This article discusses a previously unrecognized avenue for bioterrorism and biocrime. It is suggested that new gene editing technologies may have the potential to create plants that are genetically modified in harmful ways, either in terms of their effect on the plant itself or in terms of harming those who would consume foods produced by that plant. While several risk scenarios involving GMOs—such as antibiotic resistant pathogens, synthetic biology, or mixing of non-GMO seeds with GMO seeds—have previously have been recognized, the new vulnerability is rooted in a different paradigm—that of clandestinely manipulating GMOs to create damage. The ability to actively inflict diseases on plants would pose serious health hazards to both humans and animals, have detrimental consequences to the economy, and directly threaten the food supply. As this is the first study of this kind, the full scope and impact of suck attacks—especially those involving the intended misuse of technologies such as gene-drives—merits further investigation. Herein, the plausibility of some of the new risks will be analyzed by, (1) Highlighting ownership and origination issues (esp. of event-specific GM-plants) as unrecognized risk factors; (2) Investigating the unique role of GMOs, why—and how—certified GMOs could become a new venue for such attacks; (3) Analyzing possible dual-use potentials of modern technologies and research oriented toward the advancement of GMOs, plant breeding and crop improvement. The identification and analysis of harmful genetic manipulations to utilize (covertly modified) plants (GMOs and non-GMOs) as an attack vector show that these concerns need to be taken seriously, raising the prospect not only of direct harm, but of the more likely effects in generating public concern, reputational harm of agricultural biotechnology companies, law-suits, and increased import bans of certain plants or their derived products.

This study investigates the role and functionality of special nucleotide sequences (“DNA signatures”) to detect the presence of an organism and to distinguish it from all others. After highlighting vulnerabilities of the prevalent DNA signature paradigm for the identification of agricultural genetically modified (GM) organisms it will be argued that these so-called signatures really are no signatures at all - when compared to the notion of traditional (handwritten) signatures and their generalizations in the modern (digital) world. It is suggested that a recent contamination event of an unauthorized GM Bacillus subtilis strain (Paracchini et al., 2017) in Europe could have been—or the same way could be - the consequence of exploiting gaps of prevailing DNA signatures. Moreover, a recent study (Mueller, 2019) proposes that such DNA signatures may intentionally be exploited to support the counterfeiting or even weaponization of GM organisms (GMOs). These concerns mandate a re-conceptualization of how DNA signatures need to be realized. After identifying central issues of the new vulnerabilities and overlying them with practical challenges that bio-cyber hackers would be facing, recommendations are made how DNA signatures may be enhanced. To overcome the core problem of signature transferability in bioengineered mediums, it is necessary that the identifier needs to remain secret during the entire verification process. On the other hand, however, the goal of DNA signatures is to enable public verifiability, leading to a paradoxical dilemma. It is shown that this can be addressed with ideas that underlie special cryptographic signatures, in particular those of “zero-knowledge” and “invisibility.” This means more than mere signature hiding, but relies on a knowledge-based proof and differentiation of a secret (here, as assigned to specific clones) which can be realized without explicit demonstration of that secret. A re-conceptualization of these principles can be used in form of a combined (digital and physical) method to establish confidentiality and prevent un-impersonation of the manufacturer. As a result, this helps mitigate the circulation of possibly hazardous GMO counterfeits and also addresses the situation whereby attackers try to blame producers for deliberately implanting illicit adulterations hidden within authorized GMOs.

Background: Proliferation and expansion of security risks necessitates new measures to ensure authenticity and validation of GMOs. Watermarking and other cryptographic methods are available which conceal and recover the original signature, but in the process reveal the authentication information. In many scenarios watermarking and standard cryptographic methods are necessary but not sufficient and new, more advanced, cryptographic protocols are necessary. Results: Herein, we present a new crypto protocol, that is applicable in broader settings, and embeds the authentication string indistinguishably from a random element in the signature space and the string is verified or denied without disclosing the actual signature. Results show that in a nucleotide string of 1000, the algorithm gives a correlation of 0.98 or higher between the distribution of the codon and that of E. coli, making the signature virtually invisible. Conclusions: This algorithm may be used to securely authenticate and validate GMOs without disclosing the actual signature. While this protocol uses watermarking, its novelty is in use of more complex cryptographic techniques based on zero knowledge proofs to encode information.

MRNA vaccines have played a massive role during the COVID-19 pandemic and are now being developed for numerous other human and animal applications. Nevertheless, their potential ramifications on the environment lack scrutiny and regulation. On 14 July 2020, the EU decided to temporarily exclude the clinical trials with COVID-19 vaccines from prior environmental risk assessment. Even though billions of doses have been administered and large-scale agricultural and wildlife RNA applications are fast-tracked, there is no knowledge of their environmental impact via the dispersion of vaccine-derived material or their wastage. This knowledge gap is targeted here via a critical assessment of (1) the pharmacokinetic properties of these products; (2) their impact on the human microbiota; (3) novel risk factors exemplified by the human gut bacterium Escherichia coli resulting in pathogen evolution in the guts of wild animals, (4) findings on mRNA-LNP platforms that implicate extracellular vesicles (EVs) as superior carriers, and (5) potentials of exogenous regulatory RNAs. This analysis results in the first extrapolation of (a) the magnitude and likelihood of environmental risk as characterized by the FDA in 2015 for products that facilitate their action by transcription and/or translation of transferred genetic material or related processes, and (b) additional risks facilitated by the horizontal transfer of exogenous short RNAs. The arguments provided here establish the rationale for vaccine-derived bioactive material dispersed by EVs, impacted microbiota, and other exposed organisms to foster pathogen evolution, cross-species transfer of biological function, and driving widespread ecosystem disturbances. Evidence is emerging that vaccine-derived molecules, when ingested, could survive digestion and mediate gene expression regulation, host–parasite defense, immunity, and other responses in the consuming animals. Highlighting further unresolved questions, the comprehensive assessment provided here calls for open dialogue and more in-depth studies to get a clear picture in the EU and globally to most effectively gauge the environmental impact of existing and emerging human, livestock, and wildlife mRNA technologies or their potential as biological weapons or for other forms of misuse. Regulatory measures are urgently needed to mitigate potentially large-scale damage to public and ecosystem health as well as adverse societal, economic, and legal implications.

In a series of papers, D. Gordon and C. Pomerance demonstrated that pseudoprimes on elliptic curves behave in many ways very similar to pseudoprimes related to Lucas sequences. In this paper we give an answer to a challenge that was posted by D. Gordon in 1989. The challenge was to either prove that a certain composite $N \equiv 1 \bmod 4$ did not exist, or to explicitly calculate such a number. In this paper, we both present such a specific composite (for Gordon’s curve with CM by $\mathbb {Q}(\sqrt {-7})$ ), as well as a proof of the non-existence (for curves with CM by $\mathbb {Q}(\sqrt {-3}$ )). We derive some criteria for the group structure of CM curves that allow testing for all composites, including $N \equiv 3 \bmod 4$ which had been excluded by Gordon. This gives rise to another type of examples of composites where strong elliptic pseudoprimes are not Euler elliptic pseudoprimes.