Angela Vasa

Ms. Angela Vasa

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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6 May 2020 in The American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
DBDavid Brett-Major
David Brett-Major
ESElizabeth R. Schnaubelt
Elizabeth R. Schnaubelt
HCHannah Creager
Hannah Creager
ALAbigail Lowe
Abigail Lowe
TCTheodore Cieslak
Theodore Cieslak
MBM. Jana Broadhurst
M. Jana Broadhurst
The optimal time to initiate research on emergencies is before they occur. However, timely initiation of high-quality research may launch during an emergency under the right conditions. These include an appropriate context, clarity in scientific aims, preexisting resources, strong operational and research structures that are facile, and good governance. Here, Nebraskan rapid research efforts early during the 2020 coronavirus disease pandemic, while participating in the first use of U.S. federal quarantine in 50 years, are described from these aspects, as the global experience with this severe emerging infection grew apace. The experience has lessons in purpose, structure, function, and performance of research in any emergency, when facing any threat.

1 August 2017 in Health Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
AVAngela Vasa
Angela Vasa
PSPhilip W. Smith
Philip W. Smith
MSMichelle Schwedhelm
Michelle Schwedhelm
TCTheodore J. Cieslak
Theodore J. Cieslak
JLJohn Lowe
John Lowe
AHAngela Hewlett
Angela Hewlett
The Ebola outbreak of 2014-2016 highlighted the need for the development of a more robust healthcare infrastructure in the United States to provide isolation care for patients infected with a highly hazardous contagious disease. Routine exercises and skills practice are required to effectively and safely prepare care teams to confidently treat this special population of patients. The Nebraska Biocontainment Unit (NBU) at Nebraska Medicine in Omaha has been conducting exercises since 2005 when the unit was opened. Previous activities and exercises conducted by the Nebraska Biocontainment Unit have focused on transporting and caring for up to 3 patients with Ebola virus disease or other special pathogens. Changes in regional and national mandates, as well as the increased potential for receiving multiple patients at once, at a single location, have resulted in a greater demand to exercise protocols for the treatment of multiple patients. This article discusses in detail the planning, execution, and outcomes of a full-scale exercise involving 10 simulated patients with a highly infectious pathogen transmitted by the airborne route.

1 December 2021 in Infection Control & Hospital Epidemiology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
JHJocelyn Herstein
Jocelyn Herstein
TWTimo Wolf
Timo Wolf
ENEmanuele Nicastri
Emanuele Nicastri
YLYee Sin Leo
Yee Sin Leo
PLPoh Lian Lim
Poh Lian Lim
JLJohn J. Lowe
John J. Lowe
Objective: To assess experience, physical infrastructure, and capabilities of high-level isolation units (HLIUs) planning to participate in a 2018 global HLIU workshop hosted by the US National Emerging Special Pathogens Training and Education Center (NETEC).Design: An electronic survey elicited information on general HLIU organization, operating costs, staffing models, and infection control protocols of select global units.Setting and participants: The survey was distributed to site representatives of 22 HLIUs located in the United States, Europe, and Asia; 19 (86%) responded.Methods: Data were coded and analyzed using descriptive statistics.Results: The mean annual reported budget for the 19 responding units was US$484,615. Most (89%) had treated a suspected or confirmed case of a high-consequence infectious disease. Reported composition of trained teams included a broad range of clinical and nonclinical roles. The mean number of HLIU beds was 6.37 (median, 4; range, 2–20) for adults and 4.23 (median, 2; range, 1–10) for children; however, capacity was dependent on pathogen.Conclusions: Responding HLIUs represent some of the most experienced HLIUs in the world. Variation in reported unit infrastructure, capabilities, and procedures demonstrate the variety of HLIU approaches. A number of technical questions unique to HLIUs remain unanswered related to physical design, infection prevention and control procedures, and staffing and training. These key areas represent potential focal points for future evidence and practice guidelines. These data are important considerations for hospitals considering the design and development of HLIUs, and there is a need for continued global HLIU collaboration to define best practices.

31 May 2022 in Health Security
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
AVAngela Vasa
Angela Vasa
VPValerie Pacino
Valerie Pacino
SVSami Vasistha
Sami Vasistha
WEWael ElRayes
Wael ElRayes
JLJohn J. Lowe
John J. Lowe
In February 2015, the US Department of Health and Human Services developed a tiered hospital network to deliver safe and effective care to patients with Ebola virus disease (EVD) and other special pathogens. The tiered network consisted of regional special pathogen treatment centers, state- or jurisdiction-designated treatment centers, assessment hospitals able to safely isolate a patient until a diagnosis of EVD was confirmed and transfer the patient, and frontline healthcare facilities able to identify and isolate patients with EVD and facilitate transport to higher-tier facilities. The National Emerging Special Pathogens Training and Education Center (NETEC) was established in tandem to support the development of healthcare facility special pathogen management capabilities. In August 2020, 20 hospitals that previously received an onsite readiness consultation by NETEC were surveyed to assess how special pathogen programs were leveraged for COVID-19 response. All surveyed facilities indicated their programs were leveraged for COVID-19 response in at least 1 of the following ways: NETEC-sponsored resources and training, utilization of patient isolation spaces, specially trained staff, and supplies. Personal protective equipment shortages were experienced by 95% of facilities, with 80% of facilities reporting that special pathogens program personal protective equipment was used to support facility response to COVID-19 admissions. More than half of facilities (63%) reported leveraging biocontainment unit staff to provide training and education to frontline staff during initial response to COVID-19. These findings have implications for planning and investments to avoid the panic-then-forget cycle that hinders sustained preparedness for future special pathogens.

10 September 2017
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
AHAngela Hewlett
Angela Hewlett
AVAngela Vasa
Angela Vasa
TCTheodore Cieslak
Theodore Cieslak
JLJohn Lowe
John Lowe
SSShelly Schwedhelm
Shelly Schwedhelm

13 October 2025 in Antimicrobial Stewardship & Healthcare Epidemiology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MDMadeline A. DiLorenzo
Madeline A. DiLorenzo
APAnthony J. Lo Piccolo
Anthony J. Lo Piccolo
WEWael ElRayes
Wael ElRayes
JHJocelyn J. Herstein
Jocelyn J. Herstein
RPRadu Postelnicu
Radu Postelnicu
VMVikramjit Mukherjee
Vikramjit Mukherjee
Objective: A follow-up survey of Special Pathogen Treatment Centers (SPTCs) was conducted to assess their readiness to provide critical care interventions to confirmed and suspected viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF) patients after the COVID-19 pandemic. Methods: An electronic survey with 54 multiple-choice and free-response questions assessing VHF critical care capabilities was sent to 74 US SPTCs in April 2023. Results: Fourteen SPTCs (19%) completed the survey. Most respondents were prepared to provide intubation/mechanical ventilation (79%), pharmacologic cardioversion (79%), renal replacement therapy (71%), and defibrillation (71%) to suspected and confirmed VHF patients. Few were ready to provide cricothyrotomy (36%), extracorporeal membranous oxygenation (ECMO) (29%), or code status (14%). Factors impacting institutions’ ability to provide critical care to a VHF patient included staff safety (71%) and clinical futility (50%). Less than half (36%) reported that the COVID-19 pandemic positively affected their facility’s ability to care for VHF patients, while 21% indicated the pandemic prompted their facility to be better prepared to care for a VHF patient. Conclusions: Most responding SPTCs reported capability for critical care interventions, although fewer had policies governing code status, ECMO, and cricothyrotomy. Institutions were less prepared to manage a VHF patient after the COVID-19 pandemic, highlighting challenges such as staff turnover and less support for training and equipment maintenance. Given that special pathogen outbreaks continue to occur globally, governments and healthcare institutions should institute measures to recruit, support, and retain staff to ensure critical care readiness for special pathogen patients.