Kylie Burns

Prof. Kylie Burns


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

19Years (2008-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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2 July 2016 in Griffith Law Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KBKylie Burns
Kylie Burns
Judges are like other human beings. They use their ‘common sense’, their common understanding, their contemporary knowledge of society and the expectations of the community, as part of judicial decision-making. Judicial common sense understandings about the world and human behaviour may also form a silent lens through which judges interpret the meaning of matters such as reasonableness and normality of human behaviour, and assess the meaning of visual phenomenon such as signs, pictures and video. However, judges may be unconsciously impacted by cognitive limitations. Judge’s factual assumptions may be influenced by their own cultural worldviews. Judicial use of common sense can be the vehicle through which error and discrimination enter the law. Part 2 of this article examines how judges use common sense in their judicial reasoning. Part 3 suggests that judicial construction of common sense is a cognitive process with the consequent impact of bounded rationality, heuristics, biases, emotion and cognitive illusions. Part 4 discusses whether judges can overcome the limitations of common sense reasoning. The article argues that while common sense and common understandings will always be an inevitable part of judicial decision-making more attention is required to address the limitations of common sense judging.

29 June 2009 in The Law Teacher
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
KBKylie Burns
Kylie Burns
THTerry Hutchinson
Terry Hutchinson
Lawyers have traditionally viewed law as a closed system, and doctrinal research has been the research methodology used most widely in the profession. This reflects traditional concepts of legal reasoning. There is a wealth of reliable and valid social science data available to lawyers and judges. Judges in fact often refer to general facts about the world, society, institutions and human behaviour (“empirical facts”). Legal education needs to prepare our students for this broader legal context. This paper examines how “empirical facts” are used in Australian and other common law courts. Specifically, the paper argues that there is a need for enhanced training in non-doctrinal research methodologies across the law school curriculum. This should encompass a broad introduction to social science methods, with more attention being paid to a cross-section of methodologies such as content analysis, comparative law and surveys that are best applied to law.

2 July 2016 in Griffith Law Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KBKylie Burns
Kylie Burns
RDRachel Dioso-Villa
Rachel Dioso-Villa
ZAZoe Rathus Am
Zoe Rathus Am

1 September 2012 in Federal Law Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KBKylie Burns
Kylie Burns
Judicial reasons often include general statements about the nature and behaviour of people and institutions and the nature of the world and society. These statements might be called social facts (‘SF’) and are made as part of judicial development and general application of law. The presence of SF statements in judicial reasoning in Australian cases has been acknowledged by commentators and judges. However, there has been little empirical examination of this phenomenon. This article discusses a content analysis study of SF in negligence cases in the Australian High Court. This study confirms that judges do refer to SF in their judicial reasoning and that SF play a range of roles in judicial reasoning. This includes predicting social, economic and behavioural consequences of legal rules, as part of setting a context or background to judicial reasons, and as a tool to evaluate adjudicative facts. SF do not generally dominate judicial reasoning. However, they appear to have a significant role to play in certain complex and more important cases. While there were overall commonalities in the way judges used SF, some individual differences between judges emerged. Judges do not use SF in all cases in the same way. Judges referred to SF more in high significance cases, and cases with multiple separate judgments. Judges also referred to SF more in single and dissenting judgments than in joint and majority judgments. Most SF referred to by judges were not sourced or referenced in any way and reference to empirical research was very rare. Where a source or reference for a SF was given by a judge it was usually to a legal source. Most SF appeared to source from judicial ‘common sense’ with the potential dangers this brings to the accuracy and legitimacy of judicial reasoning.

2 July 2015
Verified
Book
Closed access
MDMatthew Dyson
Matthew Dyson
AGAntoine Garapon
Antoine Garapon
MNMnd
Mnd
JRJohn Randall
John Randall
VMValérie Malabat
Valérie Malabat
SWSonya Willis
Sonya Willis
The fields of tort and crime have much in common in practice, particularly in how they both try to respond to wrongs and regulate future behaviour. Despite this commonality in fact, fascinating difficulties have hitherto not been resolved about how legal systems co-ordinate (or leave wild) the border between tort and crime. What is the purpose of tort law and criminal law, and how do you tell the difference between them? Do criminal lawyers and civil lawyers reason and argue in the same way? Are the rules on capacity, consent, fault, causation, secondary liability or defences the same in tort as in crime? How do the rules of procedure operate for each area? Are there points of overlap? When, how and why do tort and crime interact? This volume systematically answers these and other questions for eight legal systems: England, France, Germany, Sweden, Spain, Scotland, the Netherlands and Australia.