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Prof. Emma García-Meca
School of Business, Technical University of Cartagena, Calle Real 3, Cartagena, Spain

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0 Corporate Governance
0 CSR
0 Intellectual Capital
0 Sustainability
0 non-financial reporting

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Corporate Governance
Sustainability
CSR
Intellectual Capital
Gender Diversity
family firms

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Journal article
Published: 23 March 2021 in Journal of Cleaner Production
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Although sustainability development goals look for the “common good”, the question of whether macro-objectives related to the fight against poverty, gender discrimination or environmental degradation affect firms’ financial results is not easily answered. This article examines whether sustainable development goal reporting is symbolic or substantive. We specifically analyze the role this reporting plays in companies belonging to controversial and environmentally sensitive industries, where the incentives to use sustainable development goal disclosures as a symbolic strategy can be greater. This paper addresses existing research gaps by first examining the influence of sustainable development goal reporting on firm performance, and second, the effect of industry-level factors in moderating the relationship between addressing sustainable development goals in sustainability reports and corporate performance. We examine our research hypotheses with the use of a European database comprising 523 firm-year observations from 2015 and 2016. After controlling for endogeneity, our evidence reports the lack of an effect of sustainable development goal reporting on firm performance, supporting the symbolic value of this information for stakeholders. However, our main findings confirm an effect of this reporting on performance in controversial sectors, such as alcohol, gambling, tobacco, and firearms, as well as in environmentally sensitive industries. Results suggest the value-enhancement of sustainable development goal reporting only happens in companies under high social scrutiny and with stakeholders concerned about ethical and environmental issues.

ACS Style

García-Meca. Emma; Martínez-Ferrero. Jennifer. Is SDG reporting substantial or symbolic? An examination of controversial and environmentally sensitive industries. Journal of Cleaner Production 2021, 298, 126781 .

AMA Style

García-Meca. Emma, Martínez-Ferrero. Jennifer. Is SDG reporting substantial or symbolic? An examination of controversial and environmentally sensitive industries. Journal of Cleaner Production. 2021; 298 ():126781.

Chicago/Turabian Style

García-Meca. Emma; Martínez-Ferrero. Jennifer. 2021. "Is SDG reporting substantial or symbolic? An examination of controversial and environmentally sensitive industries." Journal of Cleaner Production 298, no. : 126781.

Journal article
Published: 11 March 2021 in Journal of Business Research
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This paper examines the effect of chief executive officerś (CEOs) narcissistic tendencies regarding corporate tax avoidance. Moreover, it aims to test the moderating effect of two audit committee characteristics, size and gender, on the relationship between narcissism and tax avoidance. By using a Spanish sample of analysis composed of 1303 firm-year observations from the period 2008–2017, the findings indicate support for our hypotheses. Specifically, CEO narcissism is positively related to tax avoidance. Narcissism is considered a personality trait that causes CEOs to implement tax avoidance strategies. However, this discretional behavior is constrained by some audit committee characteristics. Specifically, firms with larger audit committees help to control the consequences of CEO narcissism on tax avoidance. In addition, gender diverse audit committees are more sensitive to firm tax aggressiveness, and they reduce aggressive tax practices promoted by narcissistic CEOs. Therefore, audit committee effectiveness is critical in monitoring managerial decisions related to tax avoidance.

ACS Style

Emma García-Meca; Maria-Camino Ramón-Llorens; Jennifer Martínez-Ferrero. Are narcissistic CEOs more tax aggressive? The moderating role of internal audit committees. Journal of Business Research 2021, 129, 223 -235.

AMA Style

Emma García-Meca, Maria-Camino Ramón-Llorens, Jennifer Martínez-Ferrero. Are narcissistic CEOs more tax aggressive? The moderating role of internal audit committees. Journal of Business Research. 2021; 129 ():223-235.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Emma García-Meca; Maria-Camino Ramón-Llorens; Jennifer Martínez-Ferrero. 2021. "Are narcissistic CEOs more tax aggressive? The moderating role of internal audit committees." Journal of Business Research 129, no. : 223-235.

Journal article
Published: 14 July 2020 in Administrative Sciences
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We analyze the association between managerial ability in banks and three different typologies of investments that demand significant resources: capital, research and development (R&D), and acquisition expenditures. We also analyze whether managerial ability is related to increased (reduced) investment in banks prone to underinvestment (overinvestment). The sample for analysis is composed of 877 observations of banks in nine countries over the period 2004–2010. We find evidence that more able bank managers select and implement investment projects more efficiently and confirm the upper echelon theory and resource-based view, which suggests that managers’ characteristics affect financial decisions. The findings are robust to alternative measures of investment efficiency. The evidence confirms that, after controlling for bank and country-specific institutional factors, managers’ abilities influence investment efficiency in banks in a significant way. This paper is a response to the calls for a further exploration of the roles that individual managers play in financial decisions and is the first empirical study to investigate this association in the international financial industry.

ACS Style

Isabel-María García-Sánchez; Emma García-Meca. Do Able Bank Managers Exhibit Specific Attributes? An Empirical Analysis of Their Investment Efficiency. Administrative Sciences 2020, 10, 44 .

AMA Style

Isabel-María García-Sánchez, Emma García-Meca. Do Able Bank Managers Exhibit Specific Attributes? An Empirical Analysis of Their Investment Efficiency. Administrative Sciences. 2020; 10 (3):44.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Isabel-María García-Sánchez; Emma García-Meca. 2020. "Do Able Bank Managers Exhibit Specific Attributes? An Empirical Analysis of Their Investment Efficiency." Administrative Sciences 10, no. 3: 44.

Journal article
Published: 19 March 2020 in Journal of Cleaner Production
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This paper aims to study the factors determining the quality of sustainability reporting in Latin American business groups. Applying a logistic regression model, this study is pioneer in establishing how some distinct corporate variables of business groups influence disclosure quality of Corporate Social Responsibility practices in these groups in emerging economies. The results show that control concentration in the groups negatively affects the quality of sustainability reporting. Variables such as foreign ownership, the age of the business group and board size help business groups to improve the quality of their sustainability and voluntary disclosure practices. These results form the basis to conduct further studies on voluntary disclosure in business groups, since they evidence that corporate governance has implications for the group’s sustainability and their voluntary disclosure, especially in the institutional context of developing economies where sustainability is an emerging topic in its link with the nature of the firm (business group).

ACS Style

Jaime Andres Correa-Garcia; Maria Antonia Garcia-Benau; Emma Garcia-Meca. Corporate governance and its implications for sustainability reporting quality in Latin American business groups. Journal of Cleaner Production 2020, 260, 121142 .

AMA Style

Jaime Andres Correa-Garcia, Maria Antonia Garcia-Benau, Emma Garcia-Meca. Corporate governance and its implications for sustainability reporting quality in Latin American business groups. Journal of Cleaner Production. 2020; 260 ():121142.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Jaime Andres Correa-Garcia; Maria Antonia Garcia-Benau; Emma Garcia-Meca. 2020. "Corporate governance and its implications for sustainability reporting quality in Latin American business groups." Journal of Cleaner Production 260, no. : 121142.

Journal article
Published: 28 November 2018 in Journal of Cleaner Production
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This research examines how family firms behave towards corporate social responsibility performance and the moderating role of contingent factors based on governance and environmental aspects. After applying several Tobit regressions for an international sample, from 2006 to 2014, this paper supports the following: family firms behave towards corporate social responsibility, aiming to preserve their socioemotional wealth and the firm's survival. Moreover, several contingency factors moderate on this commitment. Concretely, the socially responsible behaviour of family firms is greater: (i) under the large presence of family members on the management team and family directors on the board of directors (i.e., as governance factors) and (ii) in munificent contexts (i.e., as an environment factor).

ACS Style

Eva López-González; Jennifer Martínez-Ferrero; Emma García-Meca. Corporate social responsibility in family firms: A contingency approach. Journal of Cleaner Production 2018, 211, 1044 -1064.

AMA Style

Eva López-González, Jennifer Martínez-Ferrero, Emma García-Meca. Corporate social responsibility in family firms: A contingency approach. Journal of Cleaner Production. 2018; 211 ():1044-1064.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Eva López-González; Jennifer Martínez-Ferrero; Emma García-Meca. 2018. "Corporate social responsibility in family firms: A contingency approach." Journal of Cleaner Production 211, no. : 1044-1064.

Journal article
Published: 25 August 2018 in Long Range Planning
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The objective of this paper is to analyze the effect of the professional, technical and relational background (human and social capital) of outside directors on promoting firm CSR disclosure. Following the Hillman et al. (2000) taxonomy of board members, we classify outside directors as business experts, support specialists and community influential, and examine whether business and technical expertise or political ties in the boardroom affect CSR disclosure. This study confirms that not all outside directors are equally effective in improving CSR disclosure and that only certain kinds of outside directors, those classified as support specialists, help promote it. On the other hand, our findings also show that directors with previous experience as politicians affect CSR disclosure negatively, probably due to their interests in safeguarding their reputation within the company, in avoiding public scrutiny and in protecting their political connections. In addition, our set of analysis with interaction effects reveals that powerful CEOs have the incentive to promote CSR-related strategies and to convince business experts and support specialist directors to enhance profitable sustainability strategies and transparency in CSR disclosure. Nevertheless, the powerful CEO effect is not enough to compensate the negative role of political directors on CSR reporting. Therefore, this paper supports the theories in favor of analyzing the multiple configurations of corporate governance mechanisms by adopting a holistic approach, and the need to combine these configurations in order to analyze their impact on CSR behavior.

ACS Style

M. Camino Ramón-Llorens; Emma García-Meca; M. Consuelo Pucheta-Martínez. The role of human and social board capital in driving CSR reporting. Long Range Planning 2018, 52, 101846 .

AMA Style

M. Camino Ramón-Llorens, Emma García-Meca, M. Consuelo Pucheta-Martínez. The role of human and social board capital in driving CSR reporting. Long Range Planning. 2018; 52 (6):101846.

Chicago/Turabian Style

M. Camino Ramón-Llorens; Emma García-Meca; M. Consuelo Pucheta-Martínez. 2018. "The role of human and social board capital in driving CSR reporting." Long Range Planning 52, no. 6: 101846.

Journal article
Published: 01 August 2018 in European Management Journal
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ACS Style

Emma García-Meca; Isabel-Maria Garcia-Sanchez. Does managerial ability influence the quality of financial reporting? European Management Journal 2018, 36, 544 -557.

AMA Style

Emma García-Meca, Isabel-Maria Garcia-Sanchez. Does managerial ability influence the quality of financial reporting? European Management Journal. 2018; 36 (4):544-557.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Emma García-Meca; Isabel-Maria Garcia-Sanchez. 2018. "Does managerial ability influence the quality of financial reporting?" European Management Journal 36, no. 4: 544-557.

Journal article
Published: 31 July 2018 in Administrative Sciences
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This paper contributes to the debate on the corporate governance of financial institutions, by studying the effect of different board characteristics on the level of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures of banks. For that, we use a sample composed by 159 banks over the period 2004–2010. We found that independent directors and gender diversity favor the disclosure CSR information in baking sector. But, these results are moderated by the national cultural system; concretely, previous positive effects of independence and diversity of banks’ boards on CSR reporting are reduced in countries with a weaker cultural system, that is, individualist, masculine and vertically stratified societies, that are little indulgent and short-term oriented and show high levels of uncertainty avoidance.

ACS Style

Emma García-Meca; María-Victoria Uribe-Bohórquez; Beatriz Cuadrado-Ballesteros. Culture, Board Composition and Corporate Social Reporting in the Banking Sector. Administrative Sciences 2018, 8, 41 .

AMA Style

Emma García-Meca, María-Victoria Uribe-Bohórquez, Beatriz Cuadrado-Ballesteros. Culture, Board Composition and Corporate Social Reporting in the Banking Sector. Administrative Sciences. 2018; 8 (3):41.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Emma García-Meca; María-Victoria Uribe-Bohórquez; Beatriz Cuadrado-Ballesteros. 2018. "Culture, Board Composition and Corporate Social Reporting in the Banking Sector." Administrative Sciences 8, no. 3: 41.

Original article
Published: 28 June 2018 in Australian Accounting Review
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In this study, we examine the relationship between accounting conservatism and board composition. We categorise outside directors according to their skills, abilities, connections and knowledge in three different categories: business experts, support specialists and community influentials. We address three main questions: Is the financial and accounting expertise of directors relevant to improving accounting conservatism? Does specialised expertise in the board affect the speed at which news is reflected in earnings? And how do the political ties of directors affect the sensitivity of earnings to bad news? Our sample consists of active US biotech firms publicly traded on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stock exchanges during the 2005–2013 period. Our study confirms that not all outside directors are equally effective in monitoring and contracting and that certain kinds of outside directors, such as politicians, can even lower the sensitivity of earnings to bad news. Our robustness analysis confirms that these results are not conditional on the accounting measure, and suggest that distinguishing directors according to their skills and abilities is crucial to understanding the way in which firm boards affect conservatism.

ACS Style

Luminita Enache; Emma García‐Meca. Board Composition and Accounting Conservatism: The Role of Business Experts, Support Specialist and Community Influentials. Australian Accounting Review 2018, 29, 252 -265.

AMA Style

Luminita Enache, Emma García‐Meca. Board Composition and Accounting Conservatism: The Role of Business Experts, Support Specialist and Community Influentials. Australian Accounting Review. 2018; 29 (1):252-265.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Luminita Enache; Emma García‐Meca. 2018. "Board Composition and Accounting Conservatism: The Role of Business Experts, Support Specialist and Community Influentials." Australian Accounting Review 29, no. 1: 252-265.

Original article
Published: 28 June 2018 in Australian Accounting Review
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Our main objective is to study the effect of institutional directors on firm performance, distinguishing directors according to whether they maintain business relationships (pressure‐sensitive) or not (pressure‐resistant). Our results show that in weak regulatory and low investor protection environments, institutional directors have a negative impact on corporate performance. Our evidence shows that this negative effect is mainly driven by the role of pressure‐resistant directors and not for those directors representing mainly banks and other financial institutions with a long‐term investment horizon. These findings have implications for numerous parties, such as institutional investors, regulators, potential new board members and other corporate governance reform proponents, who frequently examine board characteristics to assess the effectiveness of boards in value‐creation policies.

ACS Style

María Consuelo Pucheta-Martínez; Emma García-Meca. Monitoring, Corporate Performance and Institutional Directors. Australian Accounting Review 2018, 29, 208 -219.

AMA Style

María Consuelo Pucheta-Martínez, Emma García-Meca. Monitoring, Corporate Performance and Institutional Directors. Australian Accounting Review. 2018; 29 (1):208-219.

Chicago/Turabian Style

María Consuelo Pucheta-Martínez; Emma García-Meca. 2018. "Monitoring, Corporate Performance and Institutional Directors." Australian Accounting Review 29, no. 1: 208-219.

Journal article
Published: 16 May 2018 in Sustainability
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The aim of this paper is to assess stakeholder orientation and corporate social responsibility (CSR) communication strategies in the business groups (BGs) of an emerging economy by means of content analysis. We worked with 30 non-financial BGs taken from the Colombian Stock Exchange. The study uses as its unit of analysis corporate reports that have been classified into four categories: annual reports (ARs), sustainability reports (SRs), combined reports (CRs), and integrated reports (IRs). The results show that IRs are the most similar reports, that Colombian BGs are mainly employee-oriented (ARs, SRs, CRs) and shareholder-oriented (IRs), and that response and involvement communication strategies are the most commonly used. Our research has theoretical and practical implications based on the assumption that the study of corporate reports has particular importance for those BGs with diversification strategies and international orientation, since it opens possibilities for future research.

ACS Style

Jaime-Andres Correa-Garcia; Maria-Antonia Garcia-Benau; Emma Garcia-Meca. CSR Communication Strategies of Colombian Business Groups: An Analysis of Corporate Reports. Sustainability 2018, 10, 1602 .

AMA Style

Jaime-Andres Correa-Garcia, Maria-Antonia Garcia-Benau, Emma Garcia-Meca. CSR Communication Strategies of Colombian Business Groups: An Analysis of Corporate Reports. Sustainability. 2018; 10 (5):1602.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Jaime-Andres Correa-Garcia; Maria-Antonia Garcia-Benau; Emma Garcia-Meca. 2018. "CSR Communication Strategies of Colombian Business Groups: An Analysis of Corporate Reports." Sustainability 10, no. 5: 1602.

Original manuscript
Published: 23 March 2018 in Corporate Governance: An International Review
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Research question The main objective of this paper is to examine the influence of managerial ability on investment efficiency. Using a sample of 2,185 firms from 24 countries for the period 2006–2015, we hypothesize a positive association between investment efficiency and managerial ability and suggest that able managers make fewer over‐ and underinvestment decisions. As a unique and helpful feature of this study, we also employ a model to capture the different interactions between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms and managerial ability. Research findings Our results show that managerial ability is an economically relevant determinant of investment efficiency, resulting in lower levels of underinvestment and overinvestment. Additionally, our findings note that the benefits of able managers for investment efficiency are reinforced when companies are located in countries with better board effectiveness, superior investor protection, and better legal enforcement, suggesting that governance mechanisms are effective complementary measures to constrain inefficient investment decisions. The results also indicate that the advantages of having able managers are especially noticeable during a financial crisis and under conditions of greater information asymmetry. Academic Implications Our findings suggest that governance mechanisms are effective complementary measures to constrain inefficient investment decisions. Specifically, our results highlight the relevance of the monitoring role of the board, noting that the efficiency of this internal control mechanism complements the effect that able managers have on investment efficiency. Practical implications The paper has relevant implications. First, boards of directors must be aware that, although the access to financial resources is a determinant of firms’ financial success, the individual ability to manage them is essential in making efficient investment decisions, which should be considered when recruiting new managers and establishing compensation schemes. Second, the paper shows that managerial ability is reinforced when the company is in a country with strong corporate governance mechanisms, implying that regulators should be aware of the relevance of investor protection, legal enforcement, and board effectiveness to improve the benefits of managerial attributes and therefore the financial efficiency of firms.

ACS Style

Isabel-María García-Sánchez; Emma García-Meca. Do talented managers invest more efficiently? The moderating role of corporate governance mechanisms. Corporate Governance: An International Review 2018, 26, 238 -254.

AMA Style

Isabel-María García-Sánchez, Emma García-Meca. Do talented managers invest more efficiently? The moderating role of corporate governance mechanisms. Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2018; 26 (4):238-254.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Isabel-María García-Sánchez; Emma García-Meca. 2018. "Do talented managers invest more efficiently? The moderating role of corporate governance mechanisms." Corporate Governance: An International Review 26, no. 4: 238-254.

Journal article
Published: 01 August 2017 in International Business Review
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ACS Style

M. Camino Ramón-Llorens; Emma García-Meca; Antonio Duréndez. Influence of CEO characteristics in family firms internationalization. International Business Review 2017, 26, 786 -799.

AMA Style

M. Camino Ramón-Llorens, Emma García-Meca, Antonio Duréndez. Influence of CEO characteristics in family firms internationalization. International Business Review. 2017; 26 (4):786-799.

Chicago/Turabian Style

M. Camino Ramón-Llorens; Emma García-Meca; Antonio Duréndez. 2017. "Influence of CEO characteristics in family firms internationalization." International Business Review 26, no. 4: 786-799.

Journal article
Published: 01 July 2017 in Journal of Business Research
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ACS Style

Isabel-María García-Sánchez; Emma García-Meca; Beatriz Cuadrado-Ballesteros. Do financial experts on audit committees matter for bank insolvency risk-taking? The monitoring role of bank regulation and ethical policy. Journal of Business Research 2017, 76, 52 -66.

AMA Style

Isabel-María García-Sánchez, Emma García-Meca, Beatriz Cuadrado-Ballesteros. Do financial experts on audit committees matter for bank insolvency risk-taking? The monitoring role of bank regulation and ethical policy. Journal of Business Research. 2017; 76 ():52-66.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Isabel-María García-Sánchez; Emma García-Meca; Beatriz Cuadrado-Ballesteros. 2017. "Do financial experts on audit committees matter for bank insolvency risk-taking? The monitoring role of bank regulation and ethical policy." Journal of Business Research 76, no. : 52-66.

Article
Published: 13 October 2015 in Journal of Business Ethics
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We examine whether the behavior of institutional investors representatives on boards leads to observable differences in corporate finance. We find that directors representing pressure-sensitive investors (i.e., banks and insurance companies) prefer lower financial leverage whereas pressure-resistant directors (i.e., mutual funds and pension funds) show no particular preference. When analyzed separately, directors appointed by banks and insurance firms have different attitudes. Bank representatives on boards increase both the financial leverage and the banking debt. This result suggests that some types of institutional directors provide financial resources to the firms on whose board they sit, supporting the view that boards manage the uncertainty associated with strategic decision making and provide firms with preferential access to resources and financial expertise. This research has interesting academic and policy implications for the debate over the proper degree of institutional involvement in corporate governance. Different institutional investors have different agendas and incentives for corporate governance, and, therefore, both researchers and policy makers should no longer consider institutional investors as a whole. In addition, our paper calls for new research on the causes and implications of institutional investor involvement in the corporate governance of nonfinancial firms. This new research could require new insights on the dynamics within the boards and on the interplay among the knowledge, incentives and attitudes of quite different directors.

ACS Style

Emma García-Meca; Felix López-Iturriaga; Fernando Tejerina Gaite. Institutional Investors on Boards: Does Their Behavior Influence Corporate Finance? Journal of Business Ethics 2015, 146, 365 -382.

AMA Style

Emma García-Meca, Felix López-Iturriaga, Fernando Tejerina Gaite. Institutional Investors on Boards: Does Their Behavior Influence Corporate Finance? Journal of Business Ethics. 2015; 146 (2):365-382.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Emma García-Meca; Felix López-Iturriaga; Fernando Tejerina Gaite. 2015. "Institutional Investors on Boards: Does Their Behavior Influence Corporate Finance?" Journal of Business Ethics 146, no. 2: 365-382.

Journal article
Published: 01 July 2015 in BRQ Business Research Quarterly
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We address the influence of directors who represent institutional investors in three aspects of board compensation policies: level of compensation, composition, and performance sensitivity. We differentiate pressure-sensitive directors (i.e., with business links) and pressure-resistant directors (i.e., without business links). Our results show that pressure-resistant directors decrease total board compensation and its fixed proportion, whereas they increase the variable proportion of total remuneration and the pay-for-performance sensitivity. By contrast, pressure-sensitive directors offer the opposite results. These findings are consistent with the view that institutional investors are not a homogeneous group and that pressure-resistant directors fulfill a more thorough monitoring role

ACS Style

Felix López-Iturriaga; Emma García-Meca; Fernando Tejerina Gaite. Institutional directors and board compensation: Spanish evidence. BRQ Business Research Quarterly 2015, 18, 161 -173.

AMA Style

Felix López-Iturriaga, Emma García-Meca, Fernando Tejerina Gaite. Institutional directors and board compensation: Spanish evidence. BRQ Business Research Quarterly. 2015; 18 (3):161-173.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Felix López-Iturriaga; Emma García-Meca; Fernando Tejerina Gaite. 2015. "Institutional directors and board compensation: Spanish evidence." BRQ Business Research Quarterly 18, no. 3: 161-173.

Journal article
Published: 14 March 2015 in Review of Managerial Science
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In this paper we analyze the influence of corporate governance, specifically political connections and gender diversity, on board and managers’ remuneration in savings banks in Spain. We also analyze whether financial experience moderates the relation between political experience and board compensation. To the best of our knowledge, the effects of having politicians on remuneration levels of financial firm have not been studied. Connections are important in hiring decisions and in generating business so it is interesting to explore whether they are important when it comes to compensation policies. We use a panel data and financial and corporate governance information from 44 savings banks for the period 2004–2009. Our results show that the previous political activity of the chairperson positively influences board remuneration. Our study provides the first evidence for a link between political connection and compensation policy, showing that, in addition to the standard firm-level factors, political and financial experience are material determinants of economic significance in compensation policies. Specifically, we show that financial expertise may substitute for governance mechanisms that are lacking in firms with weak governance environments (e.g. saving banks with high politicization).

ACS Style

Emma García-Meca. Political connections, gender diversity and compensation policy. Review of Managerial Science 2015, 10, 553 -576.

AMA Style

Emma García-Meca. Political connections, gender diversity and compensation policy. Review of Managerial Science. 2015; 10 (3):553-576.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Emma García-Meca. 2015. "Political connections, gender diversity and compensation policy." Review of Managerial Science 10, no. 3: 553-576.

Preprint
Published: 01 January 2014 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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ACS Style

Fflix J. Llpez-Iturriaga; Emma Garcca-Meca; Fernando Tejerina Gaite; Félix J. López-Iturriaga; Emma García‐Meca. Institutional Directors and Board Compensation: Spanish Evidence. SSRN Electronic Journal 2014, 1 .

AMA Style

Fflix J. Llpez-Iturriaga, Emma Garcca-Meca, Fernando Tejerina Gaite, Félix J. López-Iturriaga, Emma García‐Meca. Institutional Directors and Board Compensation: Spanish Evidence. SSRN Electronic Journal. 2014; ():1.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Fflix J. Llpez-Iturriaga; Emma Garcca-Meca; Fernando Tejerina Gaite; Félix J. López-Iturriaga; Emma García‐Meca. 2014. "Institutional Directors and Board Compensation: Spanish Evidence." SSRN Electronic Journal , no. : 1.

Journal article
Published: 26 April 2013 in Journal of Business Ethics
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Although US and European research has documented improvement in earnings quality associated with corporate governance characteristics, the situation in Latin America is questionable, given the business environment in which firms operate, which is characterized by controlling family ownership and weak legal protection. The purpose of this study is to examine the relation between the internal mechanisms of Corporate Governance and Earnings Management measured by discretionary accrual. We use a sample of listed Latin American non-financial companies from the period 2006–2009. Our results show how in the Latin American context the role of external directors is limited and that Boards which meet more frequently take a more active position in the monitoring of insiders, so showing a lower use of manipulative practices. In addition, we find a non-linear relation between insider ownership and discretionary accruals, also pointing to the fact that ownership concentration may be a manipulative practices constrictor mechanism only when the ownership of main shareholders is moderate. The findings have important policy implications since this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study to analyze the relation between the effectiveness of the government and the earnings management behavior. As policy implications, we document how when a country implements controls aimed at reducing corruption, strengthening the rule of law or improving the effectiveness of government, this leads to a reduction in firm earnings management.

ACS Style

Jesus Sáenz González; Emma García-Meca. Does Corporate Governance Influence Earnings Management in Latin American Markets? Journal of Business Ethics 2013, 121, 419 -440.

AMA Style

Jesus Sáenz González, Emma García-Meca. Does Corporate Governance Influence Earnings Management in Latin American Markets? Journal of Business Ethics. 2013; 121 (3):419-440.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Jesus Sáenz González; Emma García-Meca. 2013. "Does Corporate Governance Influence Earnings Management in Latin American Markets?" Journal of Business Ethics 121, no. 3: 419-440.

Journal article
Published: 23 December 2012 in European Journal of Law and Economics
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During the global financial crisis, criticism of the politicization and lack of professionalization of the savings banks has taken a central position in the political debate. The aim of this article is to analyze if the political presence of governing bodies in Spanish savings banks has been reflected in their various risk-taking behaviors before and during the financial crisis. We will also analyze whether the influence of the chairman’s banking experience matters. The results do not provide evidence that the composition of the boards of savings bank, or even their politicization, have played a role. However we show that savings banks run by a chairman with previous banking experience are likely to be significantly more solvent and less volatile.

ACS Style

Emma García-Meca; Juan Pedro Sánchez-Ballesta. Politicization, banking experience and risk in savings banks. European Journal of Law and Economics 2012, 38, 535 -553.

AMA Style

Emma García-Meca, Juan Pedro Sánchez-Ballesta. Politicization, banking experience and risk in savings banks. European Journal of Law and Economics. 2012; 38 (3):535-553.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Emma García-Meca; Juan Pedro Sánchez-Ballesta. 2012. "Politicization, banking experience and risk in savings banks." European Journal of Law and Economics 38, no. 3: 535-553.