The rapid growth of cultural evolutionary science, its expansion into numerous fields, its use of diverse methods, and several conceptual problems have outpaced corollary developments in theory and philosophy of science. This has led to concern, exemplified in results from a recent survey conducted with members of the Cultural Evolution Society, that the field lacks ‘knowledge synthesis’, is poorly supported by ‘theory’, has an ambiguous relation to biological evolution and uses key terms (e.g. ‘culture’, ‘social learning’, ‘cumulative culture’) in ways that hamper operationalization in models, experiments and field studies. Although numerous review papers in the field represent and categorize its empirical findings, the field's theoretical challenges receive less critical attention even though challenges of a theoretical or conceptual nature underlie most of the problems identified by Cultural Evolution Society members. Guided by the heterogeneous ‘grand challenges’ emergent in this survey, this paper restates those challenges and adopts an organizational style requisite to discussion of them. The paper's goal is to contribute to increasing conceptual clarity and theoretical discernment around the most pressing challenges facing the field of cultural evolutionary science. It will be of most interest to cultural evolutionary scientists, theoreticians, philosophers of science and interdisciplinary researchers.
This article presents preliminary findings from a multi-year, multi-disciplinary text analysis project using an ancient and medieval Chinese corpus of over five million characters in works that date from the earliest received texts to the Song dynasty. It describes “distant reading” methods in the humanities and the authors’ corpus; introduces topic-modeling procedures; answers questions about the authors’ data; discusses complementary relationships between machine learning and human expertise; explains topics represented inAnalects, Mencius,andXunzithat set each of those texts apart from the other two; and explains topics that intersect all three texts. The authors’ results confirm many scholarly opinions derived from close-reading methods, suggest a reappraisal ofXunzi’s shared semantic content withAnalects,and yield several actionable research questions for traditional scholarship. The aim of this article is to initiate a new conversation about implications of machine learning for the study of Asian texts.
24 March 2021 in Journal of Cultural Cognitive Science
A major source of attention paid to high gods in the fields of cultural evolution and cognitive science is the social effects of belief in high gods. Belief in high gods is both hypothesized to catalyze a cognitive punishment-avoidance mechanism at the level of individual minds, and a group cultural evolutionary mechanism that amplifies in-group cooperation. Recent research into non-Western contexts not only indicates a multiplicity of supernatural influences on the individual-level and group-level mechanisms but raises questions about theoretical presuppositions about how a supernatural agent is classified as a high god or as something else. Our exploratory study operationalizes the question “Does historical China have high gods?” through the assessment of semantic associations between each of several supernatural agent categories (alleged high gods, low gods, ancestors, sage kings, and emperors) and each of several social functional content categories (punishment, reward, morality, monitoring, and religion). Analyzing collocations in a corpus of 5.7 m Chinese characters, representing all of the most influential historical Chinese-language texts, our preliminary results suggest social functions of supernatural agents in historical China were widely distributed across many species of supernatural agent thereby complicating a claim that high gods constitute a special category in relation to these social functions.
15 July 2014 in Journal of the American Academy of Religion
This article articulates two prominent, competing explanations about cognitive effects of the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 and assesses them against historical documents. Humanities scholars' writings on the earthquake imply what I refer to as a “Secularizing Interpretation,” which says that the earthquake caused cognitive change across social classes and geographical regions. Results from the cognitive science of religion yield what I refer to as the “Cognitive Science of Religion Hypothesis.” This hypothesis says that people of the period interpreted this earthquake as caused (1) by God; (2) on purpose; (3) as a punishment; (4) on the out-group. The Secularizing Interpretation and the Cognitive Science of Religion Hypothesis are mutually inconsistent. This means that if one is shown to be true, the other is therefore false. This article advocates the Cognitive Science of Religion Hypothesis in two steps. Review of writings of philosophers and elites reveals little to no secularizing cognitive change. Review of writings by other authors reveals increases in religious and supernatural punishment cognition after the earthquake. This project recommends interdisciplinary methods to researchers in the humanities, which enable them to put their interpretations to the test.
8 November 2019 in Journal of Cognition and Culture
This essay discusses Cecilia Heyes’ groundbreaking new book Cognitive Gadgets: The Cultural Evolution of Thinking. Heyes’ point of departure is the claim that current theories of cultural evolution fail adequately to make a place for the mind. Heyes articulates a cognitive psychology of cultural evolution by explaining how eponymous “cognitive gadgets,” such as imitation, mindreading and language, mental technologies, are “tuned” and “assembled” through social interaction and cultural learning. After recapitulating her explanations for the cultural and psychological origins of these gadgets, we turn to criticisms. Among those, we find Heyes’ use of evolutionary theory confusing on several points of importance; alternative theories of cultural evolution, especially those of the Tomasello group and of Boyd, Richerson and Henrich, are misrepresented; the book neglects joint attention and other forms of intersubjectivity in its explanation of the origins of cognitive gadgets; and, whereas Heyes accuses other theories of being “mindblind,” we find her theory ironically other-blind and autistic in character.