Because major transportation infrastructure projects (MTIPs) have significant effects for a sustainable development, the planning modes used for these projects have been a popular topic among scholars and policy makers. However, detailed descriptions and comparisons of planning modes in different countries are still rare. Therefore, this paper first provides a simple analytical framework based on the elements of the planning goal, the planning process, the planning result and the evaluation criteria. Focusing on the hierarchic mode adopted in China, and the democratic participatory mode adopted in Germany, the governance practices used in MTIP planning are clearly shown. Furthermore, by using two airport cases, this paper compares the differences between China and Germany in the realms of preparation, review, coordination, final approval, and planning performance. The main conclusions are: (1) The analytical approach presented in this paper provides an appropriate standard for describing and comparing planning modes for MTIPs; (2) the planning modes in the two countries each have advantages and disadvantages, reflecting the trade-off between ex ante and ex post costs; (3) the comparison between China and Germany may be instructive for both of these countries and for other countries in terms of improving their planning performance in the future.

There are various explanations for the centralization of planning approval authority, but few studies focus on the explanation of selective centralization from a national governance perspective. To address this gap, this paper uses the concept of land risk to identify the reason why central government centralizes the planning approval authority of a prefectural-city in China. An econometric quantitative approach is adopted. The findings suggest that land risk from farmland protection is an important factor affecting centralization. Specifically, the probability of centralization increases by approximately 2% for each unit reduction in per capita farmland area, by 1.6% for every 1% increase in land transfer area and by 1% for each level increase in illegal land use. Furthermore, the cities with high land risk are mainly concentrated in four provinces along eastern coastal China. Additionally, the result is predicted with an overall accuracy of 93%, which proves the validity of the model.

The dual carbon goals (carbon peaking and carbon neutrality) exhibit a pronounced coupling relationship with territorial spatial governance, whose effective implementation hinges on interactions between central and local governments. However, few studies explored the central-local governance of territorial space under the dual carbon goals, to identify the game scenarios and equilibrium outcomes. To address this gap, this study, from the perspective of state governance, analyzes the behaviors of central and local governments and judges the logic of centralization and decentralization. By constructing evolutionary game models under various scenarios, it reveals the stable strategies of central and local governments in the "dual carbon" governance of territorial space and explores the sensitivity of key parameters. The results show that: (1) Delegating power from the central government to local governments can improve the efficiency of dual carbon governance of territorial space, but certain centralization is required to prevent potential risks of local out-of-control. (2) In the carbon-source space, strong central regulation coupled with passive local responses, and in the carbon-sink space, weak central regulation combined with active local implementation, together constitute the current stable strategies in the central-local government game. (3) Compared with the central government, local governments are more sensitive to key parameters. The potential benefits of the dual-carbon goals and spatial misallocation losses, as well as the changes in supervision level and risk coefficients, will affect the evolutionary trajectories of central and local governments. The current magnitude of land-indicator incentives is insufficient to alter local governments' passive responses, while variations in supervision level and risk coefficients suggest that excessive centralization by the central government may be counterproductive. This study helps to enhance the understanding of the governance logic for central and local governments to carry out the tasks related to the dual carbon goals in territorial spatial governance and provides a theoretical basis to formulate corresponding spatial policies.