In this paper I consider ‘normalisation’ as a response to urban informal livelihoods in urban southern Africa. I demonstrate that urban planning systems have been mobilised to correct or eliminate ‘spatial pathologies’. Using illustrative cases from southern Africa, I argue that the authorities’ obsession with ‘normalising’ urban spaces they have designated as ‘pathologies’ is misplaced because it glaringly defies the reality on the ground. Interrogated in the paper is the reasoning behind, and effectiveness of, ‘corrective’ measures that exclude and marginalise informality through technicalisation, ‘expertisation’ and depoliticisation. I evaluate the basis, workings and deleterious outcomes of normalising technologies and question the relevance and efficacy of normalisation at a time when it is increasingly becoming clear that African urbanisation is – and will possibly continue to be – simultaneously driven and cushioned by informalisation.
The state bureaucracy played a prominent role in Zimbabwe's “Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order”, the world-(in)famous urban “clean-up” operation. The planning system was in the forefront of the operation, conspicuously sharing the limelight with the security and law enforcement agencies. The paper examines how planners provided the operation's techno-legal articulation, which was liberally deployed by the state to explain, rationalize, and glorify the operation. The discussion critically analyses some of the most scathing criticism against planning, namely that planners were cold-hearted, negligent and spineless. Based on an interrogation of the evidence in light of the viewpoints of a cross-section of practitioners, victims and activists, the paper argues that it is difficult for the planning profession to dodge these accusations.
The paper debates the role of planning in `Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order', Zimbabwe's 2005 controversial urban clean-up campaign. The discussion critically assesses two perspectives regarding the purported contribution and complicity of planning in what critics perceive to be the machinations of a regime that is internationally viewed as nefarious. This is done, first, by interrogating the role and contribution of planners and planning to the instigation and design of the operation before it was launched and, secondly, by determining the extent to which planners and planning served as the handmaiden of state repression during the operation. After weighing relevant empirical evidence on the culpability of planning, the discussion concludes that, while planning may escape the first charge, it certainly has a case to answer on the second.
1 June 2006 in Journal of Southern African Studies
After Zimbabwe's ruling party, ZANU-PF, lost the cities to the opposition in 2000, it mounted a spirited comeback bid. Nowhere was this more apparent than in Harare, the capital city, whose residents had overwhelmingly rejected the party in the parliamentary elections – a trend that was to be repeated with chilling regularity during the next four years. The party's attempt to ‘re-urbanise’ consisted of two strategies, namely, regaining control of institutions of local governance and getting re-elected into council and parliament. The former has been hugely successful while so far the latter has not yielded much. This article revisits the party's comeback bid and assesses its strategies in order to explain their contrasting fortunes. The discussion argues that the attempt to win elections failed because, in the first place, the party did not address the reasons for the hostility of the city's voters, and in some cases even exacerbated its alienation from the majority of these voters.
10 December 2010 in Journal of Southern African Studies
Urban planning bases its interventionist strategies on the reasoning that change has to be rationally managed and that control is necessary in the ‘public interest’. In Africa, for various bureaucratic and political reasons, urban planning has often been notoriously lax. In the face of uncontrolled urban development, many urban governments have abandoned comprehensive planning and increasingly resort to ad-hoc ‘sanitising’ measures of various kinds. This paper explores the forces and rationales that lie behind the intensified use of such ‘non-planning’ strategies. It draws on examples from Harare and Maputo, where urban authorities applied forceful measures to remove unplanned settlements and market places. In these cases the forces at work behind the scenes included the political strategies of elites seeking to maintain and strengthen political control over urban areas, rationalising and legitimising such unpopular interventions by appealing to ongoing efforts at ‘city marketing’ through international events, and referring to the imperative of upholding a modern city image. We discuss the tensions that arose from these decisions and the subsequent political processes among the intended ‘victims’, and between them and the authorities. In comparing and contrasting the cases of Harare and Maputo, we bring out the dilemmas of planning resorting to ‘non-planning’ and the complex politics triggered by such interventions.