The purpose of this article is to propose a reinterpretation of the traditional flypaper effect according to which central government transfers to local governments increase public spending by more than do increases in private income. Here, higher transfers from the federal government might induce less efficiency in local tax collection opposed to the income effect. Initially, we build a model in order to point out the possible existence of that flypaper effect in a context of standard maximization on the part of local governments. Next, we construct efficiency scores for Brazilian municipalities using Free Disposable Hull (FDH), taking into consideration two outputs: amount of per capita local tax collected -tax revenue- and the size of local informal economy - tax base. Last, using two stages least squares and Tobit regressions, which the instruments is built upon the rules established in the 1988 Brazilian Constitution and where we find that unconditional transfer funds to municipalities, we estimate that transfers have the opposite effect (negative) of consumer's income on efficiency of taxation, which leads us to a reinterpretation of the flypaper effect.
The purpose of this article is to examine the causality between government size and corruption, and to verify if there is a different pattern of causality between developed Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (excluding Mexico) and developing countries (Latin American countries) during the period 1996 to 2003. Applying Granger and Huang's ( 1997 Granger, C. W. J. and Huang, L. Evaluation of panel data models: some suggestions from time series. Economics Working Paper Series 97-10. 1997. Department of Economics, University of Califórnia San Diego [Google Scholar] ) methodology we find evidence that size of government Granger causes corruption in both samples. Since a larger government involvement in private markets today will be followed in future by a higher level of corruption a policy advice would be to enhance governance. The promotion of good governance helps to combat corruption given that it complements efforts to reduce corruption more directly, and it is strongly recommended by the International Monetary Fund, other multilateral institutions, and all worried with the negative impacts of corruption on economic activity.
O objetivo deste artigo é avaliar o desempenho e a eficiência relativa dos Estados brasileiros no que diz respeito aos gastos que fazem em educação nos níveis fundamental e médio. A fim de estabelecer comparações de eficiência na provisão de educação entre os Estados constroem-se inicialmente alguns indicadores de desempenho a partir de variáveis quantitativas e qualitativas. Esses indicadores são, então, utilizados como produto para captar as diferenças estaduais nos níveis de eficiência. Os resultados obtidos indicam que Estados com melhor desempenho não necessariamente são os mais eficientes. Além disso, para a grande maioria dos Estados existe um amplo espaço para melhorar eficiência se esforços forem colocados no uso das melhores práticas de gestão dos recursos.
1 January 2020 in Journal of Environmental Management