This paper surveys the literature on point-to-point (P2P) links for integrated satellite-aerial networks, which are envisioned to be among the key enablers of the sixth-generation (6G) of wireless networks vision. The paper first outlines the unique characteristics of such integrated large-scale complex networks, often denoted by spatial networks, and focuses on two particular space-air infrastructures, namely, satellites networks and high-altitude platforms (HAPs). The paper then classifies the connecting P2P communications links as satellite-to-satellite links at the same layer (SSLL), satellite-to-satellite links at different layers (SSLD), and HAP-to-HAP links (HHL). The paper surveys each layer of such spatial networks separately, and highlights the possible natures of the connecting links (i.e., radio-frequency or free-space optics) with a dedicated survey of the existing link-budget results. The paper, afterwards, presents the prospective merit of realizing such an integrated satellite-HAP network towards providing broadband services in under-served and remote areas. Finally, the paper sheds light on several future research directions in the context of spatial networks, namely large-scale network optimization, intelligent offloading, smart platforms, energy efficiency, multiple access schemes, distributed spatial networks, and routing.

Game theory is the study of decision problems in which there are multiple decision makers and the quality of a decision maker's choice depends on both that choice and the choices of others. While game theory has been studied predominantly as a modeling paradigm in the mathematical social sciences, there is a strong connection to control systems in that a controller can be viewed as a decision-making entity. Accordingly, game theory is relevant in settings with multiple interacting controllers. This article presents an introduction to game theory, followed by a sampling of results in three specific control theory topics where game theory has played a significant role: ( a) zero-sum games, in which the two competing players are a controller and an adversarial environment; ( b) team games, in which several controllers pursue a common goal but have access to different information; and ( c) distributed control, in which both a game and online adaptive rules are designed to enable distributed interacting subsystems to achieve a collective objective.

In this paper, a new sensing device that can simultaneously monitor traffic congestion and urban flash floods is presented. This sensing device is based on the combination of passive infrared sensors (PIRs) and ultrasonic rangefinder, and is used for real-time vehicle detection, classification, and speed estimation in the context of wireless sensor networks. This framework relies on dynamic Bayesian Networks to fuse heterogeneous data both spatially and temporally for vehicle detection. To estimate the speed of the incoming vehicles, we first use cross correlation and wavelet transform-based methods to estimate the time delay between the signals of different sensors. We then propose a calibration and self-correction model based on Bayesian Networks to make a joint inference by all sensors about the speed and the length of the detected vehicle. Furthermore, we use the measurements of the ultrasonic and the PIR sensors to perform vehicle classification. Validation data (using an experimental dual infrared and ultrasonic traffic sensor) show a 99% accuracy in vehicle detection, a mean error of 5 kph in vehicle speed estimation, a mean error of 0.7m in vehicle length estimation, and a high accuracy in vehicle classification. Finally, we discuss the computational performance of the algorithm, and show that this framework can be implemented on low-power computational devices within a wireless sensor network setting. Such decentralized processing greatly improves the energy consumption of the system and minimizes bandwidth usage.

The class of “stable games”, introduced by Hofbauer and Sandholm in 2009, has the attractive property of admitting global convergence to equilibria under many evolutionary dynamics. We show that stable games can be identified as a special case of the feedback-system-theoretic notion of a “passive” dynamical system. Motivated by this observation, we develop a notion of passivity for evolutionary dynamics that complements the definition of the class of stable games. Since interconnections of passive dynamical systems exhibit stable behavior, we can make conclusions about passive evolutionary dynamics coupled with stable games. We show how established evolutionary dynamics qualify as passive dynamical systems. Moreover, we exploit the flexibility of the definition of passive dynamical systems to analyze generalizations of stable games and evolutionary dynamics that include forecasting heuristics as well as certain games with memory.