Enterprise Risk Management involves the process of identification, evaluation, treatment, and communication regarding risks throughout the enterprise. To support the tasks associated with this process, several frameworks and modeling languages have been proposed, such as theRisk and Security Overlay(RSO) of ArchiMate. An ontological investigation of this artifact would reveal its adequacy, capabilities, and limitations w.r.t. the domain of risk and security. Based on that, a language redesign can be proposed as a refinement. Such analysis and redesign have been executed for the risk elements of the RSO grounded in theCommon Ontology of Value and Risk. The next step along this line of research is to address the following research problems: What would be the outcome of an ontological analysis of security-related elements of the RSO? That is, can we identify other semantic deficiencies in the RSO through an ontological analysis? Once such an analysis is provided, can we redesign the security elements of the RSO accordingly, in order to produce an improved artifact? Here, with the aid of theReference Ontology for Security Engineering(ROSE) and the ontological theory of prevention behind it, we address the remaining gap by proceeding with anontological analysisof the security-related constructs of the RSO. The outcome of this assessment is an ontology-based redesign of the ArchiMate language regarding security modeling. In a nutshell, we report the following contributions: (1) an ontological analysis of the RSO that identifies six limitations concerning security modeling; (2) because of the key role of the notion of prevention in security modeling, the introduction of the ontological theory of prevention in ArchiMate; (3) a well-founded redesign of security elements of ArchiMate; and (4) ontology-based security modeling patterns that are logical consequences of our proposal of redesign due to its underlying ontology of security. As a form of evaluation, we show that our proposal can describe risk treatment options, according to ISO 31000. Finally, besides presenting multiple examples, we proceed with a real-world illustrative application taken from the cybersecurity domain.
Formal Ontology is a discipline whose business is to develop formal theories about general aspects of reality such as identity, dependence, parthood, truthmaking, causality, etc. A foundational ontology is a specific consistent set of these ontological theories that support activities such as domain analysis, conceptual clarification, and meaning negotiation. A (well-founded) core ontology specifies, under a foundational ontology, the central concepts and relations of a given domain. Foundational and core ontologies can be seen as ontology engineering frameworks to systematically address the laborious task of building large (more specific) domain ontologies. However, both in research and industry, it is common that ontologies as computational artifacts are built without the aid of any framework of this kind, often yielding modeling mistakes and representation gaps. In this paper, we analyze a case in the domain of cybersecurity, namely, the case of D3FEND-an OWL knowledge graph of cybersecurity countermeasure techniques proposed by the MITRE Corporation. Based on the Reference Ontology for Security Engineering (ROSE), a core ontology of the security domain founded in the Unified Foundational Ontology (UFO), our investigation reveals a number of semantic issues and opportunities for improvement in D3FEND, including missing concepts, semantic overload of terms, and lacking constraints that cause an under-specification of the model. As a result of our ontological analysis, we propose several suggestions for the appropriate redesign of D3FEND to overcome those issues.