A startling population health phenomenon has been unfolding since the turn of the 21st century. Whites in the United States, who customarily have the most favorable mortality profile of all racial groups, have experienced rising mortality rates, without a commensurate rise in other racial groups. The two leading hypotheses to date are that either contemporaneous economic conditions or longer-term (post-1970s) economic transformations have led to declining economic and social prospects of low-educated whites, culminating in "deaths of despair." We re-examine these hypotheses and investigate a third hypothesis: mortality increases are attributable to (false) perceptions of whites that they are losing social status. Using administrative and survey data, we examined trends and correlations between race-, age- and, education-specific mortality and a range of economic and social indicators. We also conducted a county-level fixed effects model to determine whether changes in the Republican share of voters during presidential elections, as a marker of growing perceptions of social status threat, was associated with changes in working-age white mortality from 2000 to 2016, adjusting for demographic and economic covariates. Rising white mortality is not restricted to the lowest education bracket and is occurring deeper into the educational distribution. Neither short-term nor long-term economic factors can themselves account for rising white mortality, because parallel trends (and more adverse levels) of these factors were being experienced by blacks, whose mortality rates are not rising. Instead, perceptions - misperceptions - of whites that their social status is being threatened by their declining economic circumstances seems best able to reconcile the observed population health patterns. Rising white mortality in the United States is not explained by traditional social and economic population health indicators, but instead by a perceived decline in relative group status on the part of whites - despite no actual loss in relative group position.

There have been decades of research on wage gaps for groups based on their socially salient identities, such as race and gender, but little empirical investigation on the effects of holding multiple identities. Using the Current Population Survey, this study provides new evidence on intersectionality and the wage gap in the US. This article makes two important contributions. First, there is no single “gender” or “race” wage penalty. Second, the evidence suggests that holding multiple identities cannot readily be disaggregated in an additive fashion. Instead, in a comparison of Black and White workers across gender, this study documents that the penalties associated with the combination of two or more socially marginalized identities interact in multiplicative or quantitatively nuanced ways. Further, the findings demonstrate that the presence of an additional intersectional penalty for Black women persists across time. HIGHLIGHTS

Poverty in the United States, one of the world's most wealthy and prosperous nations, is persistently high. Despite a complex array of social insurance prog...

A convention, particularly in economics and sociology, for empirical identification of the “middle class” has been to mark off a segment of the population above a lower bound with respect to income, occupational status, and/or educational attainment. Instead, we argue here that wealth constitutes a superior standard for demarcation of the middle class. Wealth is an especially useful standard for identification of the middle class from subaltern communities, communities that have a generally marginalized status. We illustrate the value of the wealth criteria by examining the specific case of America's Black middle class. This alternative approach enables us to demonstrate that the Black middle class is proportionately much smaller than the White middle class and to demonstrate the limitations of several proposals recently advanced to close the racial wealth gap.