The Mormon Church is best understood as a club, in the economics sense of the term. It succeeds, in part, because it identifies and selectively rewards high contributors, thereby limiting free-riding and producing large religious benefits for its members. First, it offers a menu of club goods of varying excludability, with the most valued goods excluded from less-committed members. Second, to enforce this menu, it actively monitors its members using a sophisticated administrative structure. The menu design reflects to an extent the costs of excludability of various religious goods, and the menu-monitoring approach implicitly allows some free-riding to dynamically foster commitment. Because the menu-monitoring approach is best understood as complementing other methods in achieving the Mormon Church's religious goals, these findings yield insights into the activities of other religious groups.
A discrete public good is provided when total contributions equal or exceed the contribution threshold. Recent theoretical work shows that an increase in threshold uncertainty will increase (decrease) equilibrium contributions when the public good value is sufficiently high (low). In an experiment designed to test these predictions, I find only limited verification of the prediction. Using elicited beliefs data to represent subjects’ beliefs, I find that behavior is not consistent with expected payoff maximization, however, contributions are increasing in subjects’ subjective pivotalness. Thus, wider threshold uncertainty will sometimes—but not always—hinder collective action.
Theory of Mind (ToM) ─ the ability to understand other’s thoughts, intentions, and emotions ─ is important for navigating interpersonal relationships, avoiding conflict, and empathizing. Prior research has identified many factors that affect one’s ToM ability, but little work has examined how different kinds of monetary incentives affect ToM ability. We ask: Does money affect ToM ability? If so, how does the effect depend on the structure of monetary incentives? How do the differences depend on gender? We hypothesize that money will affect ToM ability differently by gender: monetary rewards increase males’ motivation to express ToM ability while simultaneously crowding out females’ motivation. This prediction is confirmed in an experiment that varies the structure of monetary rewards for correct answers in the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET). RMET scores decrease for females and increase for males with individual payments, and this effect is stronger with competitively-structured payments. RMET scores do not significantly change when monetary earnings go to a charity. Whether money improves or hinders ToM ability, and, hence, success in social interactions, thus depends on the interaction of gender and monetary incentive structure.
The rational choice literature on religion has been noticeably silent on the nature and purpose of religious authority. I first summarize the rational choice theory of authority and offer a rational choice definition of religious authority. A primary insight is that (religious) authority exists to coordinate social action. I then argue that social coordination is a fundamental aspect of religious life, perhaps equally important as the social dilemma problems that have received attention in the literature. Finally, I apply this new rational theory to demonstrate its value. I demonstrate how rituals create religious authority; the relationship between religious authority, organizational hierarchy, and religious strictness; and how the theory creates complementarities between the two, sometimes contentious, sides of the secularization debate.
Governments fighting terrorists have many tactical options, yet these options often yield unintended and counterproductive consequences. This paper models a terrorist organization, a religious group from which the terrorists recruit suicide bombers, and the society in which the terrotists are imbedded. The model illuminates how the choice of counterterrorist tactics influences the incidence of attacks, paying particular attention to the direct and indirect (unintended) consequences of the government's actions. The ultimate goal of this work is to identify the best way to stop terrorist attacks.
9 April 2005 in European Journal of Political Economy