The first part of this article gives a brief overview of the four levels of the Chomsky hierarchy, with a special emphasis on context-free and regular languages. It then recapitulates the arguments why neither regular nor context-free grammar is sufficiently expressive to capture all phenomena in the natural language syntax. In the second part, two refinements of the Chomsky hierarchy are reviewed, which are both relevant to the extant research in cognitive science: the mildly context-sensitive languages (which are located between context-free and context-sensitive languages), and the sub-regular hierarchy (which distinguishes several levels of complexity within the class of regular languages).

Probabilistic pragmatics aspires to explain certain regularities of language use and interpretation as behavior of speakers and listeners who want to satisfy their conversational interests in a context that may contain a substantial amount of uncertainty. This approach differs substantially from more familiar approaches in theoretical pragmatics. To set it apart, we here work out some of its key distinguishing features and show, by way of some simple examples, how probabilistic pragmatics instantiates these.

This article deals with the typology of the case marking of semantic core roles. The competing economy considerations of hearer (disambiguation) and speaker (minimal effort) are formalized in terms of EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY. It is shown that the case-marking patterns that are attested in the languages of the world are those that are evolutionarily stable for different relative weightings of speaker economy and hearer economy, given the statistical patterns of language use that were extracted from corpora of naturally occurring conversations.

In this paper we argue that the psycholinguistic mechanism of priming may account for the empirical observation that grammaticalization processes typically proceed in one direction only. It is shown how two well-known unidirectional changes, i.e. the development from spatial to temporal expressions and phonological reduction, may be connected to cases of asymmetric priming as reported in the psycholinguistic literature. In these cases a form or concept A primes a form or concept B, but not vice versa, and this cognitive asymmetry corresponds precisely to the observed unidirectional pathway from A to B in diachronic change. Ultimately, then, we argue that what appears as diachronic trajectories of unidirectional change is decomposable into atomic steps of asymmetric priming in language use. More generally, we also suggest that priming is the ‘missing link’ in evolutionary models of language change in that it provides for a plausible linguistic replicating mechanism, i.e. an ‘amplifier’ of linguistic units. This is a programmatic paper which should bring to attention the potential of fruitfully applying insights from psycholinguistic research to some central issues of historical linguistics. Specifically, our approach allows for the formulation of falsifiable predictions that can be tested with present-day speakers, under the uniformitarian assumption that the same cognitive mechanisms that we find to be operating in present-day speakers also have operated in past speakers of a language.

The paper re‐examines the relevance of Carlson's (1977) distinction between stage level predicates and individual level predicates for several modules of grammar. In the first part of the paper, it is argued that rather than assume a uniform stage level vs. individual level distinction, we have to distinguish several similar but independent contrasts. Thus it is demonstrated that a unified explanation of all linguistic phenomena that are considered to be sensitive for this distinction is not possible or desirable. The second part of the paper focuses on one group of apparent contrasts between stage level and individual level predicates: the distribution of weak subjects. We will argue that it is the well‐established contrast between stative and eventive predicates that lies at the bottom of these effects. This simple picture is blurred by interaction with topic‐comment structure. We will propose a dynamic semantics of topicality that enables us to derive the observed effects formally.