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In this article, we study the impact of teamwork on an organization’s performance, considering a cooperative game’s framework. To promote teamwork culture, performance indexes were considered both individually and collectively, and by comparing the scores that every employee earned individually and collectively, their differences became obvious. In this approach, a cooperative game’s model was used in order to improve the organization’s performance. The proposed model, in addition to evaluating the organization and employee’s activities, implemented all payments, including overtime pay, rewards, etc., fairly and along with increasing performance and satisfaction. The cooperative approach created effective communications between employees and authorities and enhanced their motivation for teamwork. Moreover, results could be used for decisions related to employees (such as promotion, transition, firing, and secondment), analysis of training requirements, employees’ development, and research and plan valuation. Our findings show that the collaborative coefficient (CC) is a key factor in increasing productivity and improving the efficiency of an organization in the long run. The collaborative coefficient is a new concept in teamwork that has rarely been considered in scientific research.
Gholamreza Askari; Nader Asghri; Madjid Eshaghi Gordji; Heshmatolah Asgari; José António Filipe; Adel Azar. The Impact of Teamwork on an Organization’s Performance: A Cooperative Game’s Approach. Mathematics 2020, 8, 1804 .
AMA StyleGholamreza Askari, Nader Asghri, Madjid Eshaghi Gordji, Heshmatolah Asgari, José António Filipe, Adel Azar. The Impact of Teamwork on an Organization’s Performance: A Cooperative Game’s Approach. Mathematics. 2020; 8 (10):1804.
Chicago/Turabian StyleGholamreza Askari; Nader Asghri; Madjid Eshaghi Gordji; Heshmatolah Asgari; José António Filipe; Adel Azar. 2020. "The Impact of Teamwork on an Organization’s Performance: A Cooperative Game’s Approach." Mathematics 8, no. 10: 1804.
In this paper, we provide an interpretation of the rationality in game theory in which player consider the profit or loss of the opponent in addition to personal profit at the game. The goal of a game analysis with two hyper-rationality players is to provide insight into real-world situations that are often more complex than a game with two rational players where the choices of strategy are only based on individual preferences. The hyper-rationality does not mean perfect rationality but an insight toward how human decision-makers behave in interactive decisions. The findings of this research can help to enlarge our understanding of the psychological aspects of strategy choices in games and also provide an analysis of the decision-making process with cognitive economics approach at the same time.
Gholamreza Askari; Madjid Eshaghi Gordji. Decision Making: Rational Choice or Hyper-Rational Choice. Statistics, Optimization & Information Computing 2020, 8, 583 -589.
AMA StyleGholamreza Askari, Madjid Eshaghi Gordji. Decision Making: Rational Choice or Hyper-Rational Choice. Statistics, Optimization & Information Computing. 2020; 8 (2):583-589.
Chicago/Turabian StyleGholamreza Askari; Madjid Eshaghi Gordji. 2020. "Decision Making: Rational Choice or Hyper-Rational Choice." Statistics, Optimization & Information Computing 8, no. 2: 583-589.
The rational choice theory is based on this idea that people rationally pursue goals for increasing their personal interests. Here, we present a new concept of rational choice as a hyper-rational choice in which the actor thinks about profit or loss of other actors in addition to his personal profit or loss and then will choose an action that is desirable to him. We implement the hyper-rational choice to generalize and expand the game theory. Results of this study will help to model the behavior of people considering environmental conditions, the type of behavioral interaction, valuation system of itself and others, and system of beliefs and internal values of societies. Hyper-rationality helps us understand how human decision-makers behave in interactive decisions.
Gholamreza Askari; Madjid Eshaghi Gordji; Choonkil Park. The behavioral model and game theory. Palgrave Communications 2019, 5, 57 .
AMA StyleGholamreza Askari, Madjid Eshaghi Gordji, Choonkil Park. The behavioral model and game theory. Palgrave Communications. 2019; 5 (1):57.
Chicago/Turabian StyleGholamreza Askari; Madjid Eshaghi Gordji; Choonkil Park. 2019. "The behavioral model and game theory." Palgrave Communications 5, no. 1: 57.
By studying game theory, we find that the Nash equilibrium does not exist in some games or, if there is in one, does not describe a real event. Here we show that the matching pennies game with pure strategy has the solution, but this solution is a game that happens simultaneously with this game. Using this solution, we will answer the Brookings Institution's question of boycotting the elections whether the opposition's boycott of elections is, in different circumstances, a defeated strategy. A strategy that its result in most cases is a failure or political suicide and the least possible consequence by the opposition. The findings of this article show that in general, it can be concluded that the election boycott strategy is a dominated strategy, and most of the opposition groups that have used it have failed and they donated the playground to the ruling group.
Madjid Eshaghi Gordji; Gholamreza Askari; Hamed Abdi. Why Is a Boycott of the Elections a Bad Idea? 2018, 1 .
AMA StyleMadjid Eshaghi Gordji, Gholamreza Askari, Hamed Abdi. Why Is a Boycott of the Elections a Bad Idea? . 2018; ():1.
Chicago/Turabian StyleMadjid Eshaghi Gordji; Gholamreza Askari; Hamed Abdi. 2018. "Why Is a Boycott of the Elections a Bad Idea?" , no. : 1.
A. Bahraini; G. Askari; M. Eshaghi Gordji; R. Gholami. Correction to: Stability and hyperstability of orthogonally $$*$$∗-m-homomorphisms in orthogonally Lie $$C^*$$C∗-algebras: a fixed point approach. Journal of Fixed Point Theory and Applications 2018, 20, 118 .
AMA StyleA. Bahraini, G. Askari, M. Eshaghi Gordji, R. Gholami. Correction to: Stability and hyperstability of orthogonally $$*$$∗-m-homomorphisms in orthogonally Lie $$C^*$$C∗-algebras: a fixed point approach. Journal of Fixed Point Theory and Applications. 2018; 20 (3):118.
Chicago/Turabian StyleA. Bahraini; G. Askari; M. Eshaghi Gordji; R. Gholami. 2018. "Correction to: Stability and hyperstability of orthogonally $$*$$∗-m-homomorphisms in orthogonally Lie $$C^*$$C∗-algebras: a fixed point approach." Journal of Fixed Point Theory and Applications 20, no. 3: 118.
Recently Eshaghi et al. introduced orthogonal sets and proved the real generalization of the Banach fixed point theorem on these sets. In this paper, we prove the real generalization of Diaz–Margolis fixed point theorem on orthogonal sets. By using this fixed point theorem, we study the stability of orthogonally \(*\)-m-homomorphisms on Lie \(C^*\)-algebras associated with the following functional equation: $$\begin{aligned} \begin{aligned}&f(2x+y)+f(2x-y)+(m-1)(m-2)(m-3)f(y)\\&\quad =2^{m-2}[f(x+y)+f(x-y)+6f(x)]. \end{aligned} \end{aligned}$$for each \(m=1,2,3,4.\). Moreover, we establish the hyperstability of these functional equations by suitable control functions.
A. Bahraini; G. Askari; M. Eshaghi Gordji; R. Gholami. Stability and hyperstability of orthogonally $$*$$ ∗ -m-homomorphisms in orthogonally Lie $$C^*$$ C ∗ -algebras: a fixed point approach. Journal of Fixed Point Theory and Applications 2018, 20, 89 .
AMA StyleA. Bahraini, G. Askari, M. Eshaghi Gordji, R. Gholami. Stability and hyperstability of orthogonally $$*$$ ∗ -m-homomorphisms in orthogonally Lie $$C^*$$ C ∗ -algebras: a fixed point approach. Journal of Fixed Point Theory and Applications. 2018; 20 (2):89.
Chicago/Turabian StyleA. Bahraini; G. Askari; M. Eshaghi Gordji; R. Gholami. 2018. "Stability and hyperstability of orthogonally $$*$$ ∗ -m-homomorphisms in orthogonally Lie $$C^*$$ C ∗ -algebras: a fixed point approach." Journal of Fixed Point Theory and Applications 20, no. 2: 89.