The proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices with weak passwords poses significant challenges to network security. Hackers can easily compromise these IoT devices by brute-forcing their passwords and then utilize them to launch severe attacks, such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). To defeat such threats, an effective solution is to ensure that each device has a strong, high-strength password. However, in practice, this poses a significant challenge, as configuring and managing passwords for such a vast number of devices is highly complex. In this work, we propose a novel multidevice collaborative authentication (MDCA) system that enables IoT devices to be protected by strong passwords without altering their original weak ones. Our approach is inspired by group defense strategies prevalent in nature: animals cooperate and form groups to enhance their chances of survival. Intuitively, IoT devices can also collaborate to improve their security. Specifically, in our design, devices with strong passwords provide authentication for devices having weak credentials, and the latter can generate clues to detect brute-force attacks. Once these attacks are detected, requests to IoT devices are first authenticated by several other strong password protected devices, and if all authentications succeed, the requests are then permitted. We have implemented the proposed system and theoretically analyzed its security. The experimental results match the theoretical analysis well.
17 April 2018 in Security and Communication Networks
We propose AppFA, an Application Flow Analysis approach, to detect malicious Android applications (simply apps) on the network. Unlike most of the existing work, AppFA does not need to install programs on mobile devices or modify mobile operating systems to extract detection features. Besides, it is able to handle encrypted network traffic. Specifically, we propose a constrained clustering algorithm to classify apps network traffic, and use Kernel Principal Component Analysis to build their network behavior profiles. After that, peer group analysis is explored to detect malicious apps by comparing apps’ network behavior profiles with the historical data and the profiles of their selected peer groups. These steps can be repeated every several minutes to meet the requirement of online detection. We have implemented AppFA and tested it with a public dataset. The experimental results show that AppFA can cluster apps network traffic efficiently and detect malicious Android apps with high accuracy and low false positive rate. We have also tested the performance of AppFA from the computational time standpoint.
1 August 2020 in Security and Communication Networks
The cyberphysical system (CPS) is becoming the infrastructure of society. Unfortunately, the CPS is vulnerable to cyberattacks, which may cause environmental pollution, property losses, and even casualties. Furthermore, in contrast to the conventional Internet, the devices in CPSs are more specific, and the device systems may not be upgraded or installed with new programs during their life spans. The selection of the best defense nodes for defeating cyberattacks is quite challenging in CPSs. To overcome this issue, several attack-defense modeled methods have been proposed. However, few existing studies have considered the defense cost, which is usually a determinant in practice. In this paper, we propose a method for choosing optimal defense nodes that (1) can defeat specific attacks and (2) are inexpensive. First, the atom attack defense tree (A2DTree) is proposed by adding constraints to the conventional attack defense tree (ADTree). Second, the algebraic method is used to efficiently calculate the minimum defense cost. On this basis, a minimum defense cost calculation tool is designed and implemented. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed method is verified with two typical case studies, and a comparative experiment of related work is carried out. The results show that the method can correctly and efficiently identify the optimal defense nodes and calculate the minimum defense cost of a CPS.