Lingling Jiang

Ms. Lingling Jiang


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

1Year (2026-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 February 2026 in Mathematics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
LDLiurui Deng
Liurui Deng
LJLingling Jiang
Lingling Jiang
SGshunli gan
shunli gan
Against the backdrop of carbon quota trading policies and Energy Performance Contracting (EPC), Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) engage in supply chain emission reduction via embedded low-carbon services. However, the impact mechanism of their financing mode selection on emission reduction efficiency and economic benefits has not been fully revealed, and there is a lack of support from a systematic theoretical and engineering design framework. Therefore, this study innovatively constructs a multi-agent Stackelberg game model with bank financing, green bond financing, and internal factoring financing. We incorporate the embedding degree, emission reduction cost coefficient, and financing mode selection into a unified analysis framework. The research findings are as follows: (1) There is a significant positive linear relationship between supply chain profit and the embedding degree. In contrast, the profit of ESCOs shows an inverted “U-shaped” change trend. Moreover, there is a sustainable cooperation threshold for each of the three financing modes. (2) Green bond financing can significantly increase the overall emission reduction rate of the industrial supply chain in high-embedding-degree scenarios. However, due to emission reduction investment cost pressure, ESCOs tend to choose bank financing. (3) The dynamic change of the emission reduction investment cost coefficient will trigger a reversal effect on the financing preferences of the supply chain and ESCOs. This study unveils the internal mechanism of multi-party decision-making in the low-carbon industrial supply chain and is supported by cross-country institutional evidence and comparative case-based analysis, providing a scientific basis and engineering design guidance for optimizing ESCO financing strategies, crafting incentive contracts, and enhancing government subsidy policies.

1 January 2026 in Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
LDLiurui Deng
Liurui Deng
SLShaodan Li
Shaodan Li
LJLingling Jiang
Lingling Jiang
Unlike ordinary small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 3D printing technology vendors rely on intangible technological assets and face R&D costs, uncertainty in patent valuation, and unstable cash flows from commercialization. To address the financing constraints faced by high-risk, asset-light SMEs in the 3D printing technology sector, we constructed a three-tier supply chain model consisting of a capital-constrained 3D printing technology vendor, a well-funded manufacturer, and a retailer. By embedding financing decisions into a supply chain coordination framework, we examine three financing mechanisms: intellectual property rights (IPR) pledges, internal debt, and internal equity. Our analysis reveals an inherent conflict of interest between the manufacturer (the primary fund provider) and the technology vendor (the capital demander). To mitigate this conflict, we proposed a hybrid financing structure that integrated the three mechanisms, resulting in four distinct financing modes. The results show that financing preferences are jointly affected by customization characteristics, customization cost, and financing structure. Hybrid financing can mitigate financing-preference conflicts between the technology vendor and the manufacturer by generating mutually acceptable financing regions, but its coordinating effect depends on the operating and financing environment. Monte Carlo robustness analysis further demonstrated that the feasible proportion of IPR pledges varied substantially across customization scenarios. Under low-customization conditions, a relatively higher IPR proportion remained feasible, whereas increasing customization complexity, cost pressure, and uncertainty reduced the acceptable IPR share and increased the importance of internal debt and equity financing. These findings indicated that IPR pledge financing should not be restricted by a universal threshold; instead, the appropriate proportion should be determined by technological characteristics and financing conditions.