Brewing since the advent of South African democracy in 1994 and promises of health sector transformation, an extraordinary drug war between President Nelson Mandela's African National Congress government and U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturers took on global proportions in 1998–1999. Within months of the passage of South African legislation aimed at lowering drug prices, the U.S. government quickly applied powerful pressure points to repeal a clause allowing potential importation of generic substitutes and imposition of compulsory licensing. At stake were not only local interpretations of patent law and World Trade Organization rules on Trade in Intellectual Property, but international power relations between developing countries and the pharmaceutical industry. In reviewing the ongoing debate, this article considers post-apartheid public health policy, U.S. government pressure to change the law, and pharmaceutical industry interests and links to the U.S. government, and evaluates various kinds of resistance to U.S. corporate and government behavior. The case thus raises—not for the first time—concerns about contemporary imperialism (“globalization”), the role of the profit motive as an incentive in vital pharmaceutical products, and indeed the depth of “democracy” in a country where high-bidding international drug firms have sufficient clout to embarrass Vice President Al Gore by pitting him against the life-and-death interests of millions of consumers of essential drugs in South Africa and other developing countries.
The Marikana Massacre of August 2012 exposed the most unstable configuration of forces in post-apartheid South Africa, forged through entrenched social and economic inequalities, ecological degradation, indebtedness and corruption. Dissent against prevailing power relations had arisen over many years, with impoverished communities registering thousands of ‘service delivery protests’, seemingly without either resolution or maturation into durable social movements. However, the critical missing linkages between trade unions and urban communities were finally found in Rustenberg, 100 km west of Johannesburg, in a strike which fused labour, social, gendered, environmental and other interests. In the months following the Marikana, it became apparent that some sought to weave a genuine national revolt of the sort witnessed in 2011 across North Africa. However, this challenge to the elite political economy faced extreme difficulties, with fragments of populist, post-nationalist and working-class politics remaining isolated from the largest trade union, Communist Party and nationalist forces within the working- and middle classes.
The power, vulnerability and destructiveness of financial markets are out of control in South Africa, now among the most unequal, economically volatile and protest-intensive countries worldwide. While debt made itself felt in many sites, of interest in both criticising and promoting solutions is the ‘scale jumping’ required from South Africa’s national insertion into the world financial system, entailing the Reserve Bank setting very high interest rates, in turn leading to unpayable levels of consumer debt, and at a time when microfinance is suddenly discredited as a development strategy. Macro- and micro-financial problems fused in the course of the Marikana Massacre of August 2012, reflecting the local and global powers of the Moody’s rating agency and ‘mashonisa’ loan sharks. The over-indebted Marikana mineworkers, who led a strike which catalysed many wildcat strikes elsewhere, confronted the local crisis by displacing it into the national economy. This only heightened the contradictions that Moody’s punished with its September 2012 credit-rating downgrade. Without a genuine ‘debt relief’ solution at both scales, society will continue to unravel, as financialisation reaches its limits within one of the world’s most extreme cases of uneven and combined development.