Since its inception, phenomenological philosophy has engaged with empirical data of lived experiences. Recently, phenomenological philosophy itself has branched out into performing systematic qualitative research, resulting in a heterogeneous field of qualitative phenomenological philosophy. By introducing and outlining the research approach of ‘Qualitative Critical Phenomenology’ (QCP), this paper shows how one may conduct systemic qualitative research to lived experiences with an explicit phenomenological philosophical aim. In building on insights from various approaches within critical phenomenology, we not only give a stepwise explication of how to do QCP, we also discuss how we reflectively engage with lived experience as a research object and how key phenomenological themes – i.e. varieties of pre-/reflectivity and the phenomenological reduction – matter for designing and conducting a QCP inquiry. As such, we contribute to discussions on critical phenomenology – i.e. why it matters – but also to debates on how qualitative critical phenomenology may provide a critical lens to prevailing socio-cultural norms and their constitutive force in co-shaping perception and experience.

In healthcare settings, patient participation is increasingly adopted as a possible remedy to ill people suffering from ‘epistemic injustices’ – that is to their unfair harming as knowers. In exploring and interpreting patient participation discourses within the 2013–2018 Dutch Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (ME)/Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) Health Council advisory process, this paper assesses the epistemological emancipatory value of this participatory practice. It reveals that in the analysed case, patient representatives predominantly offer biomedical knowledge about ME/CFS. They frame this condition as primarily somatic, and accordingly, perceive appropriate diagnostic criteria, research avenues and treatment options as quantifiable, objectifiable and explicitly non‐psychogenic. This paper argues that such a dominant biomedical patient participatory practice is ambiguous in terms of its ability to correct epistemic injustices towards ill people. Biomedicalized patient participation may enhance people's credibility and their ability to make sense of their illness, but it may also undermine their valid position within participatory practices as well as lead to (sustaining) biased and reductive ideas about who ill people are and what kind of knowledge they hold. The final section of this paper offers a brief reflection on how to navigate such biomedicalized participatory practices in order to attain more emancipatory ones.

Reality TV is immensely popular, and various shows in this media genre involve a storyline of infertility and infertility treatment. Feminists argue that normative and constructed realities about infertility and infertility treatment, like those in reality TV, are central to the emancipation of women. Such realities are able to steer viewers' perceptions of the world. This article examines the emancipatory significance of representations of women on 'infertility reality TV shows'. While the women in these shows all have 'abnormal' qualities, we consider their portrayal as figurations of monstrosity. In the literature, monstrosity is understood as a way to challenge nonemancipatory norms by offering an alternative identity. Through a content analysis of seven reality TV shows, we identified four types of in/fertile monsters: the cyborg, the freak, the abject, and the childless. We show that these monsters are predominantly non-emancipatory as they all involve mechanisms of altering, excluding, or condemning infertility in relation to what is considered normal and acceptable womanhood. Therefore, at the end of this article, we make a plea for more diverse and emancipatory representations of infertile women in popular culture.

(2020). The Empirical and the Philosophical in Empirical Bioethics: Time for a Conceptual Turn. AJOB Empirical Bioethics: Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 11-13.

Contested illnesses, such as fibromyalgia, myalgic encephalomyelitis/chronic fatigue syndrome (ME/CFS), and chronic Lyme disease (CLD), are surrounded by polemic debates regarding their etiology, symptomology, treatment, and even their existence. People who suffer from these contested illnesses arguably also suffer from "epistemic injustice." This concept, coined by the philosopher Miranda Fricker, captures how people's knowledge may be discredited because of identity prejudices. In our paper, this concept is used to understand how seven Dutch women with contested illnesses experience the emancipatory potential of their vlogging practices. Our findings show how these women understood their vlogging as a means to break with epistemic smothering, understood as the propensity to cater ones testimony to one's audience (Dotson, 2011), and as a means to attain and enhance epistemic justice. However, our findings also show how vlogging about contested illnesses did not seem to allow these women to fully break with their epistemic smothering practices, and that the ableist design and gendered norms of YouTube were experienced as obstacles to attaining epistemic justice. We conclude that, even though social media do seem to hold emancipatory potential for these women, the experiences of individual users are diverse and ambiguous.

Self-tracking in general, and by women in particular is increasingly researched. In the literature, however, women’s interactions with selftracking technologies in menopause—a change that (almost) every woman will go through—is largely taken for granted. This paper addresses this lacuna by asking whether and how menopausal women use self-tracking technologies, and how this (non-) usage mediates their self-experiences. In doing so, it elaborates on another understudied phenomenon: the constitutive significance of “un-tracking”—that is, of various shades and levels of not using self-tracking technologies—in menopause. Most of the 13 interviewed women in this study reported that they stopped, drastically reduced, or resisted self-tracking in menopause. By framing the discussion of these accounts of “un-tracking” within the tradition of post-phenomenology and a phenomenology of situated bodily self-awareness, we show that these women experience their bodies as (1) wise and eu-appearing, (2) unmoldable and dysappearing, and (3) longing for disappearance. Herein, their experientially mediating un-tracking practices are temporally and socio-culturally contextualized in complex ways and bear substantial existential significance. This study establishes the potential harmful ways in which self-tracking mediates self-experiences, as well as the fruitful ways in which un-tracking may do so. Against the background of this observation, this paper makes an appeal to take a step back from uncritically celebrating self-tracking in healthcare contexts, and critically evaluates whether (the promotion of) using (more) self-tracking technologies in these contexts is desirable to begin with.