Machine learning based solutions have been successfully employed for automatic detection of malware on Android. However, machine learning models lack robustness to adversarial examples, which are crafted by adding carefully chosen perturbations to the normal inputs. So far, the adversarial examples can only deceive detectors that rely on syntactic features (e.g., requested permissions, API calls, etc.), and the perturbations can only be implemented by simply modifying application’s manifest. While recent Android malware detectors rely more on semantic features from Dalvik bytecode rather than manifest, existing attacking/defending methods are no longer effective. In this paper, we introduce a new attacking method that generates adversarial examples of Android malware and evades being detected by the current models. To this end, we propose a method of applying optimal perturbations onto Android APK that can successfully deceive the machine learning detectors. We develop an automated tool to generate the adversarial examples without human intervention. In contrast to existing works, the adversarial examples crafted by our method can also deceive recent machine learning based detectors that rely on semantic features such as control-flow-graph. The perturbations can also be implemented directly onto APK’s Dalvik bytecode rather than Android manifest to evade from recent detectors. We demonstrate our attack on two state-of-the-art Android malware detection schemes, MaMaDroid and Drebin. Our results show that the malware detection rates decreased from 96% to 0% in MaMaDroid, and from 97% to 0% in Drebin, with just a small number of codes to be inserted into the APK.

Machine learning (ML) has been widely used for malware detection on different operating systems, including Android. To keep up with malware's evolution, the detection models usually need to be retrained periodically (e.g., every month) based on the data collected in the wild. However, this leads to poisoning attacks, specifically backdoor attacks, which subvert the learning process and create evasion tunnels for manipulated malware samples. To date, we have not found any prior research that explored this critical problem in Android malware detectors. In this paper, we are motivated to study the backdoor attack against Android malware detectors. The backdoor is created and injected into the model stealthily without access to the training data and activated when an app with the trigger is presented. We demonstrate the proposed attack on four typical malware detectors that have been widely discussed in academia. Our evaluation shows that the proposed backdoor attack achieves up to 99% evasion rate over 750 malware samples. Moreover, the above successful attack is realised by a small size of triggers (only four features) and a very low data poisoning rate (0.3%).

When mobile meets LLMs, mobile app users deserve to have more intelligent usage experiences. For this to happen, we argue that there is a strong need to apply LLMs for the mobile ecosystem. We therefore provide a research roadmap for guiding our fellow researchers to achieve that as a whole. In this roadmap, we sum up six directions that we believe are urgently required for research to enable native intelligence in mobile devices. In each direction, we further summarize the current research progress and the gaps that still need to be filled by our fellow researchers.

Security of Android devices is now paramount, given their wide adoption among consumers. As researchers develop tools for statically or dynamically detecting suspicious apps, malware writers regularly update their attack mechanisms to hide malicious behavior implementation. This poses two problems to current research techniques: static analysis approaches, given their over-approximations, can report an overwhelming number of false alarms, while dynamic approaches will miss those behaviors that are hidden through evasion techniques. We propose in this work a static approach specifically targeted at highlighting hidden sensitive operations (HSOs), mainly sensitive data flows. The prototype version of HiSenDroid has been evaluated on a large-scale dataset of thousands of malware and goodware samples on which it successfully revealed anti-analysis code snippets aiming at evading detection by dynamic analysis. We further experimentally show that, with FlowDroid, some of the hidden sensitive behaviors would eventually lead to private data leaks. Those leaks would have been hard to spot either manually among the large number of false positives reported by the state-of-the-art static analyzers, or by dynamic tools. Overall, by putting the light on hidden sensitive operations, HiSenDroid helps security analysts in validating potentially sensitive data operations, which would be previously unnoticed.

Mobile apps are ubiquitous in our daily lives for supporting different tasks such as reading and chatting. Despite the availability of many GUI testing tools, app testers still struggle with low testing code coverage due to tools frequently getting stuck in loops or overlooking activities with concealed entries. This results in a significant amount of testing time being spent on redundant and repetitive exploration of a few GUI pages. To address this, we utilize Android’s deep links, which assist in triggering Android intents to lead users to specific pages and introduce a deep link-enhanced exploration method. This approach, integrated into the testing tool Monkey, gives rise to Delm (Deep Link-enhanced Monkey). Delm oversees the dynamic exploration process, guiding the tool out of meaningless testing loops to unexplored GUI pages. We provide a rigorous activity context mock-up approach for triggering existing Android intents to discover more activities with hidden entrances. We conduct experiments to evaluate Delm’s effectiveness on activity context mock-up, activity coverage, method coverage, and crash detection. The findings reveal that Delm can mock up more complex activity contexts and significantly outperform state-of-the-art baselines with 27.2% activity coverage, 21.13% method coverage, and 23.81% crash detection.

Black-box context-free grammar inference presents a significant challenge in many practical settings due to limited access to example programs. The state-of-the-art methods, Arvada and Treevada, employ heuristic approaches to generalize grammar rules, initiating from flat parse trees and exploring diverse generalization sequences. We have observed that these approaches suffer from low quality and readability, primarily because they process entire example strings, adding to the complexity and substantially slowing down computations. To overcome these limitations, we propose a novel method that segments example strings into smaller units and incrementally infers the grammar. Our approach, named Kedavra, has demonstrated superior grammar quality (enhanced precision and recall), faster runtime, and improved readability through empirical comparison.