Using panel data from 282 Chinese cities from 2003 to 2015, we estimate the impact of venture capital (VC) on innovation, employment, and payroll in metropolitan areas. Controlling for endogeneity, VC investments are significantly positively related to metropolitan innovation, employment, and payroll in a fixed effects panel regression and dynamic GMM estimation. Using the number of IPOs (Initial public offerings) in the city as an instrumental variable to again control for endogeneity, VC remains significant. Our results show that VC is significantly contributing to the metropolitan economy as a whole by supporting innovation, creating jobs, and generating wealth in the local cities.
This article, using a panel dataset covering patents granted in 336 cities and the economic and employment data of 282 cities in China, presents an preliminary exploratory spatial data analysis by Gini coefficient and Moran’s I analysis, and a confirmatory spatial data analysis by spatial Durbin model. We first investigate China regional innovative activities by three different types of patents at metropolitan-level data and make several key findings. First, the spatial autocorrelation of invention patent is insignificant from 2001 to 2013, whereas the coefficients of spatial autocorrelation of utility patents and design patents are continuingly rising across years. Second, the innovation clusters are vanishing in China’s western and northeastern cities, whereas booming in the periphery cities of Shanghai and Guangzhou during 2000–2015. Third, the cities surrounded by high level of GDP output and R&D expenditure neighbors will more likely perform better in innovative activities. By employing smaller territorial units, we provide more specific details about the regional distribution and the dynamic interaction of innovative activities across cities in China.
In this paper, we utilize a panel dataset that covers 1245 listed companies which accomplished their IPO during 2006 to 2014 in China to investigate the impact of venture capital (VC) firms on executive compensation, equity incentive and pay-performance-sensitivity. We make several key findings: First, we find the presence of VCs can significantly raise the executive compensation. Second, high reputation VCs and private VCs increases the likelihood of granting executive equity incentives, whereas foreign VCs are significantly negatively related with executive equity incentive. Third, the pay-performance sensitivity of government VCs and foreign VCs is significant on stock return (RET) whereas insignificant on accounting performance (ROA). Moreover, the increasing VCs share in portfolio companies enhance the pay performance sensitivity on RET. Our results show that before VCs final exiting their post-IPO portfolio companies in China, VCs’ impact on executive compensation are more consistent with grandstanding theories and intending to provide higher cash compensation to encourage executives to raise the companies’ stock price, which is indicating VCs’ changing role from a coach into a speculator after the portfolio companies’ IPO.