We propose a theory of information expressed solely in terms of which transformations of physical systems are possible and which are impossible—i.e. in constructor-theoretic terms. It includes conjectured, exact laws of physics expressing the regularities that allow information to be physically instantiated. Although these laws are directly about information, independently of the details of particular physical instantiations, information is not regarded as an a priori mathematical or logical concept, but as something whose nature and properties are determined by the laws of physics alone. This theory solves a problem at the foundations of existing information theory, namely that information and distinguishability are each defined in terms of the other. It also explains the relationship between classical and quantum information, and reveals the single, constructor-theoretic property underlying the most distinctive phenomena associated with the latter, including the lack of in-principle distinguishability of some states, the impossibility of cloning, the existence of pairs of variables that cannot simultaneously have sharp values, the fact that measurement processes can be both deterministic and unpredictable, the irreducible perturbation caused by measurement, and locally inaccessible information (as in entangled systems).
26 October 2011 in Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences
In a previous paper, Hayden and I ( Deutsch & Hayden 2000 Proc. R. Soc. Lond. A456 , 1759–1774. ( doi:10.1098/rspa.2000.0585 )) proved, using the Heisenberg picture, that quantum physics satisfies Einstein's criterion of locality. Wallace and Timpson ( Wallace & Timpson 2007 Found. Phys.37 , 951–955. ( doi:10.1007/s10701-007-9135-7 )) have argued that certain transformations of the Heisenberg-picture description of a quantum system must be regarded as leaving invariant the factual situation being described, and that taking this into account reveals that Einstein's criterion is violated after all. Here, I vindicate the proof and explain some misconceptions that have led to this and other criticisms of it.
Claims that the standard methodology of scientific testing is inapplicable to Everettian quantum theory, and hence that the theory is untestable, are due to misconceptions about probability and about the logic of experimental testing. Refuting those claims by correcting those misconceptions leads to various simplifications, notably the elimination of everything probabilistic from fundamental physics (stochastic processes) and from the methodology of testing ('Bayesian' credences).
Douglas Hofstadter's writing talent makes his love of paradox contagious. Reading I Am a Strange Loop inclines one to see whimsical connections, language games and self-reference everywhere. Part of Hofstadter invades one's brain and starts thinking there in its own right – a phenomenon that is itself a theme of the book. Hofstadter, therefore, is in effect co-writing this review, inclining it towards paradox. Which may be why my method of urging you to read the book will itself be paradoxical: I shall summarize why I find it ultimately unconvincing.