This paper studies a coordination game between a continuum of players with heterogeneous tastes who perceive peer pressure when behaving differently from each other. It characterizes the conditions under which a social norm—a mode of behavior followed by many—exists in equilibrium and the patterns of norm compliance. The emergent norm may be biased compared to the average taste in society, yet endogenously upheld by the population. Strikingly, a biased norm will, under some circumstances, be more sustainable than a non-biased norm, which may explain the bias of various social and religious norms. (JEL D11, Z12, Z13)
Migration may cause, not only a brain drain, but also a ‘civicness’ drain, leading to a poverty trap. Using migration choices of southern Italian high-school students classified as civic if not cheating in a modified die-roll experiment, we uncover a key role of local civicness (average civicness in the class): a civicness drain is observed only at high and low local civicness. We rationalise this pattern with a model in which civic and uncivic types balance hope versus fear of migration outcomes, taking into account economic gains, risk preferences and their beliefs about being considered civic in the place of destination.