We use a novel experiment in China to examine the effects of having a quasi-official investor own a small number of shares on specific firm outcomes. We find that, relative to control firms, pilot firms experience an increase in dissenting votes from independent directors, a reduction in tunneling and earnings management activities, and an improvement in merger performance. Independent directors questioned by the quasi-official shareholder in activism events subsequently lose board seats in the director market. Overall, our results shed light on a new mechanism for enhancing the protection of minority shareholders.
8 September 2020 in Emerging Markets Finance and Trade
This paper examines whether and how executives’ political connections affect their incentives to withhold bad news, measured by the stock price crash risk. We find that political connections are negatively associated with the stock price crash risk. Moreover, we show that political connections reduce firms’ financial constraints and encourage firms to disclose more bad news to compete for government subsidies, which lowers managers’ incentives to hide bad news. We also find that the negative relationship between political connections and crash risk varies with external institutions. Our results are robust to numerous robustness tests.