Marco Sahm

Prof. Marco Sahm

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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27 April 2019 in Journal of Economics
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Journal Article
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LPLisa Planer-Friedrich
Lisa Planer-Friedrich
MSMarco Sahm
Marco Sahm

13 May 2018 in Journal of Public Economic Theory
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Journal Article
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MSMarco Sahm
Marco Sahm

1 June 2018 in Information Economics and Policy
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Journal Article
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TGTanja Greiner
Tanja Greiner
MSMarco Sahm
Marco Sahm

26 November 2019 in Review of Industrial Organization
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Journal Article
Closed access
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MSMarco Sahm
Marco Sahm

29 September 2021 in Theory and Decision
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Journal Article
Open access
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CDChristian Deutscher
Christian Deutscher
MSMarco Sahm
Marco Sahm
SSSandra Schneemann
Sandra Schneemann
HSHendrik Sonnabend
Hendrik Sonnabend
When heterogeneous players make strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests, they might conserve resources in a current contest to spend more in a subsequent contest, if the degree of heterogeneity in the current (subsequent) contest is sufficiently large (small). We confirm these predictions using data from German professional soccer, in which players are subject to a one-match ban if they accumulate five yellow cards. Players with four yellow cards facing the risk of being suspended for the next match are (i) less likely to be fielded when the heterogeneity in the current match increases and (ii) more likely to receive a fifth yellow card in the current match when heterogeneity in the next match increases or heterogeneity in the next match but one (when they return from their ban) decreases.

25 March 2022 in Games
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Journal Article
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MSMarco Sahm
Marco Sahm
I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium (r≥2). By contrast, if she aims at maximizing the expected aggregate effort or the winner’s expected effort, she will choose a contest with a pure-strategy equilibrium, and the optimal accuracy level r<2 decreases in the players’ heterogeneity. Finally, a contest designer who faces a tradeoff between selection quality and minimum (maximum) effort will never choose a contest with a semi-mixed equilibrium.