The question of how we can use ethics and ethical frameworks to avert the negative consequences of AI through guidance on human behaviour and the design of technological systems has recently been receiving increasing attention. The appropriate response to an ethics of AI has certainly been contentious. For some years the wisdom of deontology and utilitarianism in the ethics of technology has been questioned. Today, a kind of AI ethics principlism has gained a degree of widespread acceptance, yet it still invites harsh rejections in recent scholarship. In this paper, we wish to explore the contribution to an ethics of AI made by a narrative philosophy and ethics of technology inspired by the ‘little ethics’ of Paul Ricoeur, and virtue ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre, most recently and promisingly built upon by Wessel Reijers and Mark Coeckelbergh. The objective of this paper is to examine the extent to which a narrative and virtue based ethics (or, VPD, i.e., virtuous practice design) might be a plausible candidate for the foundation of an ethics of AI, or rather ethical AI practice. This will be achieved by exploring the ways in which this approach can respond to some of the significant faults with or critiques of applied and principles and guidelines based ethical approaches to AI ethics.

This paper builds upon recent work in narrative theory and the philosophy of technology by examining the place of transparency and responsibility in discussions of AI, and what some of the implications of this might be for thinking ethically about AI and especially AI practices, that is, the structured social activities implicating and defining what AI is. In this paper, we aim to show how pursuing a narrative understanding of technology and AI can support knowledge of process and practice through transparency, as well help summon us to responsibility through visions of possibility and of actual harms arising from AI practices. We provide reflections on the relations between narrative, transparency and responsibility, building an argument that narratives (about AI, practices, and those persons implicated in its design, implementation, and deployment) support the kind of knowing and understanding that is the aim of transparency, and, moreover, that such knowledge supports responsibility in informing agents and activating responsibility through creating knowledge about something that can and should be responded to. Furthermore, we argue for considering an expansion of the kinds of practices that we might legitimately consider ‘AI practices’ given the diverse set of (often materially embedded) activities that sustain and are sustained by AI that link directly to its ethical acceptability and which are rendered transparent in the narrative mode. Finally, we argue for an expansion of narratives and narrative sources to be considered in questions of AI, understanding that transparency is multi-faceted and found in stories from diverse sources and people.

AI for good, and AI for sustainability projects, are being developed by often well-meaning innovators across the world, intending to support initiatives in sustainable development. Some such projects have been positioned within the framework of the Sustainable Development Goals. In this paper, we critically engage with this phenomenon using a virtue-based Ricoeurian narrative philosophy. Through conceptual analysis and normative argumentation, we make a theoretical contribution to scholarship on this topic. We argue that SDGs could be regarded as internationally agreed high-order end-norms that crystallise values considered to constitute the good life. We argue for exercising caution in applying SDGs as end-norms to AI projects as they are of a high order, are not directly action guiding, and threaten to sediment presentist dominant values. We argue for narrative hospitality between AI innovators and community stakeholders to guide reflection on specifying the SDGs to more situated contexts and to support the development of AI systems that may be more contextually appropriate, and more capable of supporting plural visions of the good life. Such narrative hospitality represents accommodation between parties, but refusal or resistance to engagement with AI innovators can be justified when community interests are not respected, and actors within AI industries can also be morally obliged to resist or refuse development or deployment of systems for contextually inappropriate environments that would be incompatible with a critical reading of the SDGs formed in narrative exchange with the other.