MICHAEL YAMSI TCHUINDJANG

Mr. MICHAEL YAMSI TCHUINDJANG

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

1Year (2026-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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22 January 2026 in Algorithms
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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MAMohammed Almasabi
Mohammed Almasabi
MTMICHAEL YAMSI TCHUINDJANG
MICHAEL YAMSI TCHUINDJANG
Sarfraz BrohiSarfraz Brohi
Sarfraz Brohi
Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks (IPIAs), where malicious instructions are embedded within external content rather than direct user input. This study presents an embedding-based detection approach that analyses the semantic relationship between user intent and external content, enabling the early identification of IPIAs that conventional defences overlook. We also provide a dataset of 70,000 samples, constructed using 35,000 malicious instances from the Benchmark for Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks (BIPIA) and 35,000 benign instances generated using ChatGPT-4o-mini. Furthermore, we performed a comparative analysis of three embedding models, namely OpenAI text-embedding-3-small, GTE-large, and MiniLM-L6-v2, evaluated in combination with XGBoost, LightGBM, and Random Forest classifiers. The best-performing configuration using OpenAI embeddings with XGBoost achieved an accuracy of 97.7% and an F1-score of 0.977, matching or exceeding the performance of existing IPIA detection methods while offering practical deployment advantages. Unlike prevention-focused approaches that require modifications to the underlying LLM architecture, the proposed method operates as a model-agnostic external detection layer with an average inference time of 0.001 ms per sample. This detection-based approach complements existing prevention mechanisms by providing a lightweight, scalable solution that can be integrated into LLM pipelines without requiring architectural changes.

14 February 2026 in Future Internet
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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CMChris Mayo
Chris Mayo
MTMICHAEL YAMSI TCHUINDJANG
MICHAEL YAMSI TCHUINDJANG
Sarfraz BrohiSarfraz Brohi
Sarfraz Brohi
Nikolaos ErsotelosNikolaos Ersotelos
Nikolaos Ersotelos
Phishing remains one of the most pervasive social engineering threats, exploiting human vulnerabilities and continuously evolving to bypass static detection mechanisms. Existing machine learning models achieve high accuracy but often act as opaque systems that lack robustness to evolving tactics and explainability, limiting trust and real-world deployment. In this research, we propose a dynamic Explainable AI (XAI) approach for phishing detection that integrates temporally aware feature extraction with dual interpretability through LIME and SHAP applied to the resulting window-level features. The novelty of this research lies in a temporally dynamic feature framework that simulates a plausible email reading progression using a heuristic temporal model and employs a sliding window aggregation method to capture behavioural and temporal patterns within email content. Using an aggregated dataset of 82,500 phishing and legitimate emails, dynamic features were extracted and used to train four classifiers: Random Forest, XGBoost, Multi-Layer Perceptron, and Logistic Regression. Ensemble models demonstrated strong performance with XGBoost achieving 94% accuracy and Random Forest 93%. This research addresses an important gap by combining dynamically constructed temporal features with transparent explanations, achieving high detection performance while preserving interpretability. These findings demonstrate that dynamic temporal modelling with explainable learning can enhance the trustworthiness and practicality of phishing detection systems, highlighting that temporally structured features and explainable learning can enhance the trustworthiness and practical deployability of phishing detection systems without incurring excessive computational overhead.

19 August 2026 in Cybersecurity
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Journal Article
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MTMICHAEL YAMSI TCHUINDJANG
MICHAEL YAMSI TCHUINDJANG
NDNathan Duran
Nathan Duran
Phil LeggPhil Legg
Phil Legg
FMFaiza Medjek
Faiza Medjek
Existing multi-turn jailbreak evaluation methods increasingly rely on large language models (LLMs) as automated judges to reduce the cost and scalability limitations of human assessment. However, recent studies show that LLM-based evaluators can diverge from human judgments under adversarial strategies involving subtle linguistic and semantic variations, raising reliability concerns in safety-critical domains such as cybersecurity. To address this challenge, we propose Refusal Manifold Guard (RefusalGuard-M), an open-source semantic evaluation framework that constructs a semantic refusal manifold from human-validated refusal responses for assessing LLM jailbreak interactions, including multi-turn scenarios. RefusalGuard-M uses embedding-based geometric representations to measure deviations from refusal behavior, providing a lightweight, interpretable, and reproducible alternative to LLM-based judging. We evaluate the framework across AdvBench, HarmBench, and CyMulTenSet, covering diverse jailbreak strategies, linguistic transformations, and multi-turn scenarios. Results show that RefusalGuard-M achieves strong agreement with human annotations and comparable recall performance to GPT-based evaluators while adopting a conservative evaluation strategy that prioritizes the detection of harmful outputs. On CyMulTenSet, which evaluates past-tense reformulated multi-turn jailbreaks, RefusalGuard-M achieves up to 0.87 recall, compared with 0.86 for GPT-5 and 0.81 for GPT-4, and reduces inference overhead by up to 3.7 $$\times$$ × relative to embedding-based baselines. These findings demonstrate that semantic refusal representations provide an efficient and scalable approach for jailbreak evaluation, particularly in cybersecurity settings where minimizing missed harmful outputs is critical.