Despite research efforts over recent decades to deepen our understanding of why some terminally ill patients express a wish to die (WTD), there is broad consensus that we need more detailed knowledge about the factors that might influence such a wish. The objective of this study is to explore the different possible motivations and explanations of patients who express or experience a WTD.
The article explores the underlying reasons for patients’ self‐perception of being a burden (SPB) in family settings, including its impact on relationships when wishes to die (WTD) are expressed. In a prospective, interview‐based study of WTD in patients with advanced cancer and non‐cancer disease (organ failure, degenerative neurological disease, and frailty) SPB was an important emerging theme. In a sub‐analysis we examined (a) the facets of SPB, (b) correlations between SPB and WTD, and (c) SPB as a relational phenomenon. We analyzed 248 interviews with 62 patients, their family caregivers, and professionals using grounded theory and interpretive phenomenological analysis. SPB appeared as important empathic concern in care situations. Patients expressed many sorts of concerns for others, but also perceived an altered self‐understanding that did not meet mutual expectations within relationships. In SPB associated with WTD three constellations were found: (a) WTD to unburden others; (b) patients decided against hastening death to prevent being a further burden to others (in these cases, the SPB counteracted the wish to die); and (c) both wishes for and against dying were sustained by SPB. These patients often felt paralyzed and suffered deeply. Family caregivers felt emotionally touched by SPB and tried to unburden patients by caring and compassion. We concluded that the impact of SPB on a WTD and the various meanings the facets of SPB have in balancing relationships need to be worked out individually. An early palliative and narrative approach is warranted.
The motivations that lead to wishes to die (WTD) in palliative care patients with cancer are relatively well studied. But little is known about WTD in other pathologies and the relation between subjective understandings of dying trajectories and a WTD. We investigated the WTD of palliative patients in four different dying trajectories: neurological diseases, organ failure, frailty due to age, and cancer. 62 palliative cancer (n = 30) and non-cancer (n = 32) patients (10 neurological disease; 11 organ failure; 11 frailty), their families and health professionals in different palliative care settings (248 interviews). Qualitative semi-structured interviews. Data analysis through Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis and Grounded Theory. In addition to personal motivations, we found that people dealing with similar trajectories were often confronted with similar questions and concerns due to similar challenges. For four trajectories we show typical patterns, similarities and differences that should be considered when talking with patients about their WTD. These illness-related considerations do not explain the WTD completely, but give important information on the challenges for particular patient groups that might experience a WTD. In all patient groups, there were clear moments that triggered a WTD: for neurological patients it was experiencing breathlessness, high-dependency care, or when considering tube feeding or respiratory support; for persons with organ failure it was an acute burdensome crisis; for patients with cancer after the initial diagnosis, it was the first relapse or the move into advanced palliative care; for elderly frail persons it was the move into care facilities, or the loss of important relationships or capabilities. The feeling of being a burden to others was reported in all patient groups. WTD can be triggered within disease trajectories by specific conditions and transitional points that affect agency and self-understanding. A better understanding of the concerns and challenges of a particular dying trajectory as well as its characteristic trigger points can facilitate early and comprehensive communication about patients’ WTD, and the underlying motivations and protective factors.
The concept of the ‘well-being of the child’ (like the ‘child’s welfare’ and ‘best interests of the child’) has remained underdetermined in legal and ethical texts on the needs and rights of children. As a hypothetical construct that draws attention to the child’s long-term welfare, the well-being of the child is a broader concept than autonomy and happiness. This paper clarifies some conceptual issues of the well-being of the child from a philosophical point of view. The main question is how well-being could in practice acquire a concrete meaning and content for a particular issue or situation. A phenomenological-hermeneutic research perspective will be outlined that allows the child’s well-being to be elucidated and specified as an anthropological and ethical idea. It is based on a contextual understanding of generative relationships, a combination of the theory and practice of making sense, here described as ‘generative insight’, which could provide ethical guidance for decision making in families, legal practice, medicine or biomedical research.
Do we have a moral obligation to genetically cure embryos rather than selecting between them? Such an obligation would be an ethical argument for human germline gene editing (hGGE) to avoid the inheritance of genetic conditions instead of using pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). In this article, the intuition that we do have such a moral obligation is critically evaluated. The article first develops a theoretical framework for discussing the ethical questions of hGGE. This framework is based on an exploration of the phenomenology of the germline, from both biological and philosophical points of view. It interprets the germline as an embodied intergenerational relationship that carries meanings for the parents and for the children-to-be. It relates them to previous family generations, and to their own children. Hence, the germline is a phenomenologically much richer concept than just the line of cells that carry the inheritable genetic information. Against this background, selection is compared with editing and a key moral difference is identified: editing is in effect an act of co-constructing the genome, which necessarily assumes a wider range of responsibilities that include those parts that are left unedited. Introducing hGGE into societies would hence significantly affect and change the moral structure of the intergenerational relationships. Selective implantation, on the other hand (in the context of PGD), is based on a moral choice in favour of the embryo which is to be unaffected by a disease or disability that causes suffering, rather than selecting knowingly the affected one. The claim that hGGE is in the best interests of the child-to-be counterfactually assumes the presence of a patient who has an interest in being cured. The embryo (a potential future patient) is, however, brought into existence by the same act that is also the treatment. The future children who would result from treatment by hGGE may rather have an interest in not having been treated by hGGE, since it makes the intergenerational relationships more complicated and burdensome. The question ‘Is hGGE justified, or even an obligation?’ is answered with a No.