In theory, linkages between hierarchical forest management planning levels ensure coherent disaggregation of long-term wood supply allocation as input for short-term demand-driven harvest planning. In practice, these linkages may be ineffective, and solutions produced may be incoherent in terms of volume and value-creation potential of harvested timber. Systematic incoherence between planned and implemented forest management activities may induce drift of forest system state (i.e., divergence of planned and actual system state trajectories), thus compromising credibility and performance of the forest management planning process. We describe hierarchical forest management from a game-theoretic perspective and present an iterative two-phase model simulating interaction between long- and short-term planning processes. Using an illustrative case study, we confirm the existence of a systematic drift effect, which we attribute to ineffective linkages between long- and short-term planning. In several simulated scenarios, the planning process fails to ensure long-term wood supply sustainability, fails to reliably meet industrial fiber demand over time, and exacerbates incoherence between wood supply and fiber demand over several planning iterations. We show that manipulating linkages between long- and short-term planning processes can reduce incoherence and describe future work on game-theoretic planning process model formulations that may improve hierarchical planning process performance.

Widespread impacts of a warming planet are fuelling climate change mitigation efforts world-wide. Decision makers are turning to forests, the largest terrestrial primary producer, as a nature-based contribution to mitigation efforts. Resource-based economies, however, have yet to include carbon (C) in their resource planning, slowing the implementation of these important measures for atmospheric greenhouse gas reduction. The realisation of forest mitigation potential depends greatly on our ability to integrate C-sequestration practices in our forest management applications. This requires robust C-estimates, an understanding of the natural potential for a specific landscape to sequester C, the current state of the landscape relative to this potential, and the evaluation of management practices as a tool to sequester forest C in the midst of all the other values forests offer humans. Discrepancies between models used in management decisions and C estimation are the first hurdle impeding the application of forest-based mitigation strategies. Here, we combine forest disturbance and management models with a well-established C model on an open-source simulation platform. We then use the modelling system to produce C estimates of the natural C-holding capacity (potential) and two management scenarios for a study area in BC, Canada. Our simulations provide an essential metric if forests are to be managed for C-sequestration: the natural landscape C-holding capacity. Our simulations also point to a decreasing trend in simulated C on the study area over time and to a bias of the current C-levels compared to the landscape C-holding capacity (477 vs 405.5 MtC). Our explanations for this bias may provide an avenue for improved current C-state estimates. We provide a framework and the information needed for the implementation of nature-based solutions using forests for climate change mitigation. This study is a step towards modelling systems that can unify scientifically based forest management and informed C-management.

The classic wood supply optimisation model maximises even-flow harvest levels and implicitly assumes infinite fibre demand. In many jurisdictions, this modelling assumption is a poor fit for actual fibre consumption, which is typically a subset of total fibre allocation. Failure of the model to anticipate this bias in industrial wood fibre consumption has been linked to increased risk of wood supply failure. In particular, we examine the distributed wood supply planning problem where the roles of forest owner and fibre consumer are played by independent agents. We use game theory to frame interactions between public forest land managers and industrial fibre consumers. We show that the distributed wood supply planning problem can be modelled more accurately using a bi-level formulation and present an extension of the classic wood supply optimisation model that explicitly anticipates industrial fibre consumption behaviour. We present a solution methodology that can solve a convex special case of the problem to global optimality and compare output and solution times of classic and bi-level model formulations using a computational experiment on a realistic dataset. Experimental results show that the bi-level formulation can mitigate risk of wood supply failure.