Liam Xu

Dr. Liam Xu


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

2Years (2025-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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21 April 2025 in Electronics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SWSheng Wen
Sheng Wen
LXLiam Xu
Liam Xu
LTLiwei Tian
Liwei Tian
SLSuping Liu
Suping Liu
Ding YongDing Yong
Ding Yong
The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is crucial for safeguarding the ecosystem of embedded systems. It uses isolation to minimize the TCB (Trusted Computing Base) and protect sensitive software. It is vital because devices handle vast, potentially sensitive data. Leveraging ARM TrustZone, widely used in mobile and IoT for TEEs, it ensures hardware protection via security extensions, though needing firmware and software stack support. Despite the reputation of TEEs for high security, TrustZone-aided ones have vulnerabilities. Fuzzing, as a practical bug-finding technique, has seen limited research in the context of TEE. The unique software architecture of TrustZone-assisted TEE complicates the direct application of traditional fuzzing methods. Moreover, simplistic approaches, such as feeding random input values into TEE through the API functions of the rich operating system, fail to uncover deeper, latent bugs within the TEE code. In this paper, we present a fuzzing strategy for TrustZone-assisted TEE that utilizes inferred dependencies between Trusted Kernel system calls to uncover deep-seated TEE bugs. We implemented our approach on OP-TEE, where it successfully identified 17 crashes, including one previously undetected kernel bug.



4 May 2026 in Entropy
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JWJin Wei
Jin Wei
XWXinyuan Wang
Xinyuan Wang
LXLiam Xu
Liam Xu
YLYunfei Li
Yunfei Li
Multimodal models such as CLIP and ALBEF essentially maximize cross-modal mutual information to align heterogeneous modalities, utilizing semantic consistency as an implicit prior. However, this alignment mechanism creates a structural vulnerability: the models rely heavily on invariant information coupling. In this work, we investigate this vulnerability and propose a symmetry-driven adversarial attack framework. Unlike standard methods that inject high-entropy unstructured noise, our approach designs collaborative perturbations by modeling semantic-consistent mappings between geometric image transformations and syntactic text variations. By explicitly exploiting the information redundancy inherent in cross-modal symmetries, our method effectively reduces the entropy of the adversarial search space. This reveals a fundamental trade-off between information invariance and robustness, achieving state-of-the-art attack success rates with imperceptible perturbations.