This article considers claims now being made about ‘the adolescent brain’. It points out why some of those claims are problematic for methodological, social and philosophical reasons. Attention is given to how some ‘youth experts’ and others have used this research by relying on and reinforcing prejudicial stereotypes about young people as intrinsically problematic. Questions are asked about history and what that teaches us about such claims and what the implications are of uncritically accepting this latest ‘discovery’ in terms of rights and responsibilities. One response of those wedded to the adolescent brain model is to increase the age at which young people can engage in a number of activities. I argue that if we deny young people responsibility and opportunities to build a repertoire of experiences and to learn how events connect to emotions, then we are denying them the chance to develop their capacity for good judgment. The response proposed in this article rests on a different proposition that some young people are sometimes at risk not because their brains are different, but because they have not had the experience or opportunity to develop the skills and judgment that engagement in those activities and experiences supply.
This article assesses Guy Standing's (2011) account of ‘the precariat’ as a ‘new class' to the many exercises undertaken in youth studies since the 1980s to make sense of the changing patterns of youth employment. While Standing's focus on the experience of fragmented and casualized work in many economies which now implicates young people has value, there are significant problems with his account that highlights the some difficulties in thinking in somewhat abstracted ways about ‘structural’ change processes that do not sufficiently consider the question of time. The case of Australia's of labour market regulation since the 1890s is used to test the validity of Standing's focus on the novelty of neoliberalism after the early 1980 to explain the emergence of precarious employment. Standing's claim that insecurity is central to the ‘new precariat’ because they lack the different kinds of security enjoyed by the ‘working-class’ after 1945, highlights the need for an interpretative framework attentive to the longer term role of state policy and the interplay of historical and local processes. The case is then made for developing a historical sociology that engages with what is now happening in respect to young people and their employment security.
Set against a backdrop of austerity and neoliberal policies affecting many young people adversely, the Nuit Debout protest movement in France began in March 2016 when people gathered in public spaces to oppose the Socialist government’s plan to introduce neoliberal labour legislation. Like other post-2008 movements, Nuit Debout was leaderless, non-hierarchical, and relied on social media for political communication and to mobilise participants. The Nuit Debout was also a movement inspired by powerful moral-political emotions such as righteous anger and hope. In this article, the authors address two questions. First, what features of Nuit Debout distinguished it from earlier social movements in France? Second, what role did moral emotions play in mobilising people to act as they did? Drawing on interviews with young protestors and their own testimonies, we argue that Nuit Debout was a distinctive form of protest for France. One distinguishing feature was the way young people—the “precarious generation”—were motivated by a strong sense of situated injustice, much of which related to what they saw as the unfairness of austerity policies, being deprived of a decent future and the feeling they had been betrayed by governments.
Against a backdrop of lively discussion about the best ways to do youth studies, or sociology of youth, this article asks: Can Pierre Bourdieu’s work be translated into youth studies in ways that benefit the field? We begin by considering Bourdieu’s thoughts on the category of ‘youth’ using a new translation of this text, and then turn to an important discussion by Furlong, Woodman, and Wyn about certain long standing tensions in youth studies. These tensions are between writers engaging in the ‘structure versus agency’ debate that is mapped onto the ‘culture versus transitions’ binary. We consider the case for adopting a ‘middle-ground’ represented by Bourdieu’s writings. We argue that many in youth studies work from an unacknowledged substantialist tradition, which is contra to Bourdieu's relational perspective. The result includes misunderstandings of Bourdieu's thinking and expectations of his work, for example, that it can pass certain empirical tests. We argue that if Bourdieu's relational perspective is to be translated into youth studies, we will need a more determined effort to understand that perspective first.
24 January 2014 in International Journal of Adolescence and Youth
European Union youth policy since the 1990s has been ostensibly committed to enhancing the social participation of young people. This study explores the reliance of the 2009 European Union (EU) Youth Strategy on a combination of OECD ‘active society’ and human capital theory which seeks to increase educational participation rates in Europe with the goal of creating more and better opportunities for young people and to promote active citizenship, social inclusion and solidarity. The authors adopt a ‘southern theory’ perspective to open up a range of problems with the EU Youth Strategy which begins to indicate why, contrary to expectations, this policy has failed to ameliorate the increasing levels of youth unemployment, underemployment and child and youth poverty. The study concludes that the EU Youth Strategy has consolidated ‘a relation of cruel optimism’ when what is desired, in this case more education, has become an obstacle to human flourishing.
What ethical framework provides the best guide for contemporary youth work is the central question in this article. An account is provided of why the two dominant ethical frameworks, namely, utilitarianism and deontic ethics, are not appropriate. It is argued that virtue ethics is most relevant because it specifies the nature of social goods, and provides a relevant framework of thinking about good practice. Six key reasons are identified for why virtue ethics provides the most suitable ethical framework. They include its account of virtues expressed in our character, its focus on education to build character as a source of social transformation, its emphasis on our agential capacity to make choices, its interest in our capacity to think critically and act ethically, the connections it makes between the practice of virtues and social goods that define a good life individually or collectively, and its capacity to inform good professional judgement and good practice. What all this means for youth work is considered through a discussion about good judgement and practice – or to use the virtue ethics vocabulary, ‘phronesis’. What that means in terms of the requisite skills, knowledge and dispositions is spelt out in relation to youth work practice.