Immigration has been a major trend in the last decades in Europe. However, immigrant access to the social security systems has remained a contentious issue having gained additional salience in light of the recent asylum-seeking developments. We focus on welfare chauvinism, the idea that immigrants should not participate in welfare resources, as an attitudinal dimension. We seek to answer two primary questions: To what extent are different types of objective and subjective material deprivation related to welfare chauvinism? What is the role of the recent asylum seeker influx? Using European Social Survey data and employing binary and generalized ordered logit models with country fixed effects, we find perceptions of deprivation to be more meaningful than objective factors related to potential job loss, and some relationships depend on the specific type of deprivation. On the country level, in line with the deservingness of asylum seekers as a group, higher levels of asylum seeking are related to lower levels of welfare chauvinism, while GDP per capita is not associated with welfare chauvinism. Finally, the generalized ordered logit model shows that some relationships vary according to the strictness of welfare chauvinism, which would not be visible in a conventional ordered logit model.
Adopting a differentiated threat approach, we investigated the relationship between cultural, economic, and criminal threat on attitudes toward four different ethnic minorities in Germany (Muslims, foreigners, refugees, and Sinti and Roma). We hypothesized that the effect of different types of intergroup threats on ethnic prejudice varies with the perceived characteristics of minority groups. Using a representative sample of German adults, we found that cultural and economic threat primarily predicted attitudes toward Muslims and foreigners, while criminal threat played a minor role in attitude formation among the majority population. For refugees and Sinti and Roma, all three types of intergroup threats were found to be equally important for the prediction of attitudes toward these minority groups. These results are only partially in line with the culture-specific threat profiles of these minority groups in the German context. Therefore, we discuss the tenability of the differentiated threat approach to explain the genesis of ethnic prejudice in different cultural contexts.
Even though economic globalization and foreign trade are major topics in the political discourse of most societies and negative attitudes toward international trade are prevalent, there is a lack of research investigating the ideological roots of protectionist preferences from a psychological perspective. In the present research, we examined the implications of right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) for trade attitudes. Using data from two nationally representative samples from the United States (Study 1) and Germany (Study 2), we found that RWA predicted protectionist attitudes above and beyond economic self‐interest. Furthermore, we found that the relationship between RWA and opposition to international trade was moderated by political involvement. The association of SDO with protectionist attitudes was inconsistent across the two studies and was not moderated by political involvement. Taken together, these results emphasize the importance of basic ideological orientations and the psychological dispositions they reflect in explaining public attitudes toward international trade.
European research has largely ignored the role that religion has played in the recent growth of right-wing populist (RWP) parties. In this paper we focus on how religiosity affects electoral support for RWP parties in Germany. Based on a tripartite concept of religiosity (religious practice, religious affiliation, and religious beliefs), we assume that the effect of religiosity is mediated by two intervening determinants of RWP support, namely, anti-immigrant attitudes and party identification. The existing studies have not covered Germany because until recently no significant RWP party existed. To test our hypotheses, we use pooled data from the Long-term Online Tracking of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES). The results show that anti-immigrant attitudes are strongly correlated with RWP support and that citizens with party identification are less likely to vote for an RWP party. More importantly, religiosity influences the RWP vote because, first, church attendance is negatively correlated with anti-immigrant attitudes, and, second, all dimensions of religiosity are positively associated with identification with established parties. Our results confirm the thesis that religiosity tends to indirectly ‘immunise’ citizens against voting for RWP parties. We conclude that the recent success of RWP parties in East Germany is partly due to advanced secularisation in this part of the country.
23 August 2018 in European Journal of Social Psychology