Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of the ownership structure and board governance on dividend policy in emerging markets. The authors test whether the effects of corporate governance on dividend policy change during crisis periods. Design/methodology/approach: The authors use a panel regression approach on a sample of 362 non-financial listed firms from East Asian and Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Findings: The results provide evidence that dividend payout decision increases with institutional ownership and board activity. The authors find that in emerging countries, dividend policy of firms with CEO duality and without CEO duality does not depend on the same set of factors. It is shown that the ownership concentration and board independency affect significantly the dividend policy of firms with COE duality. Finally, the results show that during the recent financial crisis, dividend decision is inversely related to CEO duality, board size and the frequency of board meetings. Research limitations/implications: Other variables of corporate governance and ownership structure can be studied more in depth. The results can be directly compared to an alternative sample of developed countries. Practical implications: This study is of particular interest for managers and shareholders when adjusting their strategies of dividend payout during financial crisis. Originality/value: The authors employ a specific approach to investigate the impact of CEO duality on dividend policy in East Asian countries. An important aspect of the results is that that for firms with CEO who is also the chairperson, the dividend decision is negatively related to ownership concentration and board independence. This research contributes to the understanding of dividend policy by testing whether the impact of corporate governance on dividend policy changes during crisis periods in emerging countries. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this work is the first to directly address this issue from this perspective.

Purpose: This paper aims to examine risk-taking in Islamic banks by exploring moral hazard and owner/manager agency problems simultaneously. Design/methodology/approach: The authors propose to estimate a model of bank risk-taking that includes both franchise value and ownership structure as explanatory factors of bank risk. Findings: The results show that franchise value is an important determinant of Islamic bank risk-taking. Banks with high franchise values are less likely to take risks than banks with low franchise value. In contrast, outside block holders have, at best, limited influences on bank risk-taking. Originality/value: This paper conducts the first empirical examination of the relationship between managerial risk preferences and Islamic banks ownership. The authors examine simultaneously the effect of franchise value and owner/manager problem on Islamic bank risk taking behavior. They consider separately the impact on total risk, systematic risk and bank specific risk.