Erika Thea Hernandez Ajes

Ms. Erika Thea Hernandez Ajes

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

2Years (2025-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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Journal Article
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Mahmoud H. QutqutMahmoud H. Qutqut
Mahmoud H. Qutqut
Ali AhmedAli Ahmed
Ali Ahmed
MTMustafa Kamal Taqi
Mustafa Kamal Taqi
JAJordan Abimanyu
Jordan Abimanyu
EAErika Thea Hernandez Ajes
Erika Thea Hernandez Ajes
FAFatima mustafa Alhaj
Fatima mustafa Alhaj
Data exfiltration poses a major cybersecurity challenge because it involves the unauthorized transfer of sensitive information. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are vital security controls in identifying such attacks; however, their effectiveness in cloud computing environments remains limited, particularly against covert channels such as Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) and Domain Name System (DNS) tunneling. This study compares two widely used IDSs, Snort and Suricata, in a controlled cloud computing environment. The assessment focuses on their ability to detect data exfiltration techniques implemented via ICMP and DNS tunneling, using DNSCat2 and Iodine. We evaluate detection performance using standard classification metrics, including Recall, Precision, Accuracy, and F1-Score. Our experiments were conducted on Amazon Web Services (AWS) Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) instances, where IDS instances monitored simulated exfiltration traffic generated by DNSCat2, Iodine, and Metasploit. Network traffic was mirrored via AWS Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) Traffic Mirroring, with the ELK Stack integrated for centralized logging and visual analysis. The findings indicate that Suricata outperformed Snort in detecting DNS-based exfiltration, underscoring the advantages of multi-threaded architectures for managing high-volume cloud traffic. For DNS tunneling, Suricata achieved 100% detection (recall) for both DNSCat2 and Iodine, whereas Snort achieved 85.7% and 66.7%, respectively. Neither IDS detected ICMP tunneling using Metasploit, with both recording 0% recall. It is worth noting that both IDSs failed to detect ICMP tunneling under default configurations, highlighting the limitations of signature-based detection in isolation. These results emphasize the need to combine signature-based and behavior-based analytics, supported by centralized logging frameworks, to strengthen cloud-based intrusion detection and enhance forensic visibility.

25 August 2025 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
EAErika Thea Hernandez Ajes
Erika Thea Hernandez Ajes
MRMahdi Rabbani
Mahdi Rabbani
ZAZeynab Anbiaee
Zeynab Anbiaee
RLRongxing Lu
Rongxing Lu
MMMansur Mirani
Mansur Mirani
Sajjad DadkhahSajjad Dadkhah
Sajjad Dadkhah
Generative reasoning models introduce a new paradigm in cybersecurity, enabling not only novel defenses but also sophisticated attack simulations. This article investigates the use of open-source reasoning models to simulate credential tweaking behavior and enhance password-based authentication security in Internet of Things (IoT) environments. We propose hybrid similarity scoring (HSS) and its user-contextualized variant HSSuser, a lightweight, client-side similarity metric combining structural (Damerau–Levenshtein) and character-distribution (cosine similarity) components to detect password reuse and subtle modifications or tweaks in real time. Following NIST guidelines, we analyzed over 4 billion password pairs from breached datasets and used five prompt designs in various reasoning models, such as DeepSeek-R1, Qwen-QwQ, Phi4-Reasoning, Qwen3, and Magistral series to generate password variants mimicking attacker strategies. Experimental results show that reasoning models can produce highly similar modifications resembling real-world password reuse patterns, while prompt reframing significantly reduces risky outputs. HSS effectively quantifies these behaviors and is suitable for deployment in constrained IoT devices, offering an intent-aware, proactive layer of client-side defense against AI-enhanced credential attacks.