Archimedean utility copulas comprise the general class of multiattribute utility functions that have additive ordinal preferences and are strictly increasing with each argument for at least one reference value of the complementary attributes. The construction of an Archimedean utility copula requires an assessment of an individual utility function for each attribute as well as a single generating function. The assessment of individual utility functions for the attributes of a decision has had a large share of literature coverage, but there has been much less literature on the construction of the generating function for the Archimedean functional form. This paper focuses on the assessment of Archimedean utility copulas with polynomial generating functions. We provide methods to assess these generating functions and derive bounds on the types of utility surfaces that they provide. We demonstrate that linear generating functions correspond to the multiplicative form of mutual utility independence, and then we show how higher-order polynomial generating functions allow more flexibility in the types of multiattribute utility functions and corner values that can be modeled. The results of this paper provide a new method to help the analyst construct multiattribute utility functions in a simple way when utility independence conditions do not hold.
The Pareto optimality condition is a widely used assumption in group decision making. The condition requires that if each individual in the group prefers one alternative to another, then the group as a whole should prefer the alternative that is most preferred by each of the group members. This condition implies that the group utility function is an additive combination of the individual utility functions of the members of the group. We argue that Pareto optimality is a desirable property for deterministic decisions but that it need not be desirable for lotteries. We show, for example, that Pareto optimality need not be a desirable property for risk sharing or partnerships. We then present a new condition, which we refer to as "independence of indifferent group members." We show that it is a weaker condition than Pareto optimality and derive the corresponding functional form of the group utility function.
16 June 2026 in International Journal of Production Economics
Classic risk sharing results determine the optimal share of each member in a group that faces a present deal by maximizing the sum of expected utilities of the group members. For decision-makers with exponential utility functions, this formulation is equivalent to maximizing the sum of certain equivalents of the group members. This paper investigates the effects of time preference and different (but constant) risk tolerances among the group members on the individual shares when the payoff is received at a future time period. The analysis first defines several concepts: (i) a group future risk tolerance to be used for valuing the certain equivalent of future payoffs, (ii) a group time preference compounding factor that takes into account the time preference of individuals in the group, and (iii) a group present risk tolerance with time preference by which the partnership should operate for the discounted value of future deals. The results show that if the individuals in a group have the same time preference, then the classic risk sharing results still apply. However, when individuals have different time preferences, then the optimal shares of the individuals are modified by two components; the first depends on the ratio of the individual time preference compounding factor to the group time preference compounding factor, and the second depends on the surety of the deal multiplied by the group future risk tolerance. Several examples illustrate the results.