Ahmet Furkan Aydogan

Dr. Ahmet Furkan Aydogan

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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13 January 2026 in Applied Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
EMERASMUS MFODWO
ERASMUS MFODWO
PLPhani Lanka
Phani Lanka
AAAhmet Furkan Aydogan
Ahmet Furkan Aydogan
Cihan VarolCihan Varol
Cihan Varol
Maritime transportation accounts for approximately 80 percent of global trade volume, with modern vessels increasingly reliant on Software-Defined Radio (SDR) technologies for communication and navigation. However, the very flexibility and reconfigurability that make SDRs advantageous also introduce complex radio frequency vulnerabilities exposing ships to threats that jeopardize vessel security, and this disrupts global supply chains. This survey paper systematically examines the security landscape of maritime SDR systems through a threat modeling lens. Following Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses guidelines, we analyzed 84 peer-reviewed publications (from 2002 to 2025) and applied the STRIDE framework to identify and categorize maritime SDR threats. We identified 44 distinct threat types, with tampering attacks being most prevalent (36 instances), followed by Denial of Service (33 instances), Repudiation (30 instances), Spoofing (23 instances), Information Disclosure (24 instances), and Elevation of Privilege (28 instances). These threats exploit vulnerabilities across device, software, network, message, and user layers, targeting critical systems including Global Navigation Satellite Systems, Automatic Identification Systems, Very High Frequency or Digital Selective Calling systems, Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems, and National Marine Electronics Association 2000 networks. Our analysis reveals that maritime SDR threats are multidimensional and interdependent, with compromises at any layer potentially cascading through entire maritime operations. Significant gaps remain in authentication mechanisms for core protocols, supply chain assurance, regulatory frameworks, multi-layer security implementations, awareness training, and standardized forensic procedures. Further analysis highlights that securing maritime SDRs requires a proactive security engineering that integrates secured hardware architectural designs, cryptographic authentications, adaptive spectrum management, strengthened international regulations, awareness education, and standardized forensic procedures to ensure resilience and trustworthiness.


5 December 2024 in Electronics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
AAAhmet Furkan Aydogan
Ahmet Furkan Aydogan
Cihan VarolCihan Varol
Cihan Varol
NSNarasimha Shashidhar
Narasimha Shashidhar
ARAmar Adnan Rasheed
Amar Adnan Rasheed
Vung PhamVung Pham
Vung Pham
MKMurat Karabatak
Murat Karabatak
Numerous encryption methods have been published to secure IoT devices in the last decade. Existing encryption methods still have disadvantages when it comes to securing IoT devices. On the other hand, a new encryption method using brain signals in IoT devices is gaining attention as a new solution. The encryption method based on brain signals essentially involves a hypothesis called imposed recall based on ironic process theory. The imposed recall was created with the expectation that imposing a specific choice on the subjects during the acquisition of brain signals would allow for better separation of EEG data. This paper presents experiments and approaches to prove the validity of the imposed recall hypothesis. With the experiments, the effects of ironic process theory on brain signal-based encryption can be observed. While performing the tests, varying approaches, including Granger causality, were applied to analyze the results. The results show that the imposed recall hypothesis can successfully reconstruct EEG data. The structured signals were determined to be effective in capturing matches of brain signals on subjects at different time intervals. Thus, the imposed recall hypothesis can be used in various fields, such as authentication, questioning, and identification, by reserving brain signals to be obtained from individuals. In addition, it was reported that it is possible to acquire the ability to provide security in both devices with limited hardware, such as IoT devices or complex systems.

11 October 2026 in Electronics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
EMERASMUS MFODWO
ERASMUS MFODWO
Cihan VarolCihan Varol
Cihan Varol
ARAmar Adnan Rasheed
Amar Adnan Rasheed
NSNarasimha Shashidhar
Narasimha Shashidhar
AAAhmet Furkan Aydogan
Ahmet Furkan Aydogan
Wireless NMEA 2000 gateways introduce convenience for onboard monitoring and navigation data access, but they also expand the maritime attack surface in ways that remain understudied. This research presents a memory forensic examination of a de-authentication attack against a NavLink2-class NMEA 2000 wireless server, executed using a WiFi Pineapple to force client disconnection and capture the WPA2 4-Way Handshake, followed by offline passphrase recovery with Aircrack-NG on Windows 11. The study focuses on memory-resident artifacts left on the attacker’s machine during the attack workflow, such as process traces, volatile credential fragments, network interfaces, pcap buffer remnants, and related driver activity. By correlating these artifacts with the memory dump (before and after the de-authentication and cracking process), the work demonstrates how volatile memory can reveal tool usage, attack timeline, and perpetrator actions even when disk artifacts are minimal. The findings highlight the forensic visibility of wireless attacks against maritime systems and underscore the broader security implications of WPA2-PSK compromise on NMEA 2000 gateways, including risks of eavesdropping, traffic analysis, unauthorized configuration, and manipulation of navigation-related data flows. This research contributes a reproducible methodology for analyzing wireless maritime attacks from a memory forensics perspective and provides evidence-based insights for both investigators and maritime cyber defenders.

12 September 2026 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
EMErasmus Mfodwo
Erasmus Mfodwo
CVCihan Varol
Cihan Varol
NSNarasimha Shashidhar
Narasimha Shashidhar
AAAhmet Furkan Aydogan
Ahmet Furkan Aydogan
NavLink2 NMEA 2000 Wireless Server provides wireless access to vessel navigation, environmental, and sensor data, but also exposes maritime networks to deauthentication attacks. Although the operational impacts of these attacks are well understood, systematic methods for attributing them through digital forensics remain limited. This study examines the forensic attribution of WiFi Pineapple deauthentication attacks directed at a NavLink2 gateway. A controlled maritime testbed was created in which a WiFi Pineapple executed a deauthentication attack against the gateway and an associated mobile device. After the attack, forensic evidence was collected from the WiFi Pineapple management interface and from a forensic image of its permanent storage. The acquired and recovered artifacts, including wireless reconnaissance records, activity and system logs, configuration data, handshake captures, databases, and residual files, were analyzed and correlated to reconstruct the attack timeline, identify the targeted maritime infrastructure, and associate the deauthentication activity with the examined WiFi Pineapple. The findings demonstrate that correlating operational and permanent-storage artifacts provides mutually corroborating evidence for device-level attribution, supporting forensic reconstruction and incident investigation in maritime Internet of Things environments.