Blockchain is a public open ledger that provides data integrity in a distributed manner. It is the underlying technology of cryptocurrencies and an increasing number of related applications, such as smart contracts. The open nature of blockchain together with strong integrity guarantees on the stored data makes it a compelling platform for covert communication. In this paper, we suggest a method of securely embedding covert messages into a blockchain. We formulate a simplified ideal blockchain model based on existing implementations and devise a protocol that enables two parties to covertly communicate through the blockchain following that model. We also formulate a rigorous definition for the security and covertness of such a protocol based on computational indistinguishability. Finally, we show that our method satisfies this definition in the random oracle model for the underlying cryptographic hash function.
We survey the state-of-the-art non-interactive zero-knowledge argument schemes and their applications in confidential transactions and private smart contracts on blockchain. The main goal of this paper is to serve as a reference for blockchain application developers in finding the most suitable scheme for a particular use case. We give an overview and compare the state-of-the-art protocols for confidential transactions and private smart contracts regarding the protection of the transaction graph and amounts, data and functionality. However, our main focus is on state-of-the-art zero-knowledge argument schemes. We briefly describe their backgrounds, proof lengths and computational complexities and discuss their cryptographic security models. Our focus is on seminal, otherwise notable and, especially, implemented methods that are ready to be applied in practice. We also survey the existing implementations of transforming computations into circuit representations required by those methods. We note that the existing schemes have different strengths and drawbacks regarding usability, setup, proof length and proving and verification costs.
The pervasive use of AI assistant systems and machine learning-based applications in various fields and everyday life has significantly shifted. However, this shift is not without its challenges. The emergence of security threats, various attacks, and vulnerabilities in this domain has not only questioned their use but also sparked the interest of security experts and researchers, underlining the urgency and importance of this topic. However, a comprehensive and systematic research endeavor is yet to be undertaken on threat modeling based on violating basic tenets of information security on the various components of a machine learning system and evaluating their security risks. This lack of comprehensive threat modeling for each violation of a machine learning system’s confidentiality, integrity, availability, and privacy for various attacks and their risk analysis is a significant gap in the field. This article aims to bridge this gap by proposing a simple, efficient, and time-saving approach to evaluate potential attacks and their security risks by utilizing the attack tree and a risk analysis method in the Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) field. One of the most important steps in determining the overall risk of the attack is evaluating the risk attached to each node in an attack tree. A systematic approach that includes describing the system architecture and identifying its assets under various operational environment scenarios is also outlined in this paper. This approach can also offer crucial insights to security experts, aiding them in understanding and mitigating potential threats and risk analysis in AML systems. To ensure the validity and reliability of our findings, we have conducted a thorough and rigorous review of academic papers, summarizing different threats and attacks and their root cause analysis.
12 August 2023 in Future Generation Computer Systems
The Diffie–Hellman key exchange scheme is one of the earliest and most widely used public-key primitives. Its underlying algebraic structure is a cyclic group and its security is based on the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). The DLP can be solved in polynomial time for any cyclic group in the quantum computation model. Therefore, new key exchange schemes have been sought to prepare for the time when quantum computing becomes a reality. Algebraically, these schemes need to provide some sort of commutativity to enable Alice and Bob to derive a common key on a public channel while keeping it computationally difficult for the adversary to deduce the derived key. We suggest an algebraically generalized Diffie–Hellman scheme (AGDH) that, in general, enables the application of any algebra as the platform for key exchange. We formulate the underlying computational problems in the framework of average-case complexity and show that the scheme is secure if the problem of computing images under an unknown homomorphism is infeasible. We also show that a symmetric encryption scheme possessing homomorphic properties over some algebraic operation can be turned into a public-key primitive with the AGDH, provided that the operation is complex enough. In addition, we present a brief survey on the algebraic properties of existing key exchange schemes and identify the source of commutativity and the family of underlying algebraic structures for each scheme.