Wei Yang

Dr. Wei Yang

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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2 May 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JYJianrong Yao
Jianrong Yao
LPLihui Pang
Lihui Pang
YSYang Su
Yang Su
ZZZhi Zhang
Zhi Zhang
WYWei Yang
Wei Yang
YGYansong Gao
Yansong Gao
Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a hardware security primitive with a desirable feature of low cost. Considering the space of challenge-response pairs (CRPs), there are two PUF categories: weak PUF and strong PUF. Compared to a weak PUF, a strong PUF has a wider range of applications. However, it is challenging to design a reliable and secure lightweight strong PUF. To address this challenge, PUF recomposition built upon multiple simple PUF instances has received a lot of attention in research, such as the most popular XOR-APUF, the recent MPUF in IEEE TC 2017 (Sahoo et al. , 2018), XOR-FF-APUF in IEEE TIFS 2020 (Avvaru et al. , 2020) and IPUF in TCHES 2020 (Nguyen et al. , 2019). When a combination of MAX and MIN (equal to AND and OR) bitwise operations are used in PUF recomposition (Rührmair et al. , 2010), (Rührmair et al. , 2013) and (Gao et al. , 2020), its resilience against model attacks was expected to be improved markedly, because one bitwise operation might be vulnerable to one type of modeling attack and combining them can yield improved resilience. To our knowledge, there is no explicit evaluation of this recomposition; thus, this study is the first to evaluate the uniformity and reliability of the O R- A ND- X OR -PUF (OAX-PUF)—( $x,y,z$ )-OAX-PUF. Compared to the most used $l$ -XOR-PUF, the ( $x,y,z$ )-OAX-PUF shows better reliability given $l=x+y+z$ without degrading the uniformity (i.e., retain to be 50%). As APUF is a compact PUF instance for constructing lightweight strong PUF candidates, e.g., XOR-APUF, MUXPUF and IPUF, we further examine the modeling resilience of the ( $x,y,z$ )-OAX-APUF using four powerful attacks, i.e., logistic regression (LR), reliability assisted CMA-ES, multilayer perceptron (MLP), and the most recent hybrid LR-reliability. Compared to the XOR-APUF, the OAX-APUF successfully defeats the CMA-ES attack. It often shows improved modeling resilience against LR and hybrid LR-reliability attacks while always increasing the attacking time costs of these two attacks. However, OAX-APUF exhibits lower modeling resilience against the MLP attack unless the $x,y,z$ are carefully tuned. Overall, the OAX recomposition could be an alternative lightweight recomposition approach in constructing strong PUFs if the underlying PUF (e.g., FF-APUF), has shown improved resilience against modeling attacks, because the OAX incurs smaller reliability degradation compared to XOR.

3 July 2024 in Expert Systems with Applications
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
YZYifan Zhu
Yifan Zhu
HPHuaibing Peng
Huaibing Peng
AFAnmin Fu
Anmin Fu
WYWei Yang
Wei Yang
HMHua Ma
Hua Ma
YGYansong Gao
Yansong Gao

12 January 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YGYansong Gao
Yansong Gao
JYJianrong Yao
Jianrong Yao
LPLihui Pang
Lihui Pang
WYWei Yang
Wei Yang
AFAnmin Fu
Anmin Fu
DADerek Abbott
Derek Abbott
To improve the modeling resilience of silicon strong physical unclonable functions (PUFs), in particular, the APUFs that yield a very large number of challenge response pairs (CRPs), a number of composited APUF variants such as XOR-APUF, interpose-PUF (iPUF), feed-forward APUF (FF-APUF), and OAX-APUF have been devised. When examining their security in terms of modeling resilience, utilizing multiple information sources such as power side channel information (SCI) or/and reliability SCI given a challenge is under-explored, which poses a challenge to their supposed modeling resilience in practice. Building upon multi-label/head deep learning model architecture, this work proposes Multi-Label Multi-Side-channel-information enabled deep learning Attacks (MLMSA) to thoroughly evaluate the modeling resilience of aforementioned APUF variants. Despite its simplicity, MLMSA can successfully break large-scaled APUF variants, which has not previously been achieved. More precisely, the MLMSA breaks 128-stage 30-XOR-APUF, (9,9)-and (2,18)-iPUFs, and (2,2,30)-OAX-APUF when CRPs, power SCI and reliability SCI are concurrently used. It breaks 128-stage 12-XOR-APUF and (2,2,9)-OAX-APUF even when only the easy-to-obtain reliability SCI and CRPs are exploited. The 128-stage six-loop FF-APUF and one-loop 20-XOR-FF-APUF can be broken by simultaneously using reliability SCI and CRPs. All these attacks are normally completed within an hour with a standard personal computer. Therefore, MLMSA is a useful technique for evaluating other existing or any emerging strong PUF designs.

3 March 2023 in IEEE Journal on Emerging and Selected Topics in Circuits and Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WYWei Yang
Wei Yang
XXXinguang Xiang
Xinguang Xiang
CHChanying Huang
Chanying Huang
AFAnmin Fu
Anmin Fu
YYYiyuan Yang
Yiyuan Yang
Multi-channel fusion attacks (MCFAs) are a more effective kind of side-channel analysis approaches for evaluating the side-channel vulnerability of a cryptographic device as compared to side-channel attacks exploiting only mono-channel leakage. However, research for MCFAs is insufficient to explore their greatest potential. Considering that multi-channel leakages are generated by the same crypto device and collected individually, the paper holds the opinion that there exists a linear combination of the multi-channel leakages or leakage features or attack results to launch a fusion attack with the highest performance. Correspondingly, this paper develops three optimal strategies of MCFAs on the basis of multiple correlation analysis (MCA). In addition, a new MCA-based leakage fusion metric applied for measuring whether or not to combine a channel with other channels for fusion attacks is constructed as well. The proposed metric can select the channels with similar noise levels for combination and reduce the possibility of negative influences on leakage fusion caused by high-noise channels. Effectiveness of the proposed optimal fusion attacks and the new fusion metric are verified by practical experiments in typical scenarios, respectively.

5 March 2021 in Security and Communication Networks
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
WYWei Yang
Wei Yang
AJAnni Jia
Anni Jia
Side-channel analysis (SCA) is usually used for security evaluation to test the side-channel vulnerability of a cryptographic device. However, in practice, an analyser may need to cope with enormous amounts of side-channel measurement data to extract valuable information for SCA. Under the circumstances, side-channel leakage detection can be used to identify leakage points which contain secret information and therefore improve the efficiency of security assessment. This investigation proposes a new black-box leakage detection approach on the basis of the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). In accordance with the relevance between leakage points and inputs of a cryptographic algorithm, the proposed method divides side-channel samples into multiple classes and tests the difference among these classes by taking advantage of the one-way ANOVA. Afterwards, leakage points and nonleakage points can be distinguished by determining whether the null hypothesis is accepted. Further, we extend our proposed method to multichannel leakage detection. In particular, a new SCA attack with a -statistic-based distinguisher is capable of developing if the input of the leakage detection approach is replaced by a sensitive intermediate variable. Practical experiments show the effectiveness of the proposed methods.

8 September 2025 in Symmetry
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SKShukai Kou
Shukai Kou
WYWei Yang
Wei Yang
LLLunbo Li
Lunbo Li
GZgongxuan zhang
gongxuan zhang
Side-channel analysis (SCA) poses a persistent threat to cryptographic hardware by exploiting unintended physical leakages. To address the limitations of traditional single-modality SCA methods, we propose a novel multi-modal side-channel analysis framework that targets the recovery of encryption keys by leveraging the imperfections inherent in hardware implementations. The core objective is to extract and classify information-rich segments from power and electromagnetic (EM) signals in order to recover secret keys without profiling or labeling. Our approach introduces a unified pipeline combining joint peak-based segmentation, isometric compression of variable-length trace segments, and multi-modal feature fusion. A key component of the framework is unsupervised clustering, which serves to automatically classify trace segments corresponding to different cryptographic operations (e.g., different key-dependent leakage classes), thereby enabling key byte hypothesis testing and full key reconstruction. Experimental results on an FPGA-based AES-128 implementation demonstrate that our method achieves up to 99.2% clustering accuracy and successfully recovers the entire encryption key using as few as 1–3 traces. Moreover, the proposed approach significantly reduces sample complexity and maintains resilience in low signal-to-noise conditions. These results highlight the practicality of our technique for side-channel vulnerability assessment and its potential to inform the design of more robust cryptographic hardware.