Progress and development in the overall industrial sector have been revolutionized by the advent of advanced digital tools and technologies, transitioning towards Industry 5.0 (I5.0), and the term Construction 5.0 (C5.0) is derived from the emergence of I5.0 in Europe. Given its currency, C5.0 remains a nascent and under-explored research area. This review article presents a bibliometric analysis of studies on C5.0, identifying and analyzing challenges and opportunities in its adoption and exploring the strategies to overcome such challenges and ways to maximize productivity from potential opportunities. Fifty-seven relevant documents were studied to accomplish the aim of this study, which were identified from the Scopus database, evaluated, and included based on the PRISMA framework. The findings showed a relatively small but growing body of literature on C5.0 research, which is disseminated globally and grouped into four specific objective categories. This pattern suggests a growing recognition of C5.0’s potential in the construction field, reflecting its expanding influence in the scientific community. Furthermore, the study examined seven critical challenges, including insufficient technological maturity, the absence of standardization, privacy concerns, ethical considerations, and more. It also explores four potential opportunities associated with the adoption of the C5.0 vision, emphasizing its alignment with societal objectives, sustainability initiatives, personalization, and profitability.

Applying blockchain to supply chain financing is an effective way to solve the problems of financing difficulties, high financing costs, and slow financing for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMZEs). Using evolutionary game theory, this study constructs a tripartite game model and analyzes the influence of blockchain technology on the evolutionary stability strategies for financial institutions (FIs), core enterprises (CEs), and SMZEs, in which the default losses of CEs and SMZEs are assumed to be dynamic. The results of this study are as follows: (1) When CEs and SMZESs’ default losses are lower than some critical value, they tend to break their promises. (2) When accounts receivable are greater than some critical value, CEs cannot repay on time because they can make a relatively large profits from delayed repayment, whereas SMZEs can be constrained to be trustworthy. Finally, the results using numerical simulation show that both relatively large default losses and enough large, trustworthy income sources can make CEs and SMZEs tend to keep their promises; in turn, CEs would be non-paying and the SMZEs tend to be trustworthy for relatively large accounts receivable. The results provide theoretical support for realizing healthy and sustainable development for supply chain finance.

The sustainability of financing is an important measure in the development of supply chains. However, the difficulty and high cost of financing have always been critical factors hindering the sustainable development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Blockchain technology (BT) is an effective tool to relieve the current problem. Based on it, this study aims to establish Blockchain-driven incentives and restraint mechanisms for SME financing using a dynamic game model in which financial institutions (FIs) and new agricultural business entities (NABEs) are regarded as game subjects. By analyzing the impact of key parameters on the equilibrium state of the game for all stakeholders, several findings are drawn as follows. (1) The usage of BT affects FI loan strategies by influencing their cost in supply chain financing. (2) The usage of BT affects NABE’s strategy choice by influencing their loan interest rate. (3) The usage of BT affects NABE’s strategy choice by influencing their default losses. (4) The usage of BT affects NABE’s and FI’s strategy choices by influencing their additional benefits. This study provides decision-making support for optimal strategy decisions under different conditions and serves as a theoretical reference for the government in formulating financing incentive and restraint mechanisms.

The performance-based payment structure has been widely used in infrastructure PPP projects. However, existing research has been absent on the structural unbalance problem of performance-based payment in the current infrastructure PPP projects. This study aims to construct an optimal proportion of the performance-based payment in the total payment, and then design a performance-based payment structure for infrastructure PPP projects. Firstly, the definition of the performance-linked rate is introduced to characterize the proportion of the performance-based payment. Secondly, based on the different objectives of the maximum social benefit and the minimum cost for the public and private sectors, a multi-objective optimization model is constructed to obtain a reasonable value range of the performance-linked rate. Thirdly, the impacts on different parameters in the performance-linked rate are revealed using simulation methods. Finally, the numerical and simulation results show that, for the weak social average ability, the social cost is also high, and a large performance-linked rate should be set. Conversely, when the social average ability is strong, the social average cost is relatively reduced, and a relatively low performance-linked rate should be set. Consequently, the results can guide the contract design in PPP projects.