This paper investigates the coordination of dual-channel supply chain under quality control with a loss-averse manufacturer and a loss-averse retailer. Facing various uncertain factors, supply chain members tend to show loss aversion, which makes their actual decision deviate from the optimal decision without considering loss aversion. Therefore, the loss aversion effect function is applied to characterize the loss aversion of members. Besides, under quality control, utility model is constructed under centralized decision and decentralized decision, and the optimal decisions are solved according to the principle of utility maximization. Further, by analyzing and comparing the optimal strategies of two typical decision structures, the wholesale price and the quality cost-sharing contract is designed to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain, and the contract is proved to be valid. Finally, the impacts of the parameters change on the optimal quality level and order price are presented through the sensitivity analysis. It is found that quality control strategy and loss aversion degree of supply chain members affect the setting of coordination contract parameters and utility of supply chain. Moreover, the coordination of dual-channel supply chain is conducive to improving the level of product quality and reducing the price difference between channels.

The rapid development of e-commerce has led to a surge in packaging, which poses a significant threat to the environment, especially overpackaging. Studying how to reduce packaging problems in e-commerce is the need for optimal decision-making in supply chains and optimal allocation of resources, and it is also the focus of this paper. Therefore, supply chain coordination considering reduced packaging strategies under consumers' green preferences and green brand and good image is studied. First, a supply chain model with integrated packaging and secondary packaging is established, which can consider consumers' green preferences. Then three models of decentralized decision-making, centralized decision-making and introduction of contract are constructed. Finally, the correctness of the model is verified by numerical analysis, and the influence of different parameters on the model is studied. We find that revenue sharing and cost sharing contracts enable supply chains to achieve coordination while reducing packaging. With the increase of the proportion of consumers with green preferences, especially when the consumers with green preferences in the market exceed the threshold (e.g. about 0.5 in numerical analysis), the strategy of reducing packaging can help the supply chain increase profits.

Fresh agricultural products have significant seasonality and perishability, and their cross-regional sales often face differences in market demand, price, and sales volume. In the context of government quality regulation, competition among retailers in different regions drives supply chain members to improve product quality, expand sales, and reduce losses. However, conflicts of interest under decentralized decision-making may lead to overall inefficiency. This article constructs a supply chain model consisting of a single Manufacturer and two regional Retailers to study the quality competition and coordination mechanism of cross-regional fresh food supply chains under government supervision. By comparing centralized and decentralized decision-making, it is found that although quality improvement in decentralized mode helps enhance competitiveness and sales performance, it is difficult to effectively increase profits and may even lead to a decline in profits. Therefore, this article proposes a cost-sharing contract to achieve supply chain coordination. Research has shown that this contract can effectively improve the overall profit of the supply chain and achieve Pareto improvement; under high market demand and strict regulatory penalties, the total profit of the supply chain increases, but the dominant Retailer benefits more, which can easily trigger the “Matthew effect”. The research results reveal the comprehensive impact of quality investment, contract coordination, market demand fluctuations, and regulatory intensity on supply chain performance, providing theoretical basis and management insights for improving the collaborative efficiency and policy design of cross-regional fresh food supply chains.