Jan Pieter Krahnen

Prof. Dr. Jan Pieter Krahnen


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 July 2023 in Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung
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Journal Article
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FHFlorian Heider
Florian Heider
JKJan Pieter Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen
LPLoriana Pelizzon
Loriana Pelizzon
JSJonas Schlegel
Jonas Schlegel
TTTobias H. Tröger
Tobias H. Tröger
Zusammenfassung: Wir fordern eine Absicherung aller Sichteinlagen. Jederzeit kündbare, aber ungesicherte Depositen sind der Hauptgrund für Bankenruns. Deren Geschwindigkeit und Ansteckungsrisiken sind durch Digitalisierung und soziale Medien stark gestiegen. Wir argumentieren, dass Bankenruns, die traditionell als Instrument der Risikobegrenzung gesehen werden, diese Aufgabe aufgrund der impliziten Staatsgarantie bei potenziell systemischen Risiken heute nicht mehr leisten können. Stattdessen wurde in Europa eine eigene Klasse von Schuldinstrumenten geschaffen, sogenannte Bail-in Anleihen, die in einem geregelten Rahmen Marktdisziplin sicherstellen sollen. Für die Moral Hazard Begrenzung bieten MREL und Kosten der Einlagensicherung Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten. Wir erläutern unseren Vorschlag und gehen auf zahlreiche Gegenargumente ein, die in der öffentlichen Diskussion vorgebracht wurden.

12 January 2026 in Preprints.org
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GFGuenter Franke
Guenter Franke
JKJan Pieter Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen
This paper looks at an emergency lending scheme offered by Germany’s national development bank (NDB) KfW during the Covid crisis. We analyze the design of the KfW scheme and identify obstacles to efficient contracting in these two-tier lending relationships, involving the NDB, the participating commercial banks, and the ultimate firm borrowers. Theoretical arguments and empirical evidence help to understand the main risks of subsidized public lending schemes. We propose a smart set of public lending contracts which induces banks to refrain from applying for public support if firms don’t need the funds because they re financially strong, or if they don’t deserve the funds because they are zombie firms. In the lending scheme, a firm chooses the contract which maximizes the subsidy, reveals its rating, and obtains public funds according to its crisis-induced needs thereby mitigating information asymmetries. In order to ensure incentive alignment, banks retain a share on borrower default risk. This co-insurance component should increase with crisis duration in order to contain moral hazard, i.e. zombification risk.

Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
GFGuenter Franke
Guenter Franke
JKJan Pieter Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen
This paper aims to present proposals for improving public lending design in an economic crisis. It combines casual empirical observations, institutional analysis and normative theoretical modeling. We obtain casual evidence from the analysis of the emergency lending scheme offered by Germany’s national development bank (NDB) KfW during the COVID-19 crisis. We identify obstacles to efficient contracting in these two-tier lending relationships, involving the NDB, the participating commercial banks, and the ultimate firm borrowers. Theoretical arguments and empirical evidence based on this case study help to understand major incentive risks of subsidized public lending schemes. To counter these risks, we propose a smart set of public lending contracts which induces banks to refrain from applying for public support for financially strong firms and for non-viable zombie firms. For firms which need financial support, we propose a set of public contracts from which the firm chooses the contract which maximizes its subsidy, reveals its rating, and obtains public funds according to its crisis-induced needs. This partially revealing signaling equilibrium implies higher interest rates for firms with a need for more public funding, thereby mitigating information asymmetries. In order to ensure incentive alignment, banks should retain a share of borrower default risk.