The leaky competing accumulator (LCA) is a biologically inspired model of choice. It describes the processes of leaky accumulation and competition observed in neuronal populations during choice tasks and it accounts for reaction time distributions observed in psychophysical experiments. This paper discusses recent analyses and extensions of the LCA model. First, it reviews the dynamics and examines the conditions that make the model achieve optimal performance. Second, it shows that nonlinearities of the type present in biological neurons improve performance when the number of choice alternatives increases. Third, the model is extended to value-based choice, where it is shown that nonlinearities in the value function explain risk aversion in risky choice and preference reversals in choice between alternatives characterized across multiple dimensions.

Progressive supranuclear palsy and Parkinson’s disease have distinct underlying neuropathology, but both diseases affect cognitive function in addition to causing a movement disorder. They impair response inhibition and may lead to impulsivity, which can occur even in the presence of profound akinesia and rigidity. The current study examined the mechanisms of cognitive impairments underlying disinhibition, using horizontal saccadic latencies that obviate the impact of limb slowness on executing response decisions. Nineteen patients with clinically diagnosed progressive supranuclear palsy (Richardson’s syndrome), 24 patients with clinically diagnosed Parkinson’s disease and 26 healthy control subjects completed a saccadic Go/No-Go task with a head-mounted infrared saccadometer. Participants were cued on each trial to make a pro-saccade to a horizontal target or withhold their responses. Both patient groups had impaired behavioural performance, with more commission errors than controls. Mean saccadic latencies were similar between all three groups. We analysed behavioural responses as a binary decision between Go and No-Go choices. By using Bayesian parameter estimation, we fitted a hierarchical drift–diffusion model to individual participants’ single trial data. The model decomposes saccadic latencies into parameters for the decision process: decision boundary, drift rate of accumulation, decision bias, and non-decision time. In a leave-one-out three-way classification analysis, the model parameters provided better discrimination between patients and controls than raw behavioural measures. Furthermore, the model revealed disease-specific deficits in the Go/No-Go decision process. Both patient groups had slower drift rate of accumulation, and shorter non-decision time than controls. But patients with progressive supranuclear palsy were strongly biased towards a pro-saccade decision boundary compared to Parkinson’s patients and controls. This indicates a prepotency of responding in combination with a reduction in further accumulation of evidence, which provides a parsimonious explanation for the apparently paradoxical combination of disinhibition and severe akinesia. The combination of the well-tolerated oculomotor paradigm and the sensitivity of the model-based analysis provides a valuable approach for interrogating decision-making processes in neurodegenerative disorders. The mechanistic differences underlying participants’ poor performance were not observable from classical analysis of behavioural data, but were clearly revealed by modelling. These differences provide a rational basis on which to develop and assess new therapeutic strategies for cognition and behaviour in these disorders.

Two phenomena are commonly observed in decision-making. First, there is a speed-accuracy tradeoff such that decisions are slower and more accurate when instructions emphasize accuracy over speed, and vice versa. Second, decision performance improves with practice, as a task is learnt. The speed-accuracy tradeoff and learning effects have been explained under a well-established evidence-accumulation framework for decision-making, which suggests that evidence supporting each choice is accumulated over time, and a decision is committed to when the accumulated evidence reaches a decision boundary. This framework suggests that changing the decision boundary creates the tradeoff between decision speed and accuracy, while increasing the rate of accumulation leads to more accurate and faster decisions after learning. However, recent studies challenged the view that speed-accuracy tradeoff and learning are associated with changes in distinct, single decision parameters. Further, the influence of speed-accuracy instructions over the course of learning remains largely unknown. Here, we used a hierarchical drift-diffusion model to examine the speed-accuracy tradeoff during learning of a coherent motion discrimination task across multiple training sessions, and a transfer test session. The influence of speed-accuracy instructions was robust over training and generalized across untrained stimulus features. Emphasizing decision accuracy rather than speed was associated with increased boundary separation, drift rate and non-decision time at the beginning of training. However, after training, an emphasis on decision accuracy was only associated with increased boundary separation. In addition, faster and more accurate decisions after learning were due to a gradual decrease in boundary separation and an increase in drift rate. The results suggest that speed-accuracy instructions and learning differentially shape decision-making processes at different time scales.

Behavior is governed by rules that associate stimuli with responses and outcomes. Human and monkey studies have shown that rule-specific information is widely represented in the frontoparietal cortex. However, it is not known how establishing a rule under different contexts affects its neural representation. Here, we use event-related functional MRI (fMRI) and multivoxel pattern classification methods to investigate the human brain9s mechanisms of establishing and maintaining rules for multiple perceptual decision tasks. Rules were either chosen by participants or specifically instructed to them, and the fMRI activation patterns representing rule-specific information were compared between these contexts. We show that frontoparietal regions differ in the properties of their rule representations during active maintenance before execution. First, rule-specific information maintained in the dorsolateral and medial frontal cortex depends on the context in which it was established (chosen vs specified). Second, rule representations maintained in the ventrolateral frontal and parietal cortex are independent of the context in which they were established. Furthermore, we found that the rule-specific coding maintained in anticipation of stimuli may change with execution of the rule: representations in context-independent regions remain invariant from maintenance to execution stages, whereas rule representations in context-dependent regions do not generalize to execution stage. The identification of distinct frontoparietal systems with context-independent and context-dependent task rule representations, and the distinction between anticipatory and executive rule representations, provide new insights into the functional architecture of goal-directed behavior.