A mock jury experiment tested the effects of attorney guidance and jury deliberation to mitigate the challenges that civil juries face in assessing damages. We hypothesized that two types of attorney guidance (per diem, per diem + lump sum), theoretically based in the Hans-Reyna model of jury decision making, would improve jury decision making compared with no guidance against five key benchmarks: injury assessment, validity, reliability, verbatim-gist coherence, and metacognitive experience. We expected that deliberation would increase reliability of, confidence in, and polarization of awards compared with predeliberation. Community members (N = 317; 61% women; 86.1% White; Mage = 48.68 years) deliberated in 54 mock juries. Participants watched a videotaped trial involving an automobile accident in which two plaintiffs sustained concussions (one mild and one severe). The plaintiffs' attorney's closing arguments varied attorney guidance (no guidance, per diem, per diem + lump sum). Mock jurors provided individual judgments before deliberating as a jury and reaching group verdicts and awards. Juries performed well against benchmarks. Providing gist-based guidance with a meaningful award recommendation increased the validity of jurors' individual damage awards (η²p jurors = .03) and the reliability of jury damage awards (η²p jurors = .04; η²p jurors = .20); gist-based guidance without an award recommendation did not improve performance against benchmarks and increased perceptions of decision-making difficulty (η²p = .13). Deliberation increased reliability of (η²p = .17), confidence in (η²p = .02), and polarization of (d = 2.14) awards compared with predeliberation. Juries performed well against objective benchmarks of performance (injury assessment, validity, reliability, and verbatim-gist coherence), and deliberation improved performance compared with predeliberation decisions. Jury decisions were further influenced by attorney closing arguments (the guidance manipulation), especially when the attorney requests a lump sum, which can serve as a powerful influence on jury awards, mainly by setting an upper limit. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
Courts have dramatically increased their use of virtual jury trials, but empirical research has yet to examine differences between in-person and virtual jury deliberations. We tested competing hypotheses that in-person juries would be better (or worse) than virtual juries in terms of attention and engagement, deliberation, and diversity. Community members (N = 317; 61% women; 86.1% White; mean age = 48.68 years) watched a videotaped trial involving an automobile accident and then deliberated either in person or virtually in 54 mock juries (Nin person = 24; Nvirtual = 30). In-person and virtual juries did not differ significantly across most outcomes. However, regarding attention and engagement, virtual juries reported expending greater cognitive effort (d = 0.59) than in-person juries. Regarding deliberation, in-person juries interrupted each other significantly more often than virtual juries (d = 1.93), and they discussed more topics than virtual juries (d = 0.59-1.02). Regarding diversity, virtual jurors were younger (d = 0.55), wealthier (d = 0.66), and more educated (φ = .14) than in-person jurors, although both samples were recruited in the same manner. Despite concerns that virtual formats substantially reduce jurors' attention/engagement and change the nature of their deliberations, virtual jurors thoroughly processed relevant evidence and reportedly expended more effort in doing so. Although virtual formats may require more technologically savvy jurors (expected to correlate with a juror's age, wealth, and education), this study provides little evidence that virtual jury participation fundamentally alters core aspects of jury deliberation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
The complexity of tax laws makes manual preparation difficult, leading more taxpayers to use software or accountants. This study presents an experimental analysis comparing taxpayer perceptions of trust and procedural justice when filing with tax experts versus using tax software. The study addressed four questions: (1) How do perceptions of human tax experts compare to tax software? (2) Do perceptions vary among different types of tax software? (3) Do trust and procedural justice predict filing decisions? (4) Can taxpayers effectively oversee tax preparation software? We hypothesized that participants would favor professional tax experts over commercial and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) software (Hypothesis 1). We also expected higher procedural justice to correlate with greater satisfaction (Hypothesis 2), self-identified knowledge to correlate with accurate expectations (Hypothesis 3), and filing decisions to be predicted by trust in the method (Hypothesis 4a) or outcome (Hypothesis 4b). We anticipated that higher trust in software would increase the likelihood of filing with software (Hypothesis 5) and that inconsistency across methods would decrease filing likelihood (Hypothesis 6). In the experiment, 146 taxpayers (64% women; 88% Hispanic; 75% White; Mage = 27.55 years) prepared their taxes using three methods: a tax professional, commercial software, and IRS software. Participants rated and ranked the trustworthiness of each method and indicated their preference. As predicted, participants had the most favorable perceptions of the tax expert, followed by commercial software and IRS software (Hypothesis 1). Trust in the method, not the outcome, predicted filing decisions (Hypothesis 4a). Participants with higher trust in software were more likely to file with software (Hypothesis 5). Contrary to expectations, procedural justice did not correlate with satisfaction (Hypothesis 2), and knowledge did not correlate with accurate expectations (Hypothesis 3). Consistency across methods did not predict filing (Hypothesis 6). Participants generally preferred human experts, but trust in software could override this preference. Future research directions and implications are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).
The National Institute of Drug Addiction has promoted the Brain Disease Model of Addiction (BDMA) for several decades, believing it will have a positive impact on drug-related social policies. Per research, neither understanding nor accepting the BDMA positively influences social behavior and decision making related to decreased stigma or increased support for treatment and funding for substance use disorders. An alternative model, the Malleability Model, focuses on the changeability of psychopathology associated with psychiatric disorders, and is associated with decreased hopelessness and increased prognostic optimism. The Moral Weakness Model focuses on moral character as the reason for addiction and is associated with punitive responses to use disorders. The current study sought to identify whether Malleability values were more predictive of willingness to vote for harm reduction (HR) policies than BDMA and Moral values (H1); and if agreement with Malleability values were more predictive of willingness to fund such policies than agreement with BDMA and Moral values (H2). Contrary to hypotheses, results indicated the Malleability Model failed to predict votes and donations, while agreement with the Moral Weakness Model and conservative political affiliation was predictive of lower HR donations. Agreement with the BDMA did not reliably predict votes and donations to policies; the associations reflected were tenuous and should be interpreted with caution. Overall, results indicated the Malleability Model did not increase votes and donations to HR policies, while agreement with Moral Weakness Model and conservative affiliation consistently predicted votes and donations.