Zhenyang Pi

Dr. Zhenyang Pi

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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13 August 2022 in International Journal of Production Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZPZhenyang Pi
Zhenyang Pi
WFWeiguo Fang
Weiguo Fang
SPSandun C. Perera
Sandun C. Perera
BZBaofeng Zhang
Baofeng Zhang

29 June 2024 in Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZPZhenyang Pi
Zhenyang Pi
KWKe Wang
Ke Wang
YWYi-Ming Wei
Yi-Ming Wei
ZHZhimin Huang
Zhimin Huang

23 April 2021 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
BBBing Bu
Bing Bu
LWLei Wang
Lei Wang
ZPZhenyang Pi
Zhenyang Pi
Weiguo FangWeiguo Fang
Weiguo Fang
The street protests and other mass demonstrations that have occurred frequently in recent years have resulted in considerable political pressure and have destabilized countries. How governments respond to such emergencies, and whether to evacuate protesters quickly, has been one of the most important public management challenges facing modern governments. In the case of evacuating protesters through police force, issues to consider include the cognitive differences among the conflicting parties and the cost-benefit considerations between the alternative strategies of mandatory evacuation and compromise. In this paper, the evolutionary dynamic of the mandatory evacuation of protesters by police is analyzed by extensive evolutionary game theory. Considering the cognitive differences among the conflicting parties, mental models of the interactions between government officials and protesters are constructed, which can not only avoid the uncertainty of evolutionary equilibrium but also consider the belief learning in the interior of the dynamic stage game. The evolutionary dynamic analysis of the mandatory evacuation of protesters is subsequently performed. To verify the effectiveness of the model set out, a multiagent simulation analysis based on a real case study of the Ningbo PX incident is presented. Furthermore, the decision-making related to police evacuation of protesters is based on the cost-benefit analysis between mandatory evacuation and compromise, the minimal number of police required, and the on-the-spot deployment plans of the police. The analysis shows that when facing protesters marching along a street, the evacuation measures are more effective if the police actions target the first several rows of protesters. However, in the case of protesters gathering near iconic buildings (or surrounding their demonstration leaders), the emergency plan of the mandatory evacuation of the protesters is less effective.

1 July 2025 in International Journal of Production Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZPZhenyang Pi
Zhenyang Pi
Weiguo FangWeiguo Fang
Weiguo Fang
KWKe Wang
Ke Wang
XYXiaohang Yue
Xiaohang Yue
BZBaofeng Zhang
Baofeng Zhang

14 October 2021 in Sustainability
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Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
YHYangyang Huang
Yangyang Huang
ZPZhenyang Pi
Zhenyang Pi
Weiguo FangWeiguo Fang
Weiguo Fang
Barter has emerged to alleviate capital pressure, maximize the circulation of goods, and facilitate the disposal of excess inventory. This study considers a two-level supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a capital-constrained retailer with trade credit, in which the retailer exchanges unsold products for needed subsidiary products on a barter platform. The retailer’s optimal order quantity and the manufacturer’s wholesale price are derived, and the influences of barter and other factors on the equilibrium strategy and performance of the supply chain are examined; these results are verified and supplemented by numerical simulation. We find that the retailer can increase profit by bartering when facing highly uncertain demand, that the retailer’s optimal order quantity increases with the supply rate and demand for subsidiary products, and that both manufacturer and retailer benefit from the high supply rate of subsidiary products. However, barter induces the manufacturer to raise the wholesale price to prevent its profit from being harmed. In addition, the manufacturer suffers from the retailer’s initial capital.

31 January 2021 in Complexity
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Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ZPZhenyang Pi
Zhenyang Pi
Weiguo FangWeiguo Fang
Weiguo Fang
This paper studies the implication of channel discrepancy between the retail and direct channels in a dual‐channel supply chain consisting of one common retailer and two manufacturers in which the manufacturers may have different market powers. Each manufacturer provides a substitutable product and opens an online channel to customers directly. We develop an analytical model to derive the optimal pricing strategies by using game theory and the backward induction method, and we examine related properties under three market power structures while considering channel discrepancy, including the Nash equilibrium, the Manufacturers leader Stackelberg, and the M1 leader Stackelberg models (denoted as the N, MS, and M1S models, respectively). Numerical simulations are examined to reveal and verify the effect of channel discrepancy on optimal prices, demands, and profits. We find that a higher level of channel discrepancy induces higher prices, demands, and profits for each member in both channels, while this kind of stimulating impact for the leader manufacturer who obtains a higher level of channel discrepancy will be more significant than it is for the other members in the three models. In addition, the profit of the supply chain in the N model is always higher than it is in the MS model, while it may be higher or lower than it is in the M1S model depending on the level of channel discrepancy.