Scholars and commentators have described the African state in different forms and versions based on their assessments, rightly or wrongly, of the development’s strides. Reports by international and local developmental agencies often present gloomy descriptions of a continent suffering from the resource curse. The scorecards of most of the African leaders seem to confirm the assertions of failures in the midst of abundant resources. The corruption pandemic in Africa has rendered the societies as the exporter of potential human resources needed for developments and innovation to the countries of the West. While the continent’s deplorable social and economic situations worsened, the leadership cadres exploit their power to widen the inequality gaps through unethical conduct. This paper interrogates the leadership-accountability nexus in some countries in Africa with a view to understanding the nature of the pervasiveness of governance crisis. The paper argues that African leaders are more of political predators than freedom fighters against the legacies of colonialism. Rather than explore the state’s power to promote the public interest, African leaders are more concerned with their personal welfare, exploiting the vulnerability of the citizens. Cases of leadership corruption and malfeasances are swept away thereby engendering the unprecedented culture of leadership deficiency with impunity. This paper submits that the crisis of governance in Africa could be dealt with only if the citizens are liberated from the grip of leadership insensitivity and the rhetoric of colonialism.
This article interrogates the effectiveness of the requisites for constitutional provisions in respect of the promotion of accountability and good governance in South Africa and Nigeria. The article notes that the drafters of the Constitutions of the two countries made sufficient provisions for the regulation and control of the executive and legislative activities in a manner that could guarantee effective service delivery. These constitutional provisions, in line with the practices of their respective governing systems of the two countries, empower the legislature to hold the executive accountable. The article discovers that the lawmakers in the two countries lacked the capacity to harness the provisions for intended purposes. Using the elite theory for its analysis, the article argues that legislative oversight in South Africa and Nigeria is not as effective as envisaged in the constitutional provisions envisaged. This weakness has given rise to the worsening governance crises in the two countries in spite of their abundant economic and human resources. The article opines that the institutional structures of the political systems of the two countries, especially the dominant party phenomenon, coupled with the personal disposition of the political elites incapacitate the effective exercise of the oversight powers of legislatures in the two countries. The article, therefore, submits that the people of the two countries have to devise another means of holding their leaders accountable in the face of collaboration between the executive and the legislature to perpetuate impunity in the public space. Independent agencies should be more active in the exposure of unethical behaviours of the political elites, while the judiciary should be more independent in the dispensation of justice.