The only joint effort area of provincial and municipal governments resides in Guangdong Province and Shenzhen City in China’s carbon emission trading system (ETS) pilots, which characterize the national carbon ETS plots. The present study on the operating experience from this area has important reference value for the national carbon ETS. Analysis and comparison of the key elements show many differences in coverage, total allowance, allowance allocation, and MRV mechanism between Guangdong and Shenzhen carbon ETS. The present study provides the following explanation: (1) the design characteristics of carbon ETS (e.g. coverage, total quotas, the allocation, and MRV mechanism) depend on the local geographical conditions and policy goals. The differences of economic structure in Guangdong Province and Shenzhen City result in different coverage, which then result in differences in other management elements. (2) The operating state of the carbon market is affected by overall design of carbon ETS: in the case of tighter total allowance, lower proportion of China Certified Emission Reductions, and harsher punishment, the carbon market is relatively active, which intends to produce carbon financial market. Based on deep analysis of operation characteristics of carbon ETS in Guangdong and Shenzhen, the present study suggests that (1) the allowance should be allocated freely at the beginning stage and then gradually transited to the voluntary paid auction; (2) the allowances assigned to companies shall be linked up with their energy-saving objectives; (3) the output fluctuations and economic influence on the allowance allocation should be properly handled to maintain the fairness and consistence of allowance allocation standards; (4) stable public expectation is one of the key elements to maintain the regular operation of carbon ETS; (5) constrained carbon emission behavior outside ETS can contribute to social justice; and (6) the improvement of professional skills of relevant personnel in the enterprise and independent third party can enhance carbon emissions data reliability.

(2019). The Guangdong Emissions Trading Scheme. Strategic Planning for Energy and the Environment: Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 42-62.

China’s delayed-retirement reform—recently announced and scheduled to start in 2025—seeks to bolster public-pension sustainability, yet its implications for wealth distribution remain unclear. Using six waves of the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS 2010–2020), we estimated a micro-level wealth-accumulation equation and embedded it in an agent-based counterfactual simulation. We examined three policy scenarios: a gradual schedule calibrated to the officially announced plan but re-indexed to begin in 2021 for the counterfactual window, and two comparators—a no-delay baseline and a one-off delay that immediately meets the target statutory ages. Using the 2020 CFPS wave (the latest available) as the baseline micro-dataset, we conduct an ex-ante counterfactual experiment that applies the reform as if it started in 2021; under a short-run, partial-equilibrium, full-compliance closure over a common 2021–2025 window (under 2020 conditions), the simulation traces changes in the national wealth distribution and the structural channels through which they propagate. Within our ex-ante counterfactual setting (2021–2025 under 2020 baseline conditions) and a short-run, partial-equilibrium, full-compliance closure, delayed retirement is associated with a higher wealth-inequality trajectory over 2021–2025, chiefly via widening gaps linked to urban–rural residence and health status; gender-related contributions remain comparatively small. Urban residents and healthier individuals are more likely to convert longer careers into additional wealth and pension entitlements, whereas gains among rural and less-healthy groups appear more limited. The findings are consistent with social-stratification and cumulative-advantage perspectives in China and present a transparent, ex-ante evaluation framework that can help inform the design and calibration of complementary measures in forthcoming pension reforms. These results should be interpreted as counterfactual policy-path differences over a common five-year horizon, not as realised outcomes or long-run forecasts.

China is establishing a carbon budget management system at both provincial and municipal levels. The carbon budget system, as a policy tool for integrating total carbon emission management and economic planning, has already been effective in developed countries. This paper provides a comprehensive review of the concept, core elements, and practical experiences of the carbon budget system, and compares international practices with China’s low-carbon management system in the context of national circumstances. It extracts elements from international experiences that provide empirical insights, exhibit reference value, and require localization and innovation. Based on the analysis, this study proposes the following policy implications. (1) Positioning the carbon budget system as a connector within China’s dual carbon 1+N system, linking the 1 and N components. (2) The carbon budget space and industrial planning should be deeply coupled to drive the rise of low-carbon and high value-added industries. (3) Defining the focus of the carbon budget system during both the carbon peaking and carbon neutrality stages of China’s carbon goals. (4) Playing its synergistic function in the carbon budget allocation system. (5) Developing a localized toolkit for carbon budget policies and carrying out pre-assessment of the impact of the carbon budget on the economy and society. (6) Initiating pilot projects in provinces with regional carbon markets to explore the integration of carbon budgets with carbon trading mechanisms.