Trust game is commonly used to study the evolution of trust among unrelated individuals. It offers valuable insights into human interactions in a range of disciplines, including economics, sociology and psychology. Previous research has revealed that reward and punishment systems can effectively promote the evolution of trust. However, these investigations overlook the gaming environment, leaving unresolved the optimal conditions for employing distinct incentives to effectively facilitate trust level. To bridge this gap, we introduce a transformation incentive mechanism in an N -player trust game, where trustees are given different forms of incentives depending on the number of trustees in the group. Using the Markov decision process approach, our research shows that as incentives increase, the level of trust rises continuously, eventually reaching a high level of coexistence between investors and trustworthy trustees. Specifically, in the case of smaller incentives, rewarding trustworthy trustees is more effective. Conversely, in the case of larger incentives, punishing untrustworthy trustees is more effective. Additionally, we find that moderate incentives have a positive impact on increasing the average payoff within the group.

Conservation Tillage Technology (CTT) is vital for mitigating soil degradation, yet its adoption rates remain far below targets. This study develops an evolutionary game model that integrates heterogeneous time preferences and the lemon market effect to explore the dynamic adoption mechanisms among boundedly rational farmers. Results show that farmers with high discount rates (indicating strong time preference) undervalue long-term benefits, creating a significant barrier to CTT adoption. The lemon market effect, where P represents the benefit from information asymmetry for non-adopters and Q is the corresponding loss for adopters, critically shapes the system equilibria: (1) when $P>Q$, a stable coexistence of adoption strategies emerges; (2) when $P<Q$, the system exhibits unpredictable heteroclinic cycles; (3) when $P=Q$, it forms a conservative Hamiltonian system characterized by stable periodic oscillations. These findings provide a dynamic analytical framework for understanding green technology diffusion and offer a theoretical basis for crafting sustainable agricultural policies in developing countries.

The promotion of Conservation Tillage Technology (CTT) is critical for mitigating global soil degradation, yet their actual adoption rates remain substantially lower than anticipated targets. Existing research predominantly focuses on static factor analyses, failing to adequately capture the dynamic evolutionary mechanisms of farmer strategic interactions and the impacts of information asymmetries in agricultural markets. This study constructs an evolutionary game model integrating heterogeneous time preferences and lemon market effects to reveal the dynamic equilibrium of technology adoption within farmer groups operating under bounded rationality. Key findings indicate that farmers with high time preferences significantly impede CTT adoption due to the excessive discounting of long-term benefits. Furthermore, the lemon market effect dictates the system's equilibrium states: 1) When the lemon market benefit ($P$) exceeds the lemon market loss ($Q$) ($P > Q$), stable tripartite coexistence of adoption strategies emerges; 2) When $P < Q$, the system evolves unpredictably, exhibiting dynamics characterized by heteroclinic cycles; 3) At the critical threshold $P = Q$, the system transforms into a conservative Hamiltonian system, yielding stable periodic oscillation solutions. Based on these insights, policy recommendations are proposed: implementing ecological certification schemes to mitigate information asymmetry, offering subsidies and insurance to reduce adoption risks, and utilizing environmental taxes to internalize the negative externalities associated with conventional tillage. This research not only provides a dynamic analytical paradigm for the diffusion of green agricultural technologies but also furnishes a theoretical foundation for designing sustainable agricultural policies in developing countries.