In the past few decades, technologies, such as mobile communication, computer and digital technologies, change rapidly. Technological turbulence has become a remarkable phenomenon faced by companies. Research has suggested that technological turbulence can be regarded as a driving force, which contributes to innovation performance improvement. However, the process of how technological turbulence influences innovation performance remains unknown. It is not clear through which path can enterprises improve innovation performance to deal with technological turbulence. In addition, the relationship between customer/supplier involvement (SI/CI) and technological turbulence is uncertain yet. In response to the research gap, this study analyses how technological turbulence is related to SI/CI, and clarify the mechanism how companies cope with technological turbulence to improve innovation performance. In this study we collect data from 213 manufacturing Chinese firms using stratified random sampling method. Results show first, technological turbulence is positively related to SI/CI. Second, flatness moderates the relationship between technological turbulence and CI. Third, SI/CI mediates the relationship between technological turbulence and innovation performance. Moreover, flatness moderates the mediation effect of CI between technological turbulence and innovation performance.

This paper uses case study method to examine the acquisition process of information and funding through the implementation of open innovation (OI) in new ventures in Chinese context. We find that in the process of accessing to the marketing or technical information through OI, the most important thing for enterprises is to establish trust and cooperation with familiar partners, and trust is derived from existing social relations. In the process of funding acquisition through OI, the most important thing for enterprises is to strike a balance between gains and losses.

The dual-channel structure resulted from manufacturer encroachment could alter the incentives of downstream retailer to ex ante communicate demand forecast. And different types of channel competition need to be investigated in this dual-channel information sharing scenario. This paper aims to investigate retailer’s ex ante imperfect demand information sharing strategy given that upstream manufacturer has set up direct sales channel (manufacturer encroachment). The imperfect information sharing means the demand information shared is uncertain and has some error relative to the real-world demand condition. It examines two types of channel competition: quantity competition and price competition. Additionally, this study discusses the encroaching manufacturer’s incentives for adjusting channel substitution. The paper adopts a stylized game theoretic model to describe interactions between retailer and the encroaching manufacturer. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the paper shows that under manufacturer encroachment, it is always possible for ex ante demand information sharing. Specifically, in the Cournot competition scenario where retailer channel and the encroaching manufacturer direct channel compete in quantity, the encroaching manufacturer could encourage demand information communication through side payment. Furthermore, in the Bertrand competition scenario, retailer may voluntarily share demand information. In addition, in either quantity or price competition, the encroaching manufacturer has incentives to adjust channel substitution for profit maximization.