of fodder, and limited farm income were perceived as the most important risks. Use of veterinary services, parasite control, and loan utilization were perceived as the most important strategies for managing risks. Livestock disease and labor shortage were perceived as less of a risk by farmers who adopted the practice of zero grazing compared to other farmers, pointing to the potential of this practice for risk reduction. We find strong evidence that farmers engage in multiple risk management practices in order to reduce losses from cattle morbidity and mortality. The results suggest that government strategies that aim at reducing farmers’ risk need to be tailored to specific farm and farmer characteristics. Findings from this study have potentially important policy implications for risk management strategies in developing countries.